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iABSTRACT
Hardware/Software (HW/SW) interfaces are pervasive in computer systems. How-
ever, many HW/SW interface implementations are unreliable due to their intrinsi-
cally complicated nature. In industrial settings, there are three major challenges to
improving reliability. First, as there is no systematic framework for HW/SW inter-
face specifications, interface protocols cannot be precisely conveyed to engineers.
Second, as there is no unifying formal model for representing the implementation
semantics of HW/SW interfaces accurately, some critical properties cannot be for-
mally verified on HW/SW interface implementations. Finally, few automatic tools
exist to help engineers in HW/SW interface development.
In this dissertation, we present an automata-theoretic approach to HW/SW co-
verification that addresses these challenges. We designed a co-specification frame-
work to formally specify HW/SW interface protocols; we synthesized a hybrid
Bu¨chi Automaton Pushdown System, namely Bu¨chi Pushdown System (BPDS), as
the unifying formal model for HW/SW interfaces; and we created a co-verification
tool, CoVer that implements our model checking algorithms and realizes our re-
duction algorithms for BPDS.
The application of our approach to the Windows device/driver framework has
resulted in the detection of fifteen specification issues. Furthermore, utilizing
CoVer, we discovered twelve real bugs in five drivers. These non-trivial findings
have demonstrated the significance of our approach in industrial applications.
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.1.1 Motivation
Computer systems such as Personal Computers (PCs) and embedded systems are
pervasive. Our everyday life depends on these systems, e.g., accessing data from a
local disk or via the Internet using our personal computers and driving to work in
our cars equipped with tens and even hundreds of embedded processors. Such de-
pendencies demand high-confidence in these systems. We would be greatly annoyed
by blue screens from Microsoft Windows while working on important documents
and endangered by malfunctions of the embedded controllers in our cars’ braking
systems. Many such failures come from HW/SW (Hardware/Software) interface
problems that are often hard to test and to debug. High-confidence is traditionally
achieved by extensive testing which is becoming cost-prohibiting and, therefore,
increasingly supplemented by formal verification such as model checking [21, 74].
HW/SW interfaces are pervasive in modern computer systems. For example,
device drivers [19] that operate hardware, constitute about 70% of Linux kernel
code (version 2.4.1) and for Windows XP there are over 35,000 device drivers with
over 100,000 versions available for various hardware devices [65]. Because drivers
usually work in the kernel mode of Operating Systems (OSs), their failures can
have severe consequences. Kernel mode drivers cause 85% of reported failures in
2Windows XP [83] and there are seven times more failures in drivers than in the
rest of the Linux kernel [19]. There have been many efforts [4, 14] to formally
verify software properties on drivers without considering the behaviors of hard-
ware devices. A successful example is Microsoft’s Static Driver Verifier (SDV) [4],
which is a tool for Windows driver verification based on the SLAM model check-
ing engine [9]. Nevertheless, one of the fundamental reasons for computer system
failures has been overlooked for years. According to Microsoft’s Online Crash Anal-
ysis (OCA) [81], at least 52.6% of Windows crashes are related to the interactions
between device drivers (software) and their devices (hardware)1, not to mention
those failures that cannot be gathered, e.g., a USB (Universal Serial Bus) mouse
cannot be detected after a PC system awakes from sleep. These kinds of system
failures are commonly related to HW/SW interface interactions.
1.1.2 Problem Statement
Our thesis is that co-verification of HW/SW interface protocols can be effectively
achieved via formal specification and model checking. There are three major chal-
lenges:
• Lack of effective formal specification framework. Hardware and software are
often manufactured separately because their construction requires highly dif-
ferent expertise. Therefore, specifications are necessary to describe HW/SW
interface protocols. Such specifications should be self-explanatory and free of
ambiguities, since any specification mistake may be encoded in implementa-
tions and cause serious failures. In industrial settings, English is commonly
used to specify HW/SW interface protocols. The misinterpretations and
implementation deviations due to ambiguous or inaccurate English specifi-
cations have been a long-outstanding hazard to system reliability.
1Not all drivers interact with devices. For example, an antivirus driver intercepts and analyzes
I/O between other drivers and devices.
3• Lack of a unifying formal model for HW/SW interfaces. Hardware and soft-
ware have different implementation semantics and different formal represen-
tations. Hardware designs are finite state and often modeled as some kind
of finite state machines such as ω-automata or Bu¨chi automata (BA) [43].
Software designs are infinite state and often modeled as some kind of Push-
down Systems (PDSs) [77]. However, for HW/SW interfaces, it is not desired
to model both hardware and software as either pushdown systems or finite
state machines (see Section 1.3).
• Lack of verification tool support. It is highly desired that both the design
and implementation of HW/SW interfaces are supported by automatic ver-
ification tools, so that critical properties can be analyzed in a faithful and
systematic manner. There are few tools existing for such a purpose and many
lack practical performance. Among the various challenges to co-verification
tool development, the key is how to efficiently exploit the nature of HW/SW
interactions in co-verification, so that the tools can scale up to a practical
level of complexity.
Other than these major challenges, there is also a lack of understanding about
HW/SW interface failures. Although hardware and software engineers are well
aware of the intrinsic complications of HW/SW interface implementations, all have
experienced significant difficulties in pinpointing the root causes of relevant failures.
One major reason is that hardware implementations are usually unaccessible to
software engineers, and vice versa. Therefore, it is impossible for software engineers
to look into the states of a hardware device when the driver fails together with
the device during runtime testing; and, at the same time, it also is hard for those
hardware engineers of the device to look into the driver’s state.
41.1.3 The Device/Driver Scenario
In computer systems, HW/SW interfaces are often implemented in devices and
drivers. A device/driver framework refers to a type of HW/SW interface as well as
the devices and drivers that both utilize this interface. We observed a common de-
velopment process for device/driver frameworks in industrial settings as illustrated
in Figure 1.1. The process contains three stages: First, the design stage, where a
Design
HW/SW interface
protocol
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Manual proof
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Published English
specification
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or drivers
Devices or
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Post-release
Stage
English
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Figure 1.1: Development process of device/driver frameworks.
group of hardware and software companies design the HW/SW interface protocol
of a device/driver framework together. The HW/SW interface specification is com-
monly written in structured English. Second, the development stage, where the
English specification is published so that different companies can produced devices
and drivers that are compliant with the HW/SW interface protocol. Finally, the
post-release stage, where devices and drivers are tested for their conformance to
the HW/SW interface protocol. (More discussion is presented in Section 3.3.)
5As we have discussed in the previous sub-section, this development process suf-
fers from three problems: First, since English lacks a formal semantics, we cannot
guarantee a unique interpretation from the same English specification. Second,
there is not a unifying formal model used to represent the device/driver inter-
actions. Third, verification tools cannot be used to validate the English specifi-
cations and are little used to validate the device/driver implementations against
the HW/SW interface protocol. It is also very hard for engineers to debug their
implementations for an issue related to device/driver interactions.
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
1.2.1 Our Approach
We present an automata-theoretic approach to HW/SW co-verification, verifying
hardware and software together. The main components of our approach are illus-
trated in Figure 1.2. In co-specification, we formally specify the HW/SW interface
Co-specification
(BPDS)
Model checking
Formal model
Figure 1.2: Main components of our co-verification approach.
protocol, where the result of the specification can be represented by a unified
formal model of HW/SW interface. Such a formal model then can be analyzed au-
tomatically using model checking algorithms for correctness assurance. In order to
realize our approach, we make the following five contributions in this dissertation:
Co-specification. We design a co-specification framework to specify HW/SW
interface protocols, where the specification captures the asynchronous hardware
behaviors, the asynchronous software behaviors, and the interactions between hard-
ware and software. In our approach, the differences between hardware and software
6are not only considered but also exploited. For example, we utilize the concept of
Transaction Level Modeling (TLM) [66] to specify hardware; we use a restricted C
semantics to specify software. Our specification language, modelC, utilizes the C
semantics with three restrictions to achieve a finite state representation and two
extensions to support the characteristics of HW/SW interface specifications.
The modelC language has precise semantics; a hardware specification in mod-
elC can be represented as a BA [43]; a software specification in modelC can be
represented as a PDS [77]; and the specification of HW/SW interactions in modelC
can be represented as the synchronization of the BA and PDS. Therefore, formal
models constructed by co-specification can be utilized in the development process
of hardware and software, as the formal HW/SW interface specifications. Further-
more, they can also serve as the test harnesses for co-verification, co-simulation,
conformance testing, etc. For example, in co-verification, a hardware model con-
structed by co-specification can be used as the harness for verifying a software
implementation.
Co-verification model. We synthesize a hybrid Bu¨chi Automaton Pushdown
System (BPDS) as a unifying formal model for HW/SW co-verification. The in-
sight is to synchronize a BA that represents hardware and a PDS (actually a labeled
pushdown system as presented in Chapter 4) that represents software. The BPDS
closely models the implementation semantics of both hardware and software. For
example, BA have been commonly used to model hardware designs in verifica-
tion practices; the unbounded stack of PDS can represent recursion in software
programs. Generally speaking, a BPDS model is a concurrent system with a syn-
chronous execution mode [22], i.e., both the BA and the PDS must transition at
the same time in order to make one BPDS transition. In synchronous execution
mode, it is straightforward to model the situation when hardware and software
transition simultaneously. However, they may also step asynchronously, which can
7be modeled by introducing self-loop transitions to both BA and PDS.
Co-verification algorithms and optimizations. We design verification al-
gorithms of BPDS models for reachability properties and Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) [71] properties respectively. With respect to reachability analysis, we demon-
strate that a BPDS model can be converted into a PDS model; therefore, existing
model checkers for PDS can be readily utilized in co-verification. For LTL check-
ing, we employ an automata-theoretic approach. An LTL formula is first negated
and then represented as a BA. The BA is combined with BPDS in such a way that
the BA monitors the state transitions of the BPDS. As the last step, we only need
to compute whether the BA has an accepting run on the BPDS.
In a na¨ıve approach, verification of BPDS needs to explore all interleavings of
the concurrent execution between BA and PDS, where some of the interleavings
may be unnecessary to explore. We prove that some special interleavings between
the BA and PDS are enough to preserve the properties to be checked. We base
our reduction algorithms on the concept of static partial order reduction [44], a
paradigm of partial order reduction [33, 69] that reduces unnecessary state tran-
sitions during the compilation phase instead of the model checking phase. Such
reduction algorithms are very useful in practice, since they do not require any mod-
ification to the model checker. Therefore, model checkers with industry strength
can be readily utilized in our approach.
Co-verification tool. We have created a co-verification tool, CoVer, that sup-
ports both reachability analysis and LTL model checking of BPDS. For reachability
analysis, CoVer is implemented based on the SLAM verification engine [4]. It ac-
cepts HW/SW designs or implementations specified in C/modelC languages. For
LTL checking, CoVer is implemented based on the Moped model checker [77]. It
accepts HW/SW designs specified in Boolean programs [7]. For every property vio-
lation detected, CoVer provides an execution trace of both hardware and software.
8This feature is a significant help to hardware and software engineers in exploring,
understanding, and validating HW/SW interface designs and implementations.
Evaluation. We use Windows devices/drivers for the case studies of our research.
We have applied our approach to four device/driver interfaces, such as the Intel
8255x 10/100Mbps Ethernet controller device/driver interface and the USB 2.0 de-
vice/driver interface. All the HW/SW interfaces are industry standards presented
in English specifications. Our co-specification process of HW/SW interfaces led
to the detection of fifteen issues in the English specifications. Such specification
issues can mislead development engineers and cause product failures. Given the
fact that some of the English specifications have existed for many years and been
revised several times, our approach is rather effective of discovering these issues.
Co-verification is evaluated in reachability analysis and LTL checking respec-
tively. For reachability analysis, we have applied CoVer to five Windows driver
implementations, using the formal device models constructed by co-specification.
Some of the drivers are fully functional, well tested, and provided as sample drivers
in Microsoft Windows Driver Kit (WDK) [59, 61, 63] for many years. Utilizing
CoVer, we have discovered real bugs in each of the drivers for a total bug count
of twelve. All of these bugs, which could cause serious system failures including
data loss, interrupt storm, device hang, etc., involve device/driver interactions and
were previously unknown to the driver developers. More specifically, one bug hap-
pens when a driver does not initialize its device correctly, i.e., a default device
state is not considered during the initialization process; three bugs happen when
devices interrupt their drivers, e.g., one of the bugs may cause an interrupt storm;
four bugs are due to the out-of-synchronization between devices and drivers, e.g.,
a driver issues a command while its device is busy; and four bugs happen when
drivers mishandle their device failures, e.g., a driver returns SUCCESS when its
device actually fails. For LTL checking, we designed a synthetic BPDS template
9to generate BPDS models with various complexities. Such template can mimic the
common scenarios of HW/SW interactions. The co-verification statistics illustrate
that our reduction algorithms are very effective in both reachability analysis and
LTL checking. The average reduction of the verification cost is 70% in time usage
and 30% in memory usage.
1.2.2 Device/Driver Development using Our Approach
Figure 1.3 illustrates how our approach can be integrated into the development
process of device/driver frameworks. In the design stage, the HW/SW interface
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Figure 1.3: Development process of device/driver frameworks using our approach.
protocol is formally specified as a formal model using our co-specification frame-
work. This formal model can be validated by automatic tools such as CoVer. In the
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development stage, the formal model is published to guide the HW/SW interface
implementations. Furthermore, tools can be utilized to validate the device/driver
implementations using the formal model as a test harness. In conformance test-
ing, the formal model can also serve as the golden model, where the device/driver
implementations are tested according to the behavior of the formal model.
In this device/driver development process, our BPDS model serves as the formal
representation of HW/SW interactions; our co-specification framework is utilized
in the formal specification of HW/SW interface protocols; and our co-verification
tool, CoVer, is applied to check the formal models and implementations.
1.3 RELATED WORK
Formal verification. Formal verification [41] uses rigorous mathematical reason-
ing to show that a design meets a property specification. In general, there are two
approaches to formal verification: theorem proving and model checking. Theorem
proving [28, 40] checks a property on a system design by proving a theorem in an
underlying logic. Since most theorem provers require lots of manual effort, they
may not scale to verifying HW/SW implementations. This dissertation research
employs the other approach, model checking [21, 74], an automatic formal method
that checks whether a model conforms to given properties. Usually, the model is
generated automatically from a system design or implementation; the properties
are specified manually to assert the desired behaviors of the system; and model
checking is the process that explores the state space of the model to check whether
a property can be violated.
When the target system is complex, model checking often faces a combinatorial
explosion of the state space to be explored. To address this problem, techniques
such as predicate abstraction [34] are often applied to reduce the complexity of
models. These abstractions should be conservative so that all defects in the original
system are preserved. However, due to over-approximation, a defect found in the
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model may not be a real defect in the system. Kurshan [43] proposed the idea of
counterexample-guided abstraction and refinement, where the verification process
starts with a highly abstracted model and then asymptotically introduces more
details to the abstraction based on infeasible counterexamples given by the model
checking engine. Clarke, et al. [20] applied this idea to symbolic model checking
and demonstrated its effectiveness in hardware verification. Ball, et al. [6] utilized
this idea in SLAM to verify C programs. We implement our co-verification tool,
CoVer, based on the SLAM engine; therefore, counterexample-guided abstraction
and refinement is also applied in CoVer.
The property specification languages usually are different for various applica-
tion domains of model checking. In hardware model checking, temporal logic [71,
72] often is used. In a temporal logic, the usual operators of propositional logic
are augmented with temporal operators, which are used to form assertions about
changes over time. Depending on the temporal operators, there are different
temporal logics such as LTL [71] and Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [21]. The
Property Specification Language (PSL) [1], as the industry standard for hardware
property specification, is an extension of LTL and CTL. In software model check-
ing, properties are often specified in C-like languages such as SLIC (Specification
Language for Interface Checking) [10] and BLAST query language [13], because
preserving the source language constructs makes the specification more intuitive
than temporal logic based specifications. Our co-verification framework accepts
property specifications in either LTL or SLIC.
Formal specification of HW/SW interfaces. Various formal languages have
been proposed for specifying the designs of embedded systems, e.g., Hybrid Au-
tomata [2], LOTOS [85], Co-design Finite State Machines (CFSMs) [3], and Petri-
net based languages such as PRES [26]. Hybrid Automata and CFSMs have been
directly model-checked. LOTOS and PRES have been verified via translation to
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directly model-checkable languages. Furthermore, there have been lots of research
on formalizing interface semantics, such as I/O automata by Lynch, et al. [52]
and interface automata by De Alfaro, et al. [27]. Kroening, et al. [42] have used
SystemC [66] to specify HW/SW interface designs. However, none of the research
formally models the stack, an important feature of software implementations. We
model the software stack, so that our specification can closely resemble the imple-
mentation semantics of HW/SW interfaces. As a significant benefit, our formal
specifications can be used, without any modification, as the test harness for soft-
ware (respectively, hardware) implementations.
Li, et al. [47, 51] modeled component-based embedded systems using ω-automata
and specified xPSL [88] (an extension of PSL to support the specification of tem-
poral assertions over both hardware and software events) properties on component
interfaces as one representation of HW/SW interface protocols. When the inter-
face protocols are complex, the number of required xPSL assertions becomes quite
large, which is inefficient for either engineers or verification engines to use.
Co-verification. Validation techniques for HW/SW interface designs (respec-
tively, implementations) fall into two major categories: co-simulation and (formal)
co-verification, which complement each other. Co-simulation is low-cost and ef-
ficient in detecting shallow bugs while co-verification provides exhaustive state
coverage and is effective in detecting deep bugs.
Research on co-simulation [11, 12, 32, 36, 37, 68, 76, 79] led to industrial tools
such as Mentor Graphics’ Seamless [55] and Microsoft’s Giano [30]. This research
focuses on exploring the design boundary between hardware and software rather
than the correct implementations of HW/SW interfaces. For example, one impor-
tant mission of such kind of co-simulation is to decide whether a function unit is
best implemented in hardware or software. This is different from our goal: the
correctness assurance of HW/SW interface designs and implementations.
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Microsoft developed the Device Simulation Framework (DSF) [80] to support
the co-simulation of device drivers and their device models. The goal of DSF is to
improve the test coverage, increase the test automation, and reduce the test cost
of drivers. Using DSF, driver implementation issues can be discovered at an early
stage of development even before real hardware devices are available. However, the
device models used in DSF are developed in an ad-hoc manner, i.e., only common
device functionalities and a small subset of device behaviors are modeled; therefore,
the test coverage of DSF is limited. As we discuss in Chapter 8, our formal models
from co-specification also can be used in co-simulation via some extensions to DSF.
Device Driver Tester (DDT) [46] is a symbolic simulation engine for testing
closed-source binary device drivers against undesired behaviors, such as race con-
ditions, memory errors, resource leaks, etc. Given a driver’s binary code, DDT
simulates its execution with symbolic hardware, a shallow hardware model that
mimics simple device behaviors such as interrupts. In symbolic hardware, most
design logic is abstracted away by non-determinism; therefore, false bugs may be
reported due to the overapproximation of the hardware behaviors. When simulat-
ing the interactions between device and driver, DDT employs a reduction method
that allows interrupts only after each kernel API call by the driver. Such reduc-
tion is quite ad-hoc, since no formal correctness justification was given. Our static
partial reduction algorithms are quite similar to the reduction idea used by DDT
and can be considered as a formal foundation for DDT’s reduction method.
There has been less research on co-verification than co-simulation. Kurshan,
et al. [45] presented a co-verification framework which models hardware and soft-
ware designs using finite state machines. Xie, et al. [48, 89] extended this frame-
work to hardware and software implementations and improved its scalability via
component-based co-verification. However, finite state machines are limited in
modeling software implementations, since they are not suitable to represent soft-
ware features such as a stack.
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Another approach to integrating hardware and software within the same model
is exemplified by Monniaux in [64]. He modeled a USB host controller device
using a C program and instrumented the device driver, another C program, in
such a way as to verify that the USB host controller driver correctly interacts
with the device. The hardware and software were both modeled by C programs
and thus are formally PDSs. However, a composition of the two PDSs to model
the HW/SW concurrency is problematic, because it is known that, in general,
verification of reachability properties on concurrent PDS with unbounded stacks
is undecidable [75].
Groβe, et al. [35] applied Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to check whether
assembly programs are correctly executed on a RISC CPU. Our approach is differ-
ent from Groβe’s approach in the sense that the properties are at a higher level of
abstraction concerning the interactions between devices and drivers. Furthermore,
the completeness of BMC is restricted by a predefined verification bound compared
to a standard model checking approach.
Bouajjani, et al. [15] presented a procedure to compute backward reachability
of PDS and applied this procedure to linear/branching-time property verification.
This approach was improved by Schwoon [77] and implemented in Moped, a tool
that checks LTL properties of PDS. An LTL formula is first negated and then
represented as a BA. The BA is combined with the PDS to monitor its state
transitions; therefore, the model checking problem is to compute whether the BA
has an accepting run. The goal of this previous research was to verify software
only; our goal is to co-verify hardware and software.
1.4 DISSERTATION OUTLINE
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the background of
our research. Chapter 3 presents our co-specification framework and discusses how
to apply co-specification to the development process of hardware and software.
15
Chapter 4 elaborates on the Bu¨chi pushdown system model for co-verification.
Chapter 5 presents our co-verification algorithms. Chapter 6 discusses the imple-
mentation details of our co-verification approach. Chapter 7 presents the evalua-
tion results. Chapter 8 concludes and discusses future work.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
A state transition system is an abstract machine used in the study of computation.
The machine consists of a set of states and transitions between states, which may
be labeled by symbols chosen from an alphabet; the same label may appear on
more than one transition; both the set of states and the set of transitions are not
necessarily finite, or even countable. If the alphabet is a singleton, the system is
essentially unlabeled; therefore a simpler definition that omits the labels can be
used. State transition systems usually have various forms in order to represent
different systems. For example, finite state machines, such as Bu¨chi automata
and ω-automata [43], are common representations of hardware designs. Pushdown
systems [15, 77], pushdown automata without input alphabets and acceptance
conditions, are common representations of software programs.
Properties specify the desired behaviors that should be observed on a system.
Temporal logics [71, 72] have been widely used in property specification for both
hardware and software. For example, they can be used to define a semantics
for programs in such a way that includes termination and pre-/post- conditions.
However, temporal logics are not intuitive in software property specifications when
the source language constructs are desired. Alternatively, Specification Language
for Interface Checking (SLIC) [10] is a well known software property specification
language designed for safety properties1 in the SLAM project [4]. SLIC has a C-
like syntax, is infinite state, and allows state variables to be read from or written
1Often stated as: “bad events never happen.”
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to in property specifications.
Model checking [21, 74] is an automatic technique that verifies whether a state
transition system meets a property specification. It was first introduced on finite
state systems such as hardware designs, and then applied to infinite state systems
such as software programs. In this dissertation, we utilize two software model
checkers in the implementation of our co-verification algorithms: the SLAM verifi-
cation engine [4] for C programs and the Moped model checker [77] for pushdown
systems.
One major challenge to model checking is the state explosion problem, which
is due, among other causes, to the modeling of concurrency by interleaving. How-
ever, exploring all interleaving of concurrent executions often is unnecessary. Such
observations led to a technique called partial order reduction [33], which is applied
on-the-fly during model checking in order to avoid exploring unnecessary interleav-
ings. Kurshan, et al. [44] have demonstrated that partial order reduction can also
be applied statically during the compilation phase before model checking; there-
fore, the reduction can be applied without any modification to the model checking
algorithm.
Last, we will introduce the Windows device/driver stack as one of the applica-
tion domains of our approach.
2.1 STATE TRANSITION SYSTEMS
2.1.1 Bu¨chi Automaton
A Bu¨chi Automaton (BA) B, as defined in [43], is a non-deterministic finite state
automaton accepting infinite input strings. Formally, B is a tuple (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F ),
where Σ is the input alphabet, Q is the finite set of states, δ ⊆ (Q×Σ×Q) is the
set of state transitions, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and F ⊆ Q is the set of final
states. B accepts an infinite input string if and only if it has a run over the string
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that visits at least one of the final states infinitely often. A run of B on an infinite
string s is a sequence of states visited by B when taking s as the input. We use
q
σ
→ q′ to denote a transition from state q to q′ with the input symbol σ. A path
of B is a sequence of states, q1
σ1−→ q2
σ1−→ . . . qi
σi−→ . . ., where qi ∈ Q, σi ∈ Σ, i > 1.
2.1.2 Pushdown System
A Pushdown System (PDS) P, as defined in [77], is a tuple (G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉),
where G is a finite set of global states (a.k.a., control locations), Γ is a finite stack
alphabet, ∆ ⊆ (G × Γ) × (G × Γ∗) is a finite set of transition rules, and 〈g0, ω0〉
is the initial configuration. A PDS transition rule is written as 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, ω〉,
where ((g, γ), (g′, ω)) ∈ ∆. A configuration of P is a pair 〈g, ω〉, where g ∈ G is a
global state and w ∈ Γ∗ is a stack content. The set of all configurations is denoted
by Conf(P). The head of a configuration c = 〈g, γv〉 (γ ∈ Γ, v ∈ Γ∗) is 〈g, γ〉 and
denoted by head(c). Similarly the head of a rule r = 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, ω〉 is 〈g, γ〉 and
denoted by head(r). The head of a configuration decides the transition rules that
Denotation Comment
g ∈ G Global state (a.k.a., control location)
γ ∈ Γ Stack symbol
ω, v ∈ Γ∗ Stack
〈g, ω〉 ∈ Conf(P) A configuration of P
〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, ω〉 A PDS transition rule, i.e., ((g, γ), (g′, ω)) ∈ ∆
〈g, γv〉 ⇒ 〈g′, ωv〉 A PDS state transition
〈g, γv〉 ⇒∗ 〈g′, ωv〉 Forward reachability relation
head(c), head(r) Head of a PDS configuration/rule
Figure 2.1: Denotations of a pushdown system
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are applicable to this configuration, where the deciding factors are the global state
and the top stack symbol. By definition, a head can also be considered as a special
type of configuration. If two PDS rules have the same head, the rules are said
to be non-deterministic, since the execution of either rule is non-deterministically
decided.
Given a rule r = 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, ω〉 ∈ ∆, for every v ∈ Γ∗, the configuration
〈g, γv〉 is an immediate predecessor of 〈g′, ωv〉 and 〈g′, ωv〉 is an immediate suc-
cessor of 〈g, γv〉. We denote the immediate successor relation in PDS as 〈g, γv〉 ⇒
〈g′, ωv〉, where we say this state transition follows the PDS rule r. The reachability
relation, ⇒∗, is the reflexive and transitive closure of the immediate successor re-
lation. A path of P is a sequence of configurations, c0 ⇒ c1 ⇒ . . . ci ⇒ . . ., where
ci ∈ Conf(P), i ≥ 0. The path is also referred to as a trace of P if c0 = 〈g0, ω0〉
is the initial configuration. Figure 2.1 lists some frequently-used PDS denotations
for reference convenience.
2.1.3 Concurrent System
A concurrent system consists of a set of components that execute together [22].
Normally, there are two modes of execution: asynchronous or interleaved execution,
in which only one component transitions at a time, and synchronous execution in
which all the components transition at the same time. A concurrent system with an
asynchronous execution mode is referred to as an asynchronous system; otherwise
it is referred to as a synchronous system.
In this dissertation, we use two similar phrases with different meanings: the
phrase synchronous (respectively, asynchronous) execution is concerned with
whether concurrent components must transition at the same time to make a system
transition; on the other hand, the phrase synchronous (respectively, asynchronous)
transition is concerned with how transitions of concurrent components may affect
each other, i.e., the dependent relation between transitions (see Chapter 4).
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2.2 PROPERTY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGES
For reasoning about transition systems, temporal logics have been widely used as
formal property specifications. In a temporal logic, the usual operators of proposi-
tional logic are augmented by temporal operators, which are used to form assertions
about changes in time. One can assert, for example, that if proposition p holds
in the present, then proposition q holds at some instant in the future, or at some
instant in the past.
Temporal logics differ in the temporal operators that they provide and the
semantics of those operators. For example, Computation Tree Logic, CTL [21], is
a branching-time logic that describes time in a tree-like structure, where temporal
operators can be used to quantify over the paths that are possible from a given
state. In contrast, Linear Temporal logic (LTL) [71], only provides operators for
describing events along a single computation path. This dissertation will discuss
the model checking algorithm of co-verification for LTL properties in Chapter 5.
Although temporal logics are powerful to define a semantics for programs, e.g.,
termination and pre-/post- conditions, they are not intuitive in software property
specifications when the source language constructs are desired. Furthermore, since
software programs usually have infinite states, it is desired that such feature is
also considered in the property specification language. SLIC is a software property
specification language designed for SLAM engine. Different from temporal logics
such as LTL, SLIC can be infinite, as it can count. However, SLIC is restricted
to safety properties. Chapter 6 will utilize SLIC to specify safety properties in
co-verification.
2.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) Formula
LTL formulae are built up on a set of propositional variables, the common logic
connectives, and a set of temporal operators, where the common logic connectives
21
are:
• Negation (not), denoted by ¬;
• Conjunction (and), denoted by
∧
;
• Disjunction (or), denoted by
∨
;
• Material implication (if...then), denoted by →;
• Biconditional (if and only if), denoted by ↔;
and the temporal operators are:
• X for next;
• G for always, i.e., globally;
• F for eventually, i.e., in the future;
• U for until;
• R for release.
Let At be a finite set of atomic propositions and a ∈ At be a propositional variable.
An LTL formula can be built according to the following syntax:
ϕ ::= a|¬ϕ|ϕ1
∧
ϕ2|ϕ1
∨
ϕ2|ϕ1 → ϕ2|ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2|Xϕ|Gϕ|Fϕ|ϕ1Uϕ2|ϕ1Rϕ2
For example, a termination property of a software thread can be expressed as
F exit,
where exit is the label on the statement when the thread exits. Such formula states
that all runs of the thread will eventually terminate. Another formula
G (F p),
states that the propositional variable p will repeatedly become true during the
system execution.
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2.2.2 Specification Language for Interface Checking (SLIC)
The SLIC language is designed to specify the temporal safety properties of Ap-
plication Program Interfaces (APIs) implemented in the C language. A SLIC
specification, S, defines a state machine that monitors the behavior of the pro-
gram P ||L at APIs’ procedural interface, where P ||L is the sequential composition
of the client P that uses APIs and the library L that provides APIs. An interface
state is a triple (A, {call, return},Ω}), where A is a procedure, the second compo-
nent indicates that control is being passed to A by a call or that control is returning
from A to its caller, and Ω is a valuation to the formal parameters of procedure and
the return value of A. The state machine rejects certain finite execution traces (a
sequence of interface states) of P ||L, either because P makes improper use of the
API implemented by L or because L does not properly implement the API. SLIC
uses a C-like syntax as presented in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example
of a SLIC rule for a global queue of integers. The rule states that it is an error to
have more than four zeroes in the queue.
2.3 MODEL CHECKING
Model checking is an automatic technique that tests whether a model of a system
complies with a property specification. It was introduced on finite state systems by
Clarke and Emerson [21] and independently by Queille and Sifakis [74]. Since hard-
ware systems are finite state, model checking was most often applied to hardware
designs [43, 54]. In the last decade, model checking of software implementations
which are usually infinite state has achieved major progress [4, 14]. Such software
model checking techniques implement a counterexample-guided abstraction and
refinement process, i.e., an iterative process that asymptotically introduces more
details to the abstraction based on infeasible counterexamples. This dissertation
utilizes two software model checkers for co-verification of reachability properties
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Syntax Comment
S ::= state A SLIC specification consists of a state
transFun+ structure, and a list of transfer functions.
state ::= state { fieldDecl+ } A state structure is a list of field
declarations.
fieldDecl ::= ctype id = expr; A field has a C type, an identifier and an
initialization expression.
transFun ::= pattern stmt A transition function consists of a pattern
and a statement.
pattern ::= id . event | [ idList ] . event
event ::= entry | exit
stmt ::= id+ = expr+; Parallel assignment statement.
| if ( choose ) stmt [ else stmt ]
| abort string;
| halt;
| { stmt }
chose ::= * Non-deterministic choice
| expr
expr ::= id | expr op expr . . . Pure expression sub-language of C
idList ::= id | idList , id
id ::= C identifier refer to fields of state structure
| $ int $i refers to ith formal parameter
| $ return return value of a function
| $ C identifier global variable
Figure 2.2: Syntax of the SLIC language.
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state {
int zero cnt = 0;
}
get.exit {
if ($return == 0)
zero cnt = zero cnt − 1;
}
put.entry {
if ($1 == 0) {
if (zero cnt == 4)
abort “Queue has 4 zeroes!”;
else
zero cnt = zero cnt + 1;
}
}
Figure 2.3: SLIC specification for a simple property of a global queue.
and LTL properties respectively.
2.3.1 SLAM Engine for C Programs
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the SLAM model checking engine contains three major
parts to conduct reachability analysis on an C program instrumented with SLIC
rules: (1) Abstraction. C2BP [5], a predicate abstraction engine, translates the
Abstraction (C2BP)
SLIC rule
C program
Check (Bebop)
Refinement (Newton)
Boolean program
Counter example
Refinement hint
No bug
Correct
True bug
Error
Figure 2.4: The abstraction-check-refinement loop of SLAM
instrumented C program into a Boolean program. Boolean programs are equivalent
in power to pushdown automata, which accept context-free language. (2) Check.
Bebop [6], a symbolic model checker for Boolean programs, conducts reachability
analysis on the Boolean program. If no bug is detected, verification terminates
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with a SLIC rule pass. (3) Refinement. When Bebop finds an error trace, if the
trace is confirmed to be feasible, SLAM reports the bug; otherwise, if the trace is
infeasible, SLAM uses Newton [8] to generate new predicates that can eliminate
the spurious path. This Abstraction-Check-Refinement loop usually ends when the
check step cannot find any error trace or an error trace is confirmed to be a bug.
SLAM supports reachability analysis of sequential programs. Figure 2.3 shows an
example of a SLIC rule.
2.3.2 Moped Engine for Pushdown Systems
Moped, a model checker developed by Schwoon, supports both reachability analysis
and LTL checking of pushdown systems [77]. Since PDSs are equivalent in power
to Boolean programs, Bebop can be replaced by Moped in SLAM.
For LTL checking, Moped employs an automata-theoretic approach. Given an
LTL formula, Moped first converts it to a BA B = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F ), and then makes
a product of B with the target PDS P = (G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉) to construct a Bu¨chi
pushdown system, BP = ((P ×Q),Γ,∆′, 〈(p0, q0), w0〉, G). Let L : (G×Γ)→ Σ be
a labeling function that associates the head of a PDS transition rule with the set
of propositions that hold on it. BP is built such that:
• 〈(p, q), γ〉 →֒ 〈(p′, q′), w〉 ∈ ∆′, if 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p′, w〉, q
σ
→ q′, and σ ⊆ L(〈p, γ〉).
• (p, q) ∈ G, if q ∈ F .
The model checking problem of an LTL formula on a PDS is then reduced into the
problem that computes an accepting run of the BA. It is important to note that
Moped constructs a Bu¨chi pushdown system in such a way that the BA monitors
the state transitions of the PDS; thus, there is no interaction between the BA
and PDS. This is different from the Bu¨chi pushdown system constructed for co-
verification in Chapter 4, where interactions between the BA and PDS go in both
directions.
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2.4 PARTIAL ORDER REDUCTION
One common method for reducing the complexity of model-checking concurrent
systems is partial order reduction [33, 69]. This approach is based on an observation
that properties in question often do not distinguish among the state-transition
orders in concurrent systems. Traditional partial order reduction algorithms use an
explicit state representation and depth-first search. The state space and transitions
to be searched are selected during the model checking process; therefore, model
checkers have to be customized for the reduction.
Normally, there are two types of transitions that help decide the selection pro-
cess during reachability analysis [33]. Persistent sets describe the set of transitions
that should be searched at a state, so that the verification result is conservatively
preserved. A persistent set is constructed in such a way that no transition of the
set can be disabled by any execution sequence of transitions that are not in the
set. Sleep sets describe the set of transitions that can be avoided at a state without
affecting the verification result. The key idea behind a sleep set is that if (1) a
transition has been explored, and (2) it is independent with all the transitions on
the searching path thereafter, this transition is unnecessary to be explored even
though it is enabled in current state.
With respect to partial order reduction for LTL checking, a common approach
is the ample set methods, which computes a set of state transitions that needs to
be explored at each state during model checking. Peled [69] demonstrated that a
number of conditions must be enforced on ample sets so that the truth value of
the property to be checked is preserved in the reduced model.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the process of model checking with traditional partial or-
der reductions. Because this approach requires modifications in the model checker
and is often applied with depth-first search, it is difficult to apply the reduction
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Model checker with
YES
NO
Target model  partial order reductions
Figure 2.5: Model checking with traditional partial order reduction.
with other techniques that use breadth-first search, e.g., the symbolic model check-
ing based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [53].
Kurshan, et al. [44] developed an alternative approach called static partial order
reduction, where the key idea is to apply partial order reduction when a model is
generated from the system specification. Therefore, no modification to the model
checker is necessary. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, the model is reduced during
the compilation phase by exploring the structure of the system specification. Any
model checker that accepts the original model can be used to solve the verification
problem of the reduced model.
Model 
YES
NO
Reduced
checkermodel
Target
model
Static partial
order reduction
Figure 2.6: Model checking with static partial order reduction.
2.5 WINDOWS DEVICE/DRIVER STACK
Drivers check device status or send commands to devices by reading or writing de-
vice registers, and receive notification of state changes from devices through inter-
rupts. In Windows [82], drivers are organized in stacks as illustrated in Figure 2.7.
Each layer of a driver stack services a specific type of device in the corresponding
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Function driver (e.g., mouse, network card)
Bus driver (e.g., PCI, USB)
Intermediate software layers
Software
Hardware
Bus device (e.g., PCI, USB)
Function device (e.g., mouse, network card)
DDI (Device Driver Interface)ISR (Interrupt Service Routine)
Interrupt
Interrupt
Signal
Signal
Intermediate hardware layers
Interrupt Signal
DDIISR
DDIISR
Figure 2.7: A generic view of Windows device/driver stacks.
hardware stack. One common method to classify device/driver layers is by decid-
ing whether devices of a layer interconnect other devices. If so, this type of device
is called as a bus device, e.g., PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus or
USB (Universal Serial Bus) bus; otherwise, this type of device is referred to as a
function device, e.g., a network adapter card connected to the PCI bus or a USB
mouse connected to the USB bus. We usually refer to function devices (respec-
tively, function drivers) directly as devices (respectively, drivers) for simplicity. For
example, a PCI function device is referred to as a PCI device.
In the stack shown in Figure 2.7, in addition to the target device and driver
layers whose HW/SW interface protocols we want to specify, there may be other
layers in between. We refer to these layers as intermediate layers. Co-specification
(see Chapter 3) needs to abstract the intermediate layers in such a way that the
interactions between the target device and driver layers are properly modeled.
Different layers of a driver stack usually have different I/O interfaces. For
example, USB drivers read USB device registers using Device Driver Interface
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(DDI) functions such as WdfUsbRetrieveConfigDescriptor; and PCI drivers read
device registers using DDI functions such as READ REGISTER UCHAR.
A Windows driver example. Figure 2.8 illustrates the excerpts from an Open
System Resources (OSR) sample driver [67] for a PCI device, Sealevel PIO-24
digital I/O card [78]. This driver will be used as an example in the rest of this
dissertation. The digital I/O card has three 8-bit ports (namely, A, B, and C)
for input or output. When the interrupt is enabled and Port A has an input, the
card raises a data-ready interrupt. The driver inputs data when the data-ready
interrupt is raised and outputs data by writing to the port registers.
DioEvtDeviceControl is the callback function that handles device control com-
mands and DioIsr is the Interrupt Service Routine (ISR). For example, when an
application sends down an I/O request, IOCTL WDFDIO READ PORTA AFTER INT, to
read data, the callback function, DioEvtDeviceControl, stores this request and
marks the driver’s status variable, AwaitingInt, to be true. Therefore, when the
device raises an interrupt later, data will be read from the device by the ISR,
DioIsr. Because ISRs run at the highest priority in a system, they preempt and
block all other system routines [62]. Therefore, ISRs should return as quickly
as possible. If necessary, an ISR will schedule a lower-priority routine for post-
interrupt processing of the received data, where this kind of routine is commonly
referred to as a Deferred Procedure Call (DPC). As illustrated in Figure 2.8c,
the DPC routine, DioDpc, returns the data read by ISR to upper applications and
completes the I/O request with proper status indicating the result of the operation.
Chapter 7 will discuss that the driver excerpt in Figure 2.8 contains a bug
which can cause invalidate data being returned to upper applications. This bug is
discovered by our co-verification tool, CoVer.
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VOID DioEvtDeviceControl( . . . ) {
. . .
switch(IoControlCode) {
. . .
// Waits for an interrupt to occur, and when it does,
// ISR/DPC will read the contents of PortA.
case IOCTL WDFDIO READ PORTA AFTER INT:
. . .
// If PortAInput is true, the interrupt is enabled
if (devContext->PortAInput == FALSE) {
status = STATUS INVALID DEVICE STATE;
} else {
// Store the I/O request to CurrentRequest
devContext->CurrentRequest = Request;
// Tell ISR: we’re waiting for an interrupt
P1: devContext->AwaitingInt = TRUE;
. . .
return;
}
break;
. . .
}
. . .
}
(a) Device Driver Control.
Figure 2.8: Excerpts from OSR sample driver code for PIO-24 digital I/O card.
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BOOLEAN DioIsr( . . . ) {
. . .
// Check if we have an interrupt pending
data = READ REGISTER UCHAR(
devContext->BaseAddress + DIO INTSTATUS OFFSET );
if(data & DIO INTSTATUS PENDING) {
// Are we waiting for this interrupt
P2: if(devContext->AwaitingInt) {
// Read the contents of PortA
data = READ REGISTER UCHAR(
devContext->BaseAddress + DIO PORTA OFFSET );
// Store it in our device context
// DPC will send the data to users
devContext->PortAValueAtInt = data;
devContext->AwaitingInt = FALSE;
}
// Request our DPC
P3: WdfInterruptQueueDpcForIsr( Interrupt );
// Tell WDF, and hence Windows, this is our interrupt
return(TRUE);
}
return(FALSE);
}
(b) Interrupt Service Routine (ISR).
Figure 2.8: Excerpts from OSR sample driver code for PIO-24 digital I/O card.
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BOOLEAN DioDpc( . . . ) {
. . .
// Is there a read-after-interrupt request in progress?
if (devContext->CurrentRequest) {
// Get a pointer to the I/O request.
req = devContext->CurrentRequest;
devContext->CurrentRequest = NULL;
// Get the data that was read in ISR
P4: data = devContext->PortAValueAtInt;
}
// Is there a pending request?
if(req) {
PUCHAR dataBuffer;
. . .
// Retrieve the buffer for the input data
status = WdfRequestRetrieveOutputBuffer(req, 0, (PVOID*)&dataBuffer, &length);
if(NT SUCCESS(status)) {
// Return the data to the user – Just 1 byte, read in the ISR
*dataBuffer = data;
// Complete the request with success, pass back 1 in the information field
P5: WdfRequestCompleteWithInformation(req, STATUS SUCCESS, 1);
return; // This request is successfully completed
} else {
WdfRequestCompleteWithInformation(req, STATUS INVALID REQUEST, 0);
}
}
(c) Deferred Procedure Call (DPC).
Figure 2.8: Excerpts from OSR sample driver code for PIO-24 digital I/O card.
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Chapter 3
CO-SPECIFICATION
As the first step of co-verification, we need to specify HW/SW interface protocols.
Such specification should capture the asynchronous hardware behaviors, the asyn-
chronous software behaviors, and the interactions between hardware and software
(i.e., synchronous behaviors of hardware and software). For various verification
foci, the models constructed by co-specification can be used in different ways. For
example, we can combine a driver implementation with its device model to verify
whether the driver correctly operates its device; or we can verify the design of
a hardware device using its driver model as the test harness. In any case, the
specification semantics should be precise, so that automatic tools can be applied
to validate the specification; the specification framework should consider the dif-
ferences between hardware and software, so that hardware and software can be
described in such a way close to their implementation semantics; and the specifi-
cation process should exploit the unique features of HW/SW interactions, so that
reductions can be applied to alleviate the cost of co-verification.
With respect to hardware and software, there are three types of concurrency
in a system, i.e., the hardware concurrency, the software concurrency, and the
HW/SW concurrency. One major challenge to co-specification is how to present
the three types of concurrency in a proper level of abstraction so that irrelevant de-
tails are abstracted away while the specification still preserves the essential system
behaviors. We utilize the concept of Transaction Level Modeling (TLM) to specify
hardware behaviors. A hardware transaction is essentially a hardware state transi-
tion that is atomic in the view of software. Hardware concurrency is specified using
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hardware transactions with non-determinism. We also propose a semantic model,
relative atomicity, to characterize the fact that concurrent components (hardware
transactions and software threads) often have different execution priorities. Any
concurrency characterized by relative atomicity can be represented by a Push-
down System (PDS), which is very useful to simplify the models constructed by
co-specification and therefore, reduce the co-verification cost. Our co-specification
language, modelC, as designed based on a restricted C semantics, supports both
relative atomicity and non-determinism.
The co-specification framework describes HW/SW interface protocols using
three parts: the HW/SW interface specification, the hardware specification, and
the software specification. The HW/SW interface specification describes how hard-
ware and software should transition synchronously when they interact with each
other. The hardware specification describes the desired hardware behaviors when
hardware and software transition asynchronously, i.e., when there is no HW/SW
interaction. The software specification describes the desired operation sequences
for software to control hardware. The three parts together specify the complete
behaviors of a system.
We choose hardware devices and software drivers as the application domain
of our research. In industrial settings, device/driver (HW/SW) interface proto-
cols are commonly presented via English specifications. English does not have
formal semantics; therefore, English specifications usually have ambiguities and
inconsistencies. In co-specification, we write formal models to describe the be-
haviors of devices and drivers with respect to their interface protocols. Such a
co-specification framework should also be utilized in the development process of de-
vices and drivers; therefore, we not only will gain formal semantics for device/driver
interface specifications but also can utilize automatic tools to validate these spec-
ifications. Furthermore, the formal models from co-specification can serve as the
basis of a uniform platform not only for co-verification, but also for co-simulation,
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conformance testing, etc. Following our co-specification framework, we present a
mechanized process to construct formal models of device/driver interface protocols
from English specifications. We also discuss how to integrate our approach into
the device/driver development process and propose the evaluation criteria for our
approach.
3.1 SPECIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR HW/SW INTERFACES
In the scope of co-verification, a system contains both hardware and software.
There are three types of concurrency in such systems, i.e., the hardware concur-
rency, the software concurrency, and the HW/SW concurrency. One major chal-
lenge to co-specification is how to capture the various types of concurrency in a
proper level of abstraction so that irrelevant details are abstracted away while the
specification still preserves essential system behaviors.
First, we briefly discuss the three types of concurrency and how they are related
to the HW/SW interface specification. Only the system behaviors that are closely
related to HW/SW interface protocols should be preserved. Second, we discuss
the TLM for hardware. TLM is a common practice in hardware design, where the
design logic is specified by transaction functions while the implementation details
such as clock signals are abstracted away. Third, we present a semantic model,
relative atomicity. Although there is a lot of concurrency existing in a system,
its complexity can be greatly reduced by characterizing the execution priorities
existing in HW/SW interface designs. Fourth, we elaborate on how we utilize
the concept of non-determinism to abstract away details unnecessary for interface
specifications. Fifth, we present our co-specification language, modelC.
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3.1.1 Concurrency in a System
Hardware concurrency. Hardware is concurrent in nature and hardware con-
currency exists at various levels of design abstractions. In the view of software, we
consider two types of hardware concurrency:
• concurrency between hardware modules; and
• concurrent assignments to registers.
For example, the Intel Ethernet Controller [39] has sub-modules such as command
unit, receiving unit, interrupt management, etc., which are fully concurrent. Since
they may not be driven by the same clock signal, we should consider their execution
as asynchronous. A sub-module can be further divided into smaller sub-modules or
directly implemented [38]. When a module is directly implemented, its operation
consists of a sequence of steps that are driven by a clock signal. The states of the
module are maintained in hardware registers and updated simultaneously upon
clock cycles. How the registers should be updated during a clock cycle depends on
the registers’ states before the clock cycle and the state transition rule specified
for the hardware design.
Software concurrency. Device drivers are commonly multi-threaded to service
different requests such as interrupts from hardware, I/O requests from user applica-
tions, etc. In the view of hardware, we consider two types of software concurrency:
• multiple threads concurrently operate hardware, e.g., read/write hardware
interface registers; and
• an Interrupt Service Routines (ISR) is invoked to service a hardware inter-
rupt, where the current executing thread is preempted [60].
Conceptually, we can understand each thread as a PDS. The threads together
should be represented as a product of the PDSs, which results in a Concurrent
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Pushdown System (CPDS) [73]. Note that even reachability analysis of CPDS is
undecidable [75]. Therefore, it is desired that software behaviors are modeled using
a single PDS as much as possible. As we shall demonstrate later, the second type
of software concurrency can be represented as a single PDS following the semantic
model of relative atomicity. We will specify both types of software concurrency;
therefore, our approach can be utilized in the formalization of HW/SW interface
specifications (see Section 3.3). However, our co-verification model (see Chapter 4)
and co-verification algorithms (see Chapter 5) will only address the second type of
software concurrency (due to the decidability issue).
HW/SW concurrency. A device and its driver are mostly asynchronous and
only transition synchronously when they interact through their interface. The
HW/SW concurrency describes such situations:
• mostly, software and hardware transition asynchronously, where their states
do not affect each other; and
• when hardware and software interact with each other, their synchronous
transition will be decided by the states of both hardware and software.
3.1.2 Transaction Level Modeling (TLM) of Hardware
We utilize the TLM concept to specify hardware behaviors. TLM is a common
approach to hardware design, where the key concept is to abstract away imple-
mentation details at the design stage so that one can focus on the design logic of
a system.
Hardware transaction. Since our goal is to specify HW/SW interface protocols,
the design logic, rather than the implementation details, is relevant. Therefore,
modeling the clock-driven semantic feature of hardware implementations is not
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necessary. For example, a data-transfer command is usually processed in multi-
ple clock cycles; however, it may only be necessary to describe this command as
one hardware state transition from the view of software. We define a hardware
transaction to represent a hardware state transition in an arbitrarily long but fi-
nite sequence of clock cycles. Hardware transactions are atomic to software. The
concept of hardware transaction preserves hardware design logic that is visible to
software, but hides details that are only necessary for synthesizable Register Trans-
fer Level (RTL) designs. In the rest of this dissertation, we will describe hardware
state transitions on the abstraction level of transactions instead of RTL level.
Hardware transaction function. We define a hardware transaction function
as a C function that describes a set of hardware transactions (i.e., hardware state
transitions). Because transactions are atomic, the intermediate hardware states
during a transaction are invisible to software. In other words, the hardware state
variables are simultaneously updated by a hardware transaction function from the
software point of view. We define the current-states and next-states of a hardware
transaction function respectively as ρ ⊆ Q representing the hardware states when
entering the function and ρ′ ⊆ Q representing the hardware states when exiting
the function. Formally, a hardware transaction function, F : Q × Q, describes
a set of hardware state transitions. Following this definition, any terminating C
function can be treated as a hardware transaction function. In order to differentiate
the definition of hardware transaction functions from other C functions, we use
the keyword atomic to indicate the type of hardware transaction function (see
Figure 3.2 for example).
3.1.3 Relative Atomicity
Concurrent threads usually have different execution priorities. Since higher-priority
threads preempt lower-priority threads, they should be considered atomic to the
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lower-priority threads. Relative atomicity captures this semantic feature: the ex-
ecution of a higher-priority thread is atomic to that of a lower-priority thread.
Any concurrency that follows the relative atomicity model can be represented by
a single PDS. In our HW/SW interface protocol specifications, relative atomicity
mainly captures two ideas:
• hardware transactions are atomic in the view of software; and
• ISRs are atomic with respect to other software routines, since ISRs have the
highest priority.
Consider the execution model of a software program and a hardware design,
the program contains a set of statements that are atomic in the view of hardware;
and the hardware design is specified as a hardware transaction function. Algo-
rithm 3.1 illustrates the scheduling algorithm for such an execution model, which
demonstrates the idea of relative atomicity. The algorithm runs a hardware trans-
Algorithm 3.1 RelativeAtomicity()
1: if Non-deterministic-Choice() then
2: “Run hardware transaction function for one time”
3: else
4: if Interrupt-Pending() or Isr-Running() then
5: “Run one atomic statement of ISR”
6: else
7: “Run one atomic statement of lower-priority routines”
8: end if
9: end if
action or an atomic software statement based on non-deterministic choices. In
computer systems, when some hardware raises an interrupt, the Operating System
(OS) typically calls all the ISRs that are registered in the interrupt vector table
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in sequence until an ISR acknowledges its ownership of the interrupt. During this
process, only one ISR can run at a time and other hardware interrupts on the same
bus are suppressed [62]. Although uncommon, it is possible that a driver provides
ISRs with different priorities, where an ISR can preempt another lower-priority
ISR. However, this does not affect the atomicity of an ISR with respect to other
lower-priority driver routines. Furthermore, the higher-priority ISR is atomic with
respect to the lower-priority ISR.
Relative atomicity captures the execution semantics of a system with different
execution priorities; therefore, we can represent such execution semantics using a
less complex model, PDS, compared to CPDS. In verification, relative atomicity
can help us not only achieve decidability but also reduce complexity. Since rel-
ative atomicity is based on the observation of real execution semantics between
hardware and software, there is no abstraction in this semantic model. However,
it is important to note that when we need to represent more than one concurrent
software thread with the same priority in a verification run, relative atomicity may
not be applicable; therefore, we need a CPDS as the formal model for software.
3.1.4 Non-determinism in Co-specification
In co-specification, we utilize non-determinism mainly in two ways: (1) updating
the variable values; and (2) deciding the conditions of branches or loops. For
both ways, the use of non-determinism abstracts away the details unnecessary for
interface specification. For example, one important utilization of non-determinism
in our approach is how we model the hardware concurrency.
Non-deterministic interleaving. Hardware is concurrent in nature. For exam-
ple, a network card processes software command and receives data concurrently.
To specify this kind of hardware concurrency, we design an approach called non-
deterministic interleaving which has three steps:
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1. identify the concurrent modules (e.g., command unit, receive unit, etc.) of
the target hardware device;
2. specify the modules using separate C functions which we refer to as module
functions; and
3. non-deterministically invoke these module functions in a hardware transac-
tion function.
The hardware concurrency is simulated in such a way that the module functions are
executed in a non-deterministic sequence when the hardware transaction function
is executed multiple times (see Section 3.2 for examples).
3.1.5 The modelC Language
As an important part of co-specification, we need a modeling language. Currently,
the C language (or its variants) is commonly used in TLM specifications, since C
semantics is widely understood by both hardware and software developers. There-
fore, we present a modeling language, modelC, based on C semantics.
ThemodelC language uses C semantics with two extensions to support non-determi-
nism and relative atomicity as well as the following three restrictions:
• numbers are treated as bounded integers so that hardware registers can be
properly modeled;
• unbounded recursion is not allowed; and
• dynamic memory allocation is not allowed.
It is important to note that modelC is simply a C language dialect with these
extensions and restrictions. Hardware description languages such as SystemC [66]
and Verilog [38] also can be adapted to support the formal specification following
our approach.
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3.2 SPECIFICATION OF HW/SW INTERFACE PROTOCOLS
We demonstrate how we specify the HW/SW interface protocols through an ex-
ample. One important rule for our specification is to capture all possible HW/SW
behaviors that are allowed by interface protocols. This rule provides guidance for
our modeling, which converges through refinement processes assisted by automa-
tion tools.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, our formal specification has: a HW/SW interface,
a hardware model, and a software model, where the hardware states are specified
using the (hardware) global variables; the software states are specified using both
the (software) global variables and stack contents of modelC programs.
Software
Model
Hardware
Model
HW/SW
Interface
Output2PortA(...)
Software routines:
......
Output2PortB(...)
Isr( )
Hardware transaction
function:
atRun_DIO( )
RunIsr()
From hardware to software:
WRITE_REGISTER_UCHAR(...)
From software to hardware
=> atWritePortA(...)
=> atWritePortB(...)
......
Figure 3.1: Co-specification framework.
The HW/SW interface describes how hardware and software should transition
synchronously when they interact with each other. Consider the PIO-24 digital
I/O device/driver interface (see Section 2.5): when software writes to the hard-
ware interface registers by invoking WRITE REGISTER UCHAR, we specify how the
interface registers should be updated using hardware transaction functions such as
atWritePortA, atWritePortB, etc. In the other direction, hardware can raise an
interrupt which will cause the software to invoke an ISR to service the interrupt.
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We model this process using a function, RunIsr.
The hardware model describes the behaviors of hardware when it transitions
asynchronously with software, i.e., when there is no HW/SW interaction. We
specify the hardware model using one hardware transaction function, atRun DIO.
The software model describes the desired operation sequences for software to
control hardware. For each functionality, we use a function to describe the opera-
tion sequences of software. For example, the function, Output2PortA, specifies the
sequence of operations that software should take in order to write to a hardware
port of the PIO-24 digital I/O device.
3.2.1 HW/SW Interface Specification
The HW/SW interface, the abstraction of the HW/SW intermediate layers (see
Figure 2.7) between the target device and driver, propagates hardware (respec-
tively, software) interface events to software (respectively, hardware). Concep-
tually, a HW/SW interface has two parts: interface states and interface events.
Interface states are state variables provided either by hardware or software and
accessible by both. Interface events have two types: hardware or software. When
hardware updates the software interface states, a hardware interface event occurs,
and vice versa. For example, when a device raises an interrupt, the HW/SW in-
terface will set the interrupt pending status and invoke the corresponding ISR to
service the interrupt. On the other hand, when a driver writes to a hardware in-
terface register, the HW/SW interface will update the related hardware registers
accordingly. In general, the HW/SW interface describes the synchronous transi-
tions of hardware and software when an interface event occurs.
Figure 3.2 illustrates a software interface event function, atWritePortA, which
is actually a hardware transaction function in response to a software register write
operation. This example describes a set of hardware state transitions when the
driver writes to the interface register, Port A, of the PIO-24 digital I/O device.
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atomic VOID atWritePortA ( UCHAR ucRegData ) {
// If Port A is configured as an “input” port
if ( g DIORegs.CW.CWD4 == 1 ) {
// Write to the output register instead of the port
g DIOState.OutputRegA.ucValue = ucRegData;
} else { // Otherwise, configured as an “output” port
// Update both the port and the output register
g DIORegs.A.ucValue = ucRegData;
g DIOState.OutputRegA.ucValue = ucRegData;
}
}
Figure 3.2: An implementation of a software interface event function in the form
of a hardware transaction function.
Figure 3.3 shows how function calls to a software write-register function (originally
provided by the OS) are related to interface event functions. A software interface
event occurs when the entry stack symbol of the interface event function is reached.
When hardware raises an interrupt, the ISR should be invoked to service this in-
terrupt. The HW/SW interface simulates this process as shown in Figure 3.4. The
variable IsrRunning represents the software status and the variable Interrupt-
Pending represents the hardware status. The function RunIsr has three steps, (1)
check/prepare the precondition before invoking the ISR; (2) invoke the ISR; and
(3) set both the hardware and software to proper status after ISR. The atomic
blocks are used to indicate that the first and third steps describe synchronous state
transitions of both hardware and software.
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VOID WRITE REGISTER UCHAR
(PUCHAR Register, UCHAR ucRegData) {
switch ( Register ) {
case REG PORTA: atWritePortA(ucRegData); return;
case REG PORTB: atWritePortB(ucRegData); return;
. . .
case REG CONFIG: atWriteConfig(ucRegData); return;
case REG STATUS: atWriteStatus(ucRegData); return;
default: abort “Register address error.”; return;
}
}
Figure 3.3: Relating register calls to software interface event functions.
3.2.2 Hardware Specification
The hardware model describes the behaviors of hardware when it works asyn-
chronously with software to realize system functionalities. Consider the PIO-24
digital I/O device: when there is an input to Port A, the hardware model decides
whether an interrupt should be raised based on both the current hardware state
and the input value. Figure 3.5 illustrates an example of a hardware transaction
function, atRun DIO, that models the set of state transitions for the PIO-24 device
when this device executes asynchronously with the driver. During each execution
of the hardware transaction function, one module function (such as RunPorts or
RunInterrupt) is non-deterministically selected; therefore, only one module exe-
cutes and its related state variables get updated. The concurrency between these
modules is simulated by non-deterministic interleaving between the module func-
tions when the hardware transaction function is executed multiple times.
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VOID RunIsr () {
atomic {
// Make sure only one ISR is invoked
if ( (IsrRunning == TRUE) || (InterruptPending == FALSE) )
return;
IsrRunning = TRUE;
}
DioIsr(); // Invoke the ISR
atomic {
IsrRunning = FALSE;
InterruptPending = FALSE;
}
}
Figure 3.4: Interrupt monitoring function.
atomic VOID atRun DIO() {
switch ( choice() ) { // non-deterministic choices
case 0: RunPorts(); break; // Port I/O Management
case 1: RunInterrupt(); break; // Interrupt Management
. . .
}
}
Figure 3.5: Hardware transaction function of the PIO-24 digital I/O card device
model.
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3.2.3 Software Specification
The software model describes the desired operation sequences for software to con-
trol hardware. It is straightforward to specify software behaviors using modelC,
because modelC is designed based on the C semantics. In the English documents
for HW/SW interface protocols, software specifications are usually categorized by
functionality. For every functionality, a piece of English-based pseudo-code is pro-
vided to describe the desired software operations. We use a C function to replace
each of the pseudo-code pieces. Figure 3.6 illustrates an example of such a C
function for the PIO-24 driver model. This function describes the desired software
operations for outputting a byte to Port A. Conceptually, all these C functions
VOID Output2PortA ( UCHAR ucRegData ) {
// Write to Port A
WRITE REGISTER UCHAR(REG PORTA, ucRegData);
// Read the I/O configuration
g SWState.CW.WholeByte =
READ REGISTER UCHAR(REG CONFIG);
// If Port A is configured as “input”, set it as “output”
if ( g SWState.CW.CWD4 == 1 ) {
g SWState.CW.CWD4 = 0;
WRITE REGISTER UCHAR(REG CONFIG,
g SWState.CW.WholeByte);
}
}
Figure 3.6: A C function for outputting to Port A.
are implemented in several concurrent driver threads (the number of threads and
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how the functions should be assigned to the threads depend highly on implemen-
tation details). Some types of software concurrency can be captured by relative
atomicity and, therefore, represented by a single PDS. For example, the thread for
DioIsr (see Figure 3.4) should always be atomic to other driver threads, because
ISRs have the highest priority. A CPDS is necessary as the software representation
when relative atomicity is inapplicable, i.e., (1) there is more than one unbounded
stack of software threads; and (2) the context-switches between the threads are
also unbounded.
3.2.4 A Realization of Relative Atomicity
VOID Output2PortA ( UCHAR ucRegData ) {
⇐=
WRITE REGISTER UCHAR(REG PORTA, ucRegData);
⇐=
g SWState.CW.WholeByte =
READ REGISTER UCHAR(REG CONFIG);
⇐=
if ( g SWState.CW.CWD4 == 1) {
⇐=
g SWState.CW.CWD4 = 0;
⇐=
WRITE REGISTER UCHAR(REG CONFIG,
g SWState.CW.WholeByte);
⇐=
}
}


while( choice() ) {
atRun DIO();
RunIsr();
}
Figure 3.7: Execution model of relative atomicity.
Given the examples of HW/SW interface, hardware model, and software model,
Figure 3.7 illustrates how they can be combined into a single-threaded program
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following the concept of relative atomicity. After every software statement, we non-
deterministically invoke the hardware transaction function, atRun DIO, to let the
asynchronous hardware model run. Meanwhile, since a hardware transaction may
raise an interrupt, we invoke the interrupt monitoring function, RunIsr; therefore,
ISR can be invoked if an interrupt has been raised. Note that software statements
are not really atomic in this example; however, we use this format to retain the
readability. There are two types of synchronous transitions between hardware
and software. First, when software invokes register operation functions such as
WRITE REGISTER UCHAR, the hardware transaction functions such as atWritePortA
will be invoked to update the hardware interface registers. Second, in RunIsr, the
ISR routine will be invoked if an interrupt has been raised.
3.2.5 Summary and Generalization
We have demonstrated our co-specification framework via an example. Our ap-
proach is also applicable to other common HW/SW interfaces in devices/drivers
and microcode/firmware. There are three reasons:
1. TLM is already widely used in hardware development. Hardware designers
usually specify transaction level models in order to evaluate the performance
and correctness of their designs.
2. In HW/SW interface designs, it is standard to have different execution prior-
ities for concurrent components such as software threads and hardware trans-
actions. For example, when hardware raises an interrupt, software needs to
service the interrupt in a high priority thread to prevent losing any volatile
hardware state.
3. The models constructed by co-specification can be formally represented by
BA and PDS, which are suitable formal representations for hardware and
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software respectively (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, BA and PDS have al-
ready been successfully used in hardware and software verification.
3.3 APPLICATIONS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA
In industrial settings, hardware and software are often manufactured separately,
because their development processes require highly different expertise. English
is the de facto language for specifying HW/SW interface protocols. Since lots
of HW/SW interfaces are public standards, their English specifications have to
be self-explanatory. However, English does not have formal semantics, so these
specifications commonly contain ambiguities and inconsistencies. A single misin-
terpretation of an interface protocol can cause bugs in products, which will likely
lead to system failures. These failures are hard to diagnose especially when they
happen only in a product release as a specific combination of device and driver.
Figure 3.8: An excerpt from Intel 10/100 Mbps Ethernet Controller document.
Figure 3.8 illustrates an excerpt from the English document of the Intel 8255x
10/100Mbps Ethernet Controller Specification [39]. This excerpt describes how the
shared memory between hardware and software should be operated by hardware
when a CU/RU (Command Unit/Receive Unit) command is issued from software.
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There are two issues: First, the content of Table 15 is inconsistent with its title
(underlined, the RU and CU difference). Second, the CU HPQ Start command is
neither defined nor mentioned in any other part of this document. This is quite
confusing when compared to the CU Start command. Such specification issues are
pervasive (see Chapter 7 for details) in various English documents for HW/SW
interfaces. These issues can cause confusion, produce bugs, and lead to product
failures.
English has four significant drawbacks as the HW/SW interface specification
language:
• First, since English lacks a formal semantics, we cannot guarantee a unique
interpretation from the same English specification.
• Second, no automatic tool can be offered to validate the correctness of an
English-based interface protocol due to lack of formal semantics.
• Third, implementation semantics of HW/SW interfaces are quite different
from the specification semantics; therefore, the implementations can signifi-
cantly deviate from their interface protocols.
• Fourth, it is not straightforward to design test cases for HW/SW interface
implementations based on English specifications. Instead of using a system-
atic approach, ad-hoc test cases are commonly used.
To address the drawbacks of English specifications, we need to describe HW/SW
interface protocols in a precise manner, so that the protocols can be specified
formally and analyzed automatically. We refer to this specification process as
HW/SW interface formalization.
In our co-specification framework, we construct formal models of HW/SW in-
terface protocols. Compared to English-based specifications, there are three ad-
vantages of our approach in specifying HW/SW interface protocols:
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• First, our specification is exact and free of ambiguities, since a programming
language such as modelC is used to describe the HW/SW interface protocols
rather than English.
• Second, our specifications can be represented as formal models. Therefore,
automatic formal verification tools (such as CoVer presented in Chapter 6)
can be used to ensure that critical properties about HW/SW interface pro-
tocols are correctly expressed through co-specification.
• Third, the formal hardware (respectively, software) specifications can be
readily utilized in the co-verification with software (respectively, hardware)
implementations.
In this section, we first present a mechanized process to construct formal models
of HW/SW interface protocols from English specifications. This process is quite
helpful to apply our approach to legacy HW/SW interfaces, where their English
specifications already exist. Second, we discuss how to integrate our approach into
the HW/SW development process. Finally, we propose the evaluation criteria for
our approach.
3.3.1 Formalization Process from English Specifications
Specifications of HW/SW interface protocols are often presented in structured
English that describes HW/SW interface protocols in three parts:
1. Definition of hardware interface registers. Hardware uses interface registers
to receive commands from software, and in the other direction provide soft-
ware with the current hardware state. Figure 3.9 illustrates an excerpt from
the English specification of the PIO-24 device [78]. This excerpt presents the
offsets and access (read/write) modes of the 8-bit registers, where the names
from D0 to D7 represent the bits of a register. The register names such
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Figure 3.9: Excerpt of PIO-24 specification: hardware interface registers.
as PA (a.k.a., Port A), PB (a.k.a., Port B), etc. are defined in the English
specification (omitted in the excerpt). The PIO-24 driver relies on register
offsets to access different registers. Figure 3.10 illustrates how we define
the register offset macros based on the English specification. For example,
REG PORTA corresponds to the name PA; REG CONFIG corresponds to the name
CW (a.k.a., Control Word). As another example, Figure 3.11 illustrates the
excerpt about how the I/O direction of port registers are controlled by the
value of the CW register. The hardware transaction function atWritePortA
illustrated in Figure 3.2 is specified according to this excerpt, i.e., the Port
A register is configured as “input” (respectively, “output”) if the D4 bit of
the CW register is 1 (respectively, 0). The symbol X represents that this bit is
not used, which is indicated in Figure 3.9.
2. Hardware (environment) behaviors. Mostly, hardware execution is asyn-
chronous with software, e.g., when hardware processes software commands
or inputs from the environment. Figure 3.12 illustrates the excerpt from the
English specification about how the PIO-24 device should process the input
to Port A and raise an interrupt to notify the driver. We specify this be-
havior using the module function RunInterrupt illustrated in Figure 3.13.
RunInterrupt is invoked by the hardware transaction function atRun DIO
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#define REG PORTA BASE ADDRESS + 0
#define REG PORTB BASE ADDRESS + 1
#define REG PORTC BASE ADDRESS + 2
#define REG CONFIG BASE ADDRESS + 3
#define REG IRQ BASE ADDRESS + 4
#define REG STATUS BASE ADDRESS + 5
Figure 3.10: Macros for interface register offsets of the PIO-24 device.
Figure 3.11: Excerpt of PIO-24 specification: meaning of CW (a.k.a., the Control
Word register).
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Figure 3.12: Excerpt of PIO-24 specification: input to Port A.
which describes the asynchronous hardware behavior in the view of software.
Based on the current hardware state and input to Port A from the envi-
ronment, RunInterrupt decides whether or not hardware should raise an
interrupt. Note that the input from the environment can be modeled by as-
signing non-deterministic values to the Port A register after every execution
of atRun DIO.
3. Recommendations for software to operate hardware. Software often needs to
follow certain rules when operating hardware. Since software implementa-
tions are more flexible than hardware, the rules are usually presented in the
form of recommendations. For example, Figure 3.14 illustrates an excerpt
that recommends the desired behaviors for software to output to the ports
of the PIO-24 device. Our software specification illustrated in Figure 3.6
captures this recommendation.
Given an English specification of a HW/SW interface protocol, we summarize
our formalization process of developing the corresponding formal model by three
steps as illustrated in Figure 3.15. First, we identify the structure of the target
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VOID RunInterrupt() {
// If interrupt is disabled
if(g DIORegs.IRQ.IRQENn == 0) goto Exit;
// If Port A is not configured as input
if(g DIORegs.CW.CWD4 != 1) goto Exit;
. . .
// Low level triggers an interrupt
if( (g DIORegs.IRQ.IRQCn == 0) && (g DIORegs.A.D0 == 0) )
g DIORegs.IRQST.IRQST1 = 1;
// High level triggers an interrupt
else if( (g DIORegs.IRQ.IRQCn == 1) && (g DIORegs.A.D0 == 1) )
g DIORegs.IRQST.IRQST1 = 1;
// Falling edge triggers an interrupt (we assume that if this path
// is executed, falling edge just occurred)
else if( g DIORegs.IRQ.IRQCn == 2 )
g DIORegs.IRQST.IRQST1 = 1;
// Rising edge triggers an interrupt (we assume that if this path
// is executed, rising edge just occurred)
else if( g DIORegs.IRQ.IRQCn == 3 )
g DIORegs.IRQST.IRQST1 = 1;
Exit: return;
}
Figure 3.13: The module function, RunInterrupt, invoked by atRun DIO (see
Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.14: Excerpt of PIO-24 specification: a recommendation for software.
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Figure 3.15: The formalization process from an English specification.
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English specification. The goal of this step is to decide the three specification
parts of the HW/SW interface protocol: definition of hardware interface registers,
hardware behaviors, and recommendations for software behaviors. Second, we
develop the formal model from the English specification following the mappings
between the structure of the English specification and that of the formal model.
We have already discussed how to develop each part of the formal model from
the corresponding part of the English specification. For example, Figure 3.9 and
Figure 3.10 illustrate how to define the hardware interface registers’ offsets based
on the English specification. Third, we utilize automatic tools to validate the
formal model. For example, a C compiler can easily detect inconsistencies in
the formal model; CoVer can verify correctness properties of the formal model.
Issues discovered during the validation are sent back to the development process
for refinement. The formal model can be released only if no validation fails.
3.3.2 Applications in the HW/SW Development Process
A device/driver framework refers to a type of HW/SW interface as well as the
devices and drivers that both utilize this interface. Device/driver frameworks can
have different levels of abstractions. For example, the PCI device/driver framework
refers to the PCI HW/SW interface, all the PCI devices, and all the PCI drivers;
the Sealevel PIO-24 device/driver framework refers to the PIO-24 HW/SW inter-
face, the PIO-24 driver, and the PIO-24 device. Note that, although the PIO-24
HW/SW interface is built on the PCI HW/SW interface, the two interfaces de-
scribe different HW/SW interface protocols and are logically separate.
We have observed a common development process for device/driver frameworks
in industrial settings as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The process contains three stages:
Design stage. Usually, a device/driver framework is designed by a group of
hardware and software companies together. The HW/SW interface is described in
59
a draft English specification which is shared between these participant companies
for revision. Engineers from these companies proof-read the English specification
and try to identify potential problems in the HW/SW interface design. However,
there are no automatic tools that can be used to help identify specification problems
because the HW/SW interface protocols are not formally specified.
Development stage. After the English specification has been agreed upon by
the participant companies, it is made public. The companies will start to develop
their own hardware (respectively, software) products for this device/driver frame-
work based on the English specification. During this stage, other companies, who
have not participated in the design stage, may also develop their own hardware
(respectively, software) products that are compliant with this device/driver frame-
work. How well a product complies with the HW/SW interface protocol depends
greatly on the development engineers’ interpretations of the English specification.
In order to further ensure the HW/SW interface compliance, a product also needs
to be tested according to the English specification. Because test engineers from
different companies may have their own interpretations of the specification, the test
cases vary; therefore, the test coverage of different products can be significantly
different, as well as the products’ quality in terms of the HW/SW interface com-
patibilities. Figure 3.16 illustrates such an example, which contains two excerpts
respectively from a Linux driver and a Windows driver for the same hardware
device, the Intel 8255x 10/100Mbps Ethernet controller. The two C functions re-
spectively illustrated in Figure 3.16a and Figure 3.16b have the same functionality
which is to issue a software command to the device; however, the implementations
are different. Before issuing a new command, the Linux driver always waits until
the command register becomes free (this rule is indicated by the English specifica-
tion); however the Windows driver does not wait before issuing any new command
unless the parameter WaitForScb is set to be true, a performance optimization.
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int e100 exec cmd( nic *nic, u8 cmd,
dma addr t dma addr ) {
int err = 0;
. . .
spin lock irqsave( . . . );
/* Previous command is accepted when SCB clears */
for (i = 0; i < E100 WAIT SCB TIMEOUT; i++) {
/* If last command has been completed */
if (likely(!ioread8(&nic->csr->scb.cmd lo))) break;
cpu relax();
if (unlikely(i > E100 WAIT SCB FAST)) udelay(5);
}
/* If last command timeout */
if (unlikely(i == E100 WAIT SCB TIMEOUT)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto err unlock;
}
/* Issue a new command */
if (unlikely(cmd != cuc resume))
iowrite32(dma addr, &nic->csr->scb.gen ptr);
iowrite8(cmd, &nic->csr->scb.cmd lo);
err unlock: spin unlock irqrestore( . . . );
return err;
}
(a) Linux driver code excerpt.
NTSTATUS D100IssueScbCommand(
PFDO DATA FdoData,
PUCHAR ScbCommandLow,
BOOLEAN WaitForScb ) {
// Wait for the last command to complete?
if ( WaitForScb == TRUE ) {
// If last command timeout
if ( !WaitScb(FdoData) )
return
(STATUS DEVICE DATA ERROR);
}
// Issue a new command
WRITE REGISTER UCHAR (
((PUCHAR)(FdoData->CSRAddress +
SCB COMMAND LOW BYTE),
ScbCommandLow );
return (STATUS SUCCESS);
}
(b) Windows driver code excerpt.
Figure 3.16: Excerpts from the Linux and Windows drivers for the Intel 8255x
10/100Mbps Ethernet controller.
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Obviously, the Windows driver is more efficient, because it tries to avoid unneces-
sary checks on hardware registers. On the other hand, it is also more challenging
to maintain the driver’s correctness, because the driver developer must guaran-
tee that when D100IssueScbCommand is called with WaitForScb being FALSE, the
command register should always be free.
Post-release stage. After a product passes in-house testing, the company may
choose to ship it to market directly or send it to a third-party organization for
conformance testing. Conformance testing decides whether a hardware (respec-
tively, software) product complies with the HW/SW interface protocol. Test cases
are developed by engineers from the third-party organization based on the English
specification. The effectiveness of the test cases highly relies on the engineers’
interpretations of the specification. The product passes the certification if all the
test cases succeed.
As discussed above, English specifications serve an important role to ensure
the reliability of HW/SW interface implementations. Not only are the products
developed based on English specifications, but the validation processes also rely
on the precise understanding of English specifications.
In our approach of formalizing HW/SW interface specifications, formal mod-
els are employed to describe the HW/SW interface protocols instead of English
specifications as illustrated in Figure 1.3. Our approach improves the development
process of devices and drivers in the following four aspects:
• In the design stage of a device/driver framework, automatic verification tools
are applied to check the correctness of the formal model which describes the
HW/SW interface protocol. This is more efficient and reliable than manual
proof reading.
• During the development of a product, the formal model is referred to rather
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than the English specification; therefore, it is easier for both development en-
gineers and test engineers to have precise understanding about how hardware
and software should interact following the HW/SW interface protocol.
• During in-house testing, because the formal model closely resembles the
implementation semantics of both hardware and software, it can be read-
ily utilized by validation techniques such as co-verification [49, 50] and co-
simulation [56] (also see Section 8.2). This not only reduces the duplicate
efforts in developing test harnesses but also provides a uniform and system-
atic platform for validation.
• In conformance testing, the formal model can also serve as the golden model.
Two types of testing can be applied. First, equivalence checking/testing [70,
84, 87] can be used to check if a hardware (respectively, software) product
complies with the hardware (respectively, software) formal model. Second, a
hardware (respectively, software) formal model can be used as the test har-
ness of the software (respectively, hardware) products. Furthermore, because
the formal model is shared between manufacturing companies and certifica-
tion organizations, product issues discovered by certification organizations
will be easier to resolve with manufacturing companies.
Among these advantages, the ability to provide a uniform and systematic plat-
form for validation is very important. In traditional testing, because devices and
drivers are manufactured separately, some failures due to interface incompatibility
only occur when a specific version of device is combined with a specific version of
driver. It is hard to pinpoint the responsibility for such failures, because both the
device and the driver are black boxes (or at least one of them is). Using formal
specifications as the uniform validation platform will greatly relieve this problem.
Although formalizing the HW/SW interface specification can significantly help
the development process and improve the product reliability, we do not expect to
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abandon English documents completely, because there are five aspects we do not
specify in formalization:
• terminology definitions;
• introduction and architecture overview;
• non-interface-related specifications, e.g., device virtualization support;
• physical criteria, e.g., physical shapes and sizes of device interfaces; and
• timing criteria, e.g., the device initialization time (in milliseconds).
In other words, our formalization approach augments the English specifications of
HW/SW interface protocols by formal models, so that the interaction logic between
hardware and software can be precisely captured.
3.3.3 Evaluation Criteria
We propose four criteria for evaluating our approach: (1) whether a formal model is
easy to read compared to its English specification; (2) how to ensure the correctness
of the formal model, i.e., whether the HW/SW behaviors are correctly captured;
(3) how much manual effort is required in the formalization process; and (4) how
to compare the formal model with its English specification. We also present how
we categorize the English specification issues into two types.
Reference convenience. We discuss this criterion from the perspective of hard-
ware and software engineers respectively. In hardware design, it is very common
that a high-level model of a product is firstly specified using programming lan-
guages such as C or SystemC so that the correctness and performance of the
design can be evaluated by verification or simulation. After a hardware product
is actually implemented as RTL design, the high-level model can also serve as the
golden model for equivalence testing, because it is easier in practice to maintain
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the correctness of a high-level design rather than a complicated implementation
that is optimized for performance. For software development, we have interviewed
several device driver developers, they all agree that it is easier to refer to formal
models rather than English specifications for HW/SW interface protocols. There
mainly are two reasons: (1) device driver developers are familiar with the C lan-
guage; and (2) IDEs (Integrated Development Environments) such as Microsoft
Visual Studio [58] and Eclipse CDT (C/C++ Development Tooling) [29] can be
utilized to help review the formal models.
Correctness assurance. We argue that the correctness of formal models is easier
to maintain than that of English specifications, because in addition to manual
review, we can apply all kinds of tools in order to help validate the correctness
of formal models. For example, the C compiler alone can detect a large amount
of specification inconsistencies; we can also use our co-verification tool, CoVer, to
verify the correctness of formal models (see Chapter 7). Even for manual review,
reading formal models are easier than reading English specifications with the help
of IDEs.
Manual effort. The manual effort required in the specification of a formal model
mainly depends on the complexity of the HW/SW interface protocol and the ex-
perience of the specification engineer. In general, the complexity of a HW/SW
interface protocol can be approximately quantified by the size of its English doc-
ument (i.e., the number of pages); the experience of specification engineers can
be quantified by their years of experience in hardware and software development.
More quantification about the evaluation of manual effort is discussed in Chapter 7.
Comparison with the English specification. It is important to compare for-
mal models with their English specifications. Different English specifications may
describe HW/SW interface protocols in different levels of details. However, enough
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details must be included when specifying a formal model using our approach, be-
cause formal models are designed to closely resemble the HW/SW implementation
semantics. For example, an English specification may omit the input restrictions
on a device’s I/O port, however this detail must be specified explicitly in the for-
mal model, i.e., if the device’s input is not specified in the English specification,
non-deterministic values should be given as the input in the formal model. We
define a concept, model-document ratio, to help analyze the relation between a
formal model and its English specification. Given that the formal model has LFM
lines of modelC code and the English document has Pdoc pages of specification
about the HW/SW interface protocol, we define the model-document ratio1 as:
Definition 3.1. Model-Doc = LF M
Pdoc
When the Model-Doc ratio is high, it suggests that the HW/SW interface pro-
tocol is loosely described by the English specification; therefore, the deviations of
HW/SW interface behaviors in various products may be very high. This is a po-
tential hazard that can cause HW/SW interface incompatibility problems, because
the less information provided by the English specification, the more interpretations
development engineers have to make by their own. When the Model-Doc ratio is
low, it suggests that the English specification is elaborate, where the HW/SW in-
terface protocol is described in details. However, the lower a Model-Doc ratio is,
the higher possibility the English specification may have inconsistencies. In other
words, it is hard to maintain the consistency of an English specification when it is
elaborate (usually large) and the same rule about a HW/SW interface protocol is
described in many places.
Two types of specification issues in English documents.
1Since HW/SW interface specifications are presented in structured English, they are often
similar in format and structures (but different in the level of details). Therefore, the pages can
be used to indicate the size of the specifications.
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• Spec-inconsistency. Multiple places of an English specification are partially
contradictory to each other. For example, the first issue illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.8 is a spec-inconsistency issue, where the name RU contradicts the name
CU.
• Spec-incompleteness. The information provided by an English specification
is not enough to guide the implementation. As a result, engineers need to de-
velop products based on their own interpretations, which can cause product
failures due to the potential incompatibility between different HW/SW inter-
face implementations. The second issue of Figure 3.8 is a spec-incomplete-
ness issue, because the description about the CU HPQ Start command is
incomplete.
The two types of specification issues commonly exist even after an English specifi-
cation has been published for years and revised for several editions (see Chapter 7
for more examples). This is a strong reason for applying our approach, so that
HW/SW interface specifications can be checked by automatic tools for correctness.
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Chapter 4
CO-VERIFICATION MODEL
Chapter 3 has presented a co-specification framework for a system that contains
hardware, software, and a hardware/software (HW/SW) interface. The specifica-
tion cannot be formally analyzed until we provide a formal representation for it.
Automata theory, as a formal method, studies abstract machines that are useful
to represent concrete systems. These abstract machines usually capture only the
certain aspects of target systems, for example, their design logic. Therefore, anal-
ysis on abstract machines is not only more precise but also more efficient than that
on the original systems. Furthermore, the operations on abstract machines can be
studied with mathematical methods so that we can reason about the correctness
of the system designs.
Since hardware and software are designed in different approaches, they are com-
monly represented by different formal models. Because hardware has a bounded
state space, finite state machines, such as Bu¨chi automata, are commonly used
as hardware formal models. On the other hand, software programs can have
unbounded stacks; therefore, pushdown systems are more suitable for software
compared to finite state machines. Since pushdown systems do not have input
alphabet, they cannot take inputs from hardware models. Therefore, we extend
pushdown systems to labeled pushdown systems, where each state transition of
a labeled pushdown system is labeled by a symbol defined on the states of the
hardware model.
Having separate formal models for hardware and software is cumbersome for
co-verification. A unifying model that combines the merits of Bu¨chi automata
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and labeled pushdown systems is desired so that hardware, software, and their
interactions can be analyzed together as an integrated system. A Bu¨chi pushdown
system, as the Cartesian product of a Bu¨chi automaton and a labeled pushdown
system, is such a unifying model. Bu¨chi pushdown systems capture both the
synchronous transitions and asynchronous transitions of hardware and software.
State transitions of formal models can be described in different ways. By defini-
tion, a state transition specifies a relation between two states, i.e., the current-state
which is the model state before the state transition and the next-state which is the
model state after the state transition. We refer to such representation as an explicit
representation. It is straightforward to explain algorithms using an explicit rep-
resentation. However, the implementation of explicit representations is inefficient
in practice, because complete state graphs must be built in order to realize any
analysis algorithm. By contrast, symbolic representations describe a set of state
transitions using a few symbolic rules. A symbolic rule, similar to a mapping func-
tion, specifies a relation between two sets of states, i.e., the set of current-states
which are the possible model states before the transitions and the set of next-states
which are the possible model states after the state transitions. Symbolic represen-
tations are more efficient than explicit representations in implementation. We will
discuss both the explicit representations and the symbolic representations for the
formal models used in co-verification.
4.1 BU¨CHI AUTOMATON AS HARDWARE MODEL
Formally, a hardware design can be represented as a BA B = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F ). More
specifically, the alphabet Σ is the power set of the set of propositions induced
by software interface events. In other words, the evaluation of the propositional
variables in Σ depends on whether a software interface event occurs. The set of
states Q represents the hardware states. The initial state q0 represents the initial
hardware state. The transition relation R describes the hardware behavior, i.e.,
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B = ( Σ, Q, δ, q0, F )
Σ = { ∅, {reset}, {no event}, {stop}, {reset, no event},
{no event, stop}, {reset, stop}, {reset, no event, stop} }
Q = { Init, Rst, Wrk, Idle, Intr }
δ = { t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10 }
t1 = Init
{reset}
−−−−−→ Rst
t2 = Wrk
{reset}
−−−−−→ Rst
t3 = Wrk
{stop}
−−−−→ Init
t4 = Rst
∅
−→ Rst
t5 = Rst
∅
−→ Wrk
t6 = Wrk
{no event}
−−−−−−−→ Idle
t7 = Wrk
{no event}
−−−−−−−→ Intr
t8 = Idle
{no event}
−−−−−−−→ Init
t9 = Init
{no event}
−−−−−−−→ Init
t10 = Intr
{no event}
−−−−−−−→ Wrk
q0 = Init
F = { Init, Wrk, Idle }
Init
Rst
Idle
reset{        }
Intr
Wrk
no_event
{              }
no_event{              }
reset{        }
st
op
{ 
   
   
 }
no_event{              }
no
_e
ve
nt
{ 
   
   
   
   
 }
Figure 4.1: A hardware design represented by BA.
how hardware should transition from current state to next state. The set of final
states (a.k.a., accepting states) F constrains the state transitions of the hardware
design in such a way that at least one of the final states should be visited infinitely
often.
Example. Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of a BA representing a hardware
design. This BA has five states: the initial state (Init), the resetting state (Rst),
the working state (Wrk), the idle state (Idle), and the interrupt triggering state
(Intr). The transitions are labeled by the sets of propositions that are induced by
software interface events. A transition is said to be enabled when all propositional
variables in its label are true. In this example, there are two software interface
events, i.e., reset and stop. The propositional variables reset and stop are true if
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and only if their corresponding software interface events occur. The propositional
variable no event is true if and only if no software interface event occurs. The
empty set ∅ is always considered as true. If two transitions starting from the same
state can be enabled by the same condition, the transitions are referred to as non-
deterministic transitions. For example, t4 and t5 are non-deterministic transitions
from the state Rst; and t6 and t7 are non-deterministic transitions from the state
Wrk. Note that the alphabet Σ is constructed strictly following its definition as the
power set of the set of propositions induced by software interface events; there-
fore, symbols such as {reset, no event} and {no event, stop} are elements of Σ by
definition. They do not have concrete meaning in this example.
This hardware design is in the initial state, Init, by default. It requires a
reset command from software in order to transition from the initial state to the
working state, Wrk. While in the working state, the hardware can raise an interrupt
by transitioning to the interrupt triggering state, Intr; it can also transition to
the idle state, Idle, and consequently, transition to the initial state. If there is
a software interface event stop, the hardware should transition from the working
state to the initial state. If there is a software interface event reset, the hardware
should transition from the working state to the resetting state, Rst. Since the
resetting process may take time to complete, a delay is modeled by a self-loop
transition on Rst, i.e., t4. However, a resetting process should not delay infinitely.
Both the resetting state and interrupt triggering state are intermediate states that
model the resetting process and interrupt triggering event respectively. Therefore,
the two states are not in the set of final states, F . An alternative way to specify
the set of final states is via an LTL formula, i.e., G (F (Init||Wrk||Idle)), which
states that one of the final states should be repeatedly visited.
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4.2 LABELED PUSHDOWN SYSTEM AS SOFTWARE MODEL
4.2.1 Representing Software Design
Formally, a software program can be represented as a PDS P = (G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉).
More specifically, the set of states G represents the states of global variables. The
set of strings Γ∗ represents the states of a stack. A configuration, denoted by
〈g, ω〉 ∈ G × Γ∗, represents a program state. The set of PDS rules ∆ represents
program statements. A PDS rule, written as 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, ω〉 ∈ (G×Γ)× (G×Γ∗),
summarizes a set of PDS state transitions in the form of 〈g, γv〉 ⇒ 〈g′, ωv〉, where
v ∈ Γ∗. Since the stack may be unbounded, a PDS can have infinite states;
therefore, the number of PDS transitions can also be infinite. However, the number
of PDS rules is finite. In general, there are three types of PDS rules:
• 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, γ′〉, where γ, γ′ ∈ Γ, i.e., the stack control location transitions
from γ to γ′ without a procedure call, e.g., through an assignment;
• 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, γ′γ′′〉, where γ, γ′, γ′′ ∈ Γ, i.e., a call to a procedure f such that
γ′ represents the entry point of f and γ′′ represents the return address of the
call;
• 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, ε〉, where γ ∈ Γ and ε denotes the empty string, i.e., a return
statement.
Example. Figure 4.2 shows how a Boolean program can be represented as a PDS
P = {G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉}, where
• G = {⋄, a, !a};
• Γ = {⊔, main0, main1, main2, main3, main4, main5, reset0, reset1, stop0,
stop1, NonHWRelated0, NonHWRelated1};
• ∆ is given in Figure 4.2b;
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decl a;
void main() begin
0 reset();
1 a := 0;
2 NonHWRelated();
3 if(a) then
4 stop();
fi
5 return;
end
void reset() begin
0 skip;
1 return
end
void NonHWRelated() begin
0 skip;
1 return
end
void stop() begin
0 skip;
1 return
end
(a) Boolean program.
〈g0, ω0〉 = 〈⋄,⊔〉, i.e., the initial configuration.
〈⋄, ⊔〉 →֒ 〈!a, main0〉
〈⋄, ⊔〉 →֒ 〈a, main0〉
〈·, main0〉 →֒ 〈·, reset0 main1〉
“·” is used when the rules (1) do not modify a; and
(2) are not affected by the value of a.
〈a, main1〉 →֒ 〈!a, main2〉
〈!a, main1〉 →֒ 〈!a, main2〉
〈·, main2〉 →֒ 〈·, NonHWRelated0 main3〉
〈a, main3〉 →֒ 〈a, main4〉
〈!a, main3〉 →֒ 〈!a, main5〉
〈·, main4〉 →֒ 〈·, stop0 main5〉
〈·, main5〉 →֒ 〈·, ε〉
〈·, reset0〉 →֒ 〈·, reset1〉
〈·, reset1〉 →֒ 〈·, ε〉
〈·, NonHWRelated0〉 →֒ 〈·, NonHWRelated1〉
〈·, NonHWRelated1〉 →֒ 〈·, ε〉
〈·, stop0〉 →֒ 〈·, stop1〉
〈·, stop1〉 →֒ 〈·, ε〉
(b) Corresponding PDS rules.
Figure 4.2: Representing a Boolean program using PDS.
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• 〈g0, ω0〉 = 〈⋄,⊔〉.
The Boolean program has a global variable a and four procedures named main,
reset, NonHWRelated, and stop. The entry point of the program is the first state-
ment of main, where the stack location is denoted by main0. For every program
statement, there are several corresponding PDS rules that model the transitions
of both the stack locations and the data (e.g., the value of a). Since the global
variable a is not initialized, there are two non-deterministic rules from the initial
configuration to the configurations 〈a,main0〉 and 〈!a,main0〉 respectively. A cen-
ter dot “·” is used to simplify the representation of the PDS rules that (1) do not
modify the data; and (2) are not affected by the value of the data.
This program is designed to operate hardware. The two procedures reset and
stop are used to reset or stop the hardware respectively. Conceptually, a software
interface event occurs when the entry stack location of such a procedure is reached.
For example, when reset0 is reached, the software interface event, reset, occurs;
therefore, the propositional variable reset (see Figure 4.1) is evaluated as true. On
the other hand, the Boolean program also can have computation steps that are
not related to any hardware operations. For example, the propositional variable
no event is true on every stack location of the procedure NonHWRelated. In other
words, the program statements in NonHWRelated do not operate hardware.
4.2.2 Accepting Inputs from Hardware
While PDS is a suitable model for programs, it is not designed to accept any
inputs. In co-verification, hardware behaviors may also affect software executions,
e.g., through an interrupt; therefore, the PDS software model should be extended
to accept inputs from the BA hardware model.
74
Definition 4.1. A Labeled Pushdown System (LPDS), an extension of a push-
down system, is denoted as P = (I, G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉), where I is a finite in-
put alphabet, G is a finite set of global states, Γ is a finite stack alphabet,
∆ ⊆ (G × Γ) × I × (G × Γ∗) is a finite set of transition rules, and 〈g0, ω0〉 is
the initial configuration. An LPDS rule is written as 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉 ∈ ∆.
LPDS extends PDS in such a way that a rule in ∆ is labeled by a symbol in
I. In the context of co-verification, I is defined as the power set of the set of
propositions that may hold on a state of B. In the rest of this dissertation, the
notation P represents an LPDS unless it is indicated otherwise. A path of P on
an infinite input string, τ0τ1 . . . τi . . ., is written as c0
τ0⇒ c1
τ1⇒ . . . ci
τi⇒ . . ., where
ci ∈ Conf(P), i ≥ 0. The path is also referred to as a trace if c0 = 〈g0, w0〉 is the
initial configuration. Given an input string s, the reachability relation between
two configurations c, c′ ∈ Conf(P) is written as c
s
⇒∗c′. It can also be written as
c⇒∗ c′ if the input string is irrelevant to the context.
Example. In Figure 4.1, the hardware design raises an interrupt when it transi-
tions to the interrupt triggering state, Intr. This hardware interface event should
cause a context-switch in software so that the software’s Interrupt Service Routine
(ISR) will be executed. Figure 4.3a shows the implementation of such an ISR pro-
cedure. The PDS software model illustrated in Figure 4.2 can then be extended
to an LPDS P = (I, G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉) in such a way that:
• I = {∅, {intr}, {no intr}, {intr, no intr}}, where the propositional variable
intr is true if and only if the BA (in Figure 4.1) is at the state Intr; otherwise
the propositional variable no intr is true. Note that {intr, no intr} is an
element of I by definition, although it does not have concrete meaning in
this example;
• G = {⋄, a, !a};
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void isr() begin
0 a := 1;
1 return;
end
(a) ISR in Boolean program.
〈a, isr0〉 ֒
∅
−→ 〈a, isr1〉
〈!a, isr0〉 ֒
∅
−→ 〈a, isr1〉
〈·, isr1〉 ֒
∅
−→ 〈·, ε〉
(b) Corresponding LPDS rules.
Figure 4.3: An Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) procedure specified in Boolean
program and LPDS respectively.
• Γ = {⊔, main0, main1, main2, main3, main4, main5, reset0, reset1, stop0,
stop1, NonHWRelated0, NonHWRelated1, isr0, isr1};
• ∆ is given in Figure 4.3b, Figure 4.4b and Figure 4.5b, where all rules are
labeled by symbols in I;
• 〈g0, ω0〉 = 〈⋄,⊔〉.
An LPDS rule is said to be enabled when all propositional variables of its label are
evaluated as true. Since the empty set, ∅, is always true, an LPDS rule labeled by
∅ is always enabled regardless the current state of the BA. All LPDS rules for the
ISR procedure are labeled by ∅, because ISR has the highest execution priority.
When an ISR is being executed, no more hardware interrupts can be serviced by
software. On the other hand, procedures with the lower execution priority, such
as main, can be interrupted by hardware; therefore their LPDS rules are labeled
by the set {no intr}. A special kind of rule (bold in the figures) is introduced
to model the context-switch to ISR when an interrupt is raised. These rules are
all labeled by the set {intr}, i.e., when hardware raises an interrupt, ISR should
preempt the current executing procedure to service the interrupt.
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decl a;
void main() begin
0 reset();
1 a := 0;
2 NonHWRelated();
3 if(a) then
4 stop();
fi
5 return;
end
(a) Boolean program.
〈g0, ω0〉 = 〈⋄,⊔〉, i.e., the initial configuration.
〈⋄, ⊔〉 ֒
∅
−→ 〈!a, main0〉
〈⋄, ⊔〉 ֒
∅
−→ 〈a, main0〉
〈·, main0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, reset0 main1〉
〈·, main0〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 main0〉
〈a, main1〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈!a, main2〉
〈!a, main1〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈!a, main2〉
〈·, main1〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 main1〉
〈·, main2〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, NonHWRelated0 main3〉
〈·, main2〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 main2〉
〈a, main3〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈a, main4〉
〈!a, main3〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈!a, main5〉
〈·, main3〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 main3〉
〈·, main4〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, stop0 main5〉
〈·, main4〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 main4〉
〈·, main5〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, ε〉
〈·, main5〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 main5〉
(b) Corresponding LPDS rules.
Figure 4.4: Representing the procedure main using LPDS.
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void reset() begin
0 skip;
1 return
end
void NonHWRelated() begin
0 skip;
1 return
end
void stop() begin
0 skip;
1 return
end
(a) Boolean program.
〈·, reset0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, reset1〉
〈·, reset0〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 reset0〉
〈·, reset1〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, ε〉
〈·, reset1〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 reset1〉
〈·, NonHWRelated0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, NonHWRelated1〉
〈·, NonHWRelated0〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 NonHWRelated0〉
〈·, NonHWRelated1〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, ε〉
〈·, NonHWRelated1〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 NonHWRelated1〉
〈·, stop0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, stop1〉
〈·, stop0〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 stop0〉
〈·, stop1〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−−→ 〈·, ε〉
〈·, stop1〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−−→ 〈·, isr0 stop1〉
(b) Corresponding LPDS rules.
Figure 4.5: Representing the procedures reset, etc. using LPDS.
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4.3 UNIFYING MODEL FOR CO-VERIFICATION
As discussed in the previous sections, BA is a suitable model for hardware designs
and LPDS is a suitable model for software programs. The state transitions of both
the BA and LPDS are labeled by the symbols induced by the interface events of
each other, so that the two models are synchronized. It is further desired that a
unifying model is built to combine the BA and LPDS; therefore their behaviors
can be analyzed together as an integrated system.
4.3.1 Preliminaries
Given a BA B = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F ) and an LPDS P = (I, G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉), we define
two labeling functions such that
• LP2B : (G × Γ) → Σ, which associates the head of an LPDS configuration
with the set of propositions that hold on it. Given a configuration c ∈
Conf(P), we write LP2B(c) instead of LP2B(head(c)) for simplicity in the
rest of this dissertation.
• LB2P : Q → I, which associates a state of B with the set of propositions
that hold on it.
Three concepts are defined using the labeling functions: enabledness, indistin-
guishability, and independence.
Enabledness
A BA transition t = q
σ
→ q′ ∈ δ is enabled by an LPDS configuration c ∈ Conf(P)
(respectively, an LPDS rule r = c
τ
→֒ c′ ∈ ∆) if and only if σ ⊆ LP2B(c); otherwise t
is disabled by c (respectively, r). On the other hand, an LPDS rule r = c
τ
→֒ c′ ∈ ∆
is enabled by a BA state q ∈ Q (respectively, a BA transition t = q
σ
→ q′ ∈ δ) if
and only if τ ⊆ LB2P(q); otherwise r is disabled by q (respectively, t).
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Example 1. Given the following BA transition, LPDS rule, and instances of
the labeling functions:
• a BA transition, t = Rst
∅
−→ Wrk, as illustrated in Figure 4.1;
• an LPDS rule, r = 〈a, main3〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈a, main4〉, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.4b;
• LP2B(〈a, main3〉) = {no event};
• LB2P(Rst) = {no intr}.
Because ∅ ⊆ LP2B(〈a, main3〉), t is enabled by the LPDS rule r as well as all LPDS
configurations in the form of 〈a, main3 v〉, where v ∈ Γ
∗; because {no intr} ⊆
LB2P(Rst), r is enabled by the BA transition t as well as the BA state Rst.
Example 2. Given the following BA transition, LPDS rule, and instances of
the labeling functions:
• a BA transition, t = Wrk
{stop}
−−−→ Init, as illustrated in Figure 4.1;
• an LPDS rule, r = 〈a, main0〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−→ 〈a, isr0 main0〉, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.4b;
• LP2B(〈a, main0〉) = {no event};
• LB2P(Wrk) = {no intr}.
Because {stop} * LP2B(〈a, main0〉), t is disabled by the LPDS rule r as well
as all LPDS configurations in the form of 〈a, main0 v〉, where v ∈ Γ
∗; because
{intr} * LB2P(Wrk), r is disabled by the BA transition t as well as the BA state
Wrk.
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Indistinguishability
Given a BA transition t = q
σ
→ q′ ∈ δ, two LPDS configurations c, c′ ∈ Conf(P)
are (respectively, an LPDS rule r = c
τ
→֒ c′ ∈ ∆ is) indistinguishable to t if
and only if σ ⊆ LP2B(c) ∩ LP2B(c
′), i.e., t is enabled by both c and c′. On the
other hand, given an LPDS rule r = c
τ
→֒ c′ ∈ ∆, two BA states q, q′ ∈ Q are
(respectively, a BA transition t = q
σ
→ q′ ∈ δ is) indistinguishable to r if and only
if τ ⊆ LB2P(q) ∩ LB2P(q
′), i.e., r is enabled by both q and q′.
Although the antonym of the word indistinguishable should be distinguishable,
it is not used to describe the negation of indistinguishability. This is because when
an LPDS rule r is disabled by both the BA states q and q′, it is inappropriate to
say that q and q′ are distinguishable1 to r. As an alternative, q and q′ are said to
be not indistinguishable to r.
Example 1. Given the following BA transition, LPDS rule, and instances of
the labeling functions:
• a BA transition, t = Intr
{no event}
−−−−−−→ Wrk, as illustrated in Figure 4.1;
• an LPDS rule, r = 〈a, main0〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−→ 〈a, isr0 main0〉, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.4b;
• LP2B(〈a, main0〉) = {no event} and LP2B(〈a, isr0〉) = {no event};
• LB2P(Intr) = {intr} and LB2P(Wrk) = {no intr}.
Because {no event} ⊆ LP2B(〈a, main0〉) ∩ LP2B(〈a, isr0〉), r is indistinguishable
to t; because {intr} * LB2P(Intr) ∩ LB2P(Wrk), t is not indistinguishable to r.
Example 2. Given the following BA transition, LPDS rule, and instances of
the labeling functions:
1The word indistinguishable is inappropriate neither, because we are interested in the relation
between a BA transition and an LPDS rule only when they enable each other.
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• a BA transition, t = Wrk
{stop}
−−−→ Init, as illustrated in Figure 4.1;
• an LPDS rule, r = 〈!a, stop0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈!a, stop1〉, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.5b;
• LP2B(〈!a, stop0〉) = {stop} and LP2B(〈!a, stop1〉) = {no event};
• LB2P(Wrk) = {no intr} and LB2P(Init) = {no intr}.
Because {stop} * LP2B(〈!a, stop0〉) ∩ LP2B(〈!a, stop1〉), r is not indistinguishable
to t; because {no intr} ⊆ LB2P(Wrk) ∩ LB2P(Init), t is indistinguishable to r.
Independence
Given a BA transition t ∈ δ and an LPDS rule r ∈ ∆, if they are indistinguishable
to each other, t and r are said to be independent; otherwise if either t or r is not
indistinguishable to the other but they still enable each other, t and r are said to
be dependent. The independence relation is symmetric.
Example 1. Given the following BA transition, LPDS rule, and instances of
the labeling functions:
• a BA transition, t = Rst
∅
−→ Wrk, as illustrated in Figure 4.1;
• an LPDS rule, r = 〈a, main3〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈a, main4〉, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.4b;
• LP2B(〈a, main3〉) = {no event} and LP2B(〈a, main4〉) = {no event};
• LB2P(Rst) = {no intr} and LB2P(Wrk) = {no intr}.
Because ∅ ⊆ LP2B(〈a, main3〉) ∩ LP2B(〈a, main4〉), r is indistinguishable to t;
because {no intr} ⊆ LB2P(Rst)∩LB2P(Wrk), t is indistinguishable to r. Therefore,
t and r are independent.
Example 2. Given the following BA transition, LPDS rule, and instances of
the labeling functions:
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• a BA transition, t = Wrk
{stop}
−−−→ Init, as illustrated in Figure 4.1;
• an LPDS rule, r = 〈!a, stop0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈!a, stop1〉, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.5b;
• LP2B(〈!a, stop0〉) = {stop} and LP2B(〈!a, stop1〉) = {no event};
• LB2P(Wrk) = {no intr} and LB2P(Init) = {no intr}.
Because {stop} * LP2B(〈!a, stop0〉) ∩ LP2B(〈!a, stop1〉), r is not indistinguishable
to t; because {no intr} ⊆ LB2P(Wrk) and {stop} ⊆ LP2B(〈!a, stop0〉), t and r
enable each other. Therefore, t and r are dependent.
4.3.2 Bu¨chi Pushdown System (BPDS)
Definition 4.2. Given a BA B = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F ) and an LPDS P = (I, G,Γ,∆,
〈g0, ω0〉), a Bu¨chi Pushdown System (BPDS), denoted by BP , is the Cartesian
product of B and P. Formally, BP = (G×Q,Γ,∆′, 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉, F
′), where G×Q,
as the product of G and Q, is the set of global states; Γ is the stack alphabet from
P; ∆′ is constructed by Algorithm 4.1 from δ and ∆; 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉 is the initial
configuration; 〈(g, q), γ〉 ∈ F ′ if q ∈ F , where g ∈ G and γ ∈ Γ.
Algorithm 4.1 does not create a strict Cartesian product of the transition rules
from B and P respectively. Given a BA transition t = q
σ
→ q′ from δ and an LPDS
rule r = 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉 from ∆, the algorithm constructs BPDS rules from t and
r only if they enable each other. When t and r are dependent, B and P must tran-
sition together, which is modeled by the BPDS rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉.
In such situation, the BPDS rule represents synchronous transitions of B and P.
In other words, B and P cannot transition in an interleaved manner, because one
transition may disable the other. When t and r are independent, B and P can tran-
sition asynchronously. There are three types of BPDS rules, i.e., B transitions and
P self-loops as modeled by the BPDS rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉, P transitions
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Algorithm 4.1 BPDSRules(δ ×∆)
1: ∆sycn ← ∅ ∆hori ← ∅, ∆vert ← ∅, ∆diag ← ∅
2: for all r = 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉 ∈ ∆ do
3: for all t = q
σ
→ q′ ∈ δ and σ ⊆ LP2B(〈g, γ〉) and τ ⊆ LB2P(q) do
4: if r and t are dependent then
5: {B and P must transition together}
6: ∆sync ← ∆sync
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉}
7: else
8: {B transitions and P self-loops}
9: ∆hori ← ∆hori
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉}
10: {P transitions and B self-loops}
11: ∆vert ← ∆vert
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉}
12: {B and P transition together}
13: ∆diag ← ∆diag
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉}
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: ∆′ ← ∆sync
⋃
∆hori
⋃
∆vert
⋃
∆diag
18: return ∆′
and B self-loops as modeled by the BPDS rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉, and B
and P transition together as modeled by the BPDS rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉.
There is one self-loop BA transition, q
σ
−→ q, used in the first BPDS rule; and there
is one self-loop LPDS rule, 〈g, γ〉 ֒
τ
−→ 〈g, γ〉, used in the second BPDS rule. These
self-loop transitions/rules may not exist in the original design of B or P; however, it
is necessary to introduce such self-loop transitions/rules so that the asynchronous
transitions between B and P can be modeled. Let Bloop denote the BA with the
self-loop transitions introduced to B and Ploop denote the LPDS with the self-loop
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transitions introduced to P. Algorithm 4.1 actually constructs a set of BPDS rules
as the Cartesian product of the transition rules from Bloop and Ploop respectively.
The input alphabets Σ and I are used to synchronize the BA transitions and
LPDS rules. Once BP is constructed, these input alphabets are no longer useful;
therefore, they are not in the definition of BP . A configuration of BP is denoted by
〈(g, q), ω〉 ∈ (G×Q)× Γ∗. The set of all configurations is denoted by Conf(BP).
The head2 of a configuration c = 〈(g, q), γv〉 (γ ∈ Γ, v ∈ Γ∗) is 〈(g, q), γ〉 and
denoted by head(c). Similarly the head of a rule r = 〈(g, q), γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈(g′, q′), ω〉
is 〈(g, q), γ〉 and denoted by head(r). Given a BPDS rule r = 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP
〈(g′, q′), ω〉 ∈ ∆′, for every v ∈ Γ∗ the configuration 〈(g, q), γv〉 is an immediate pre-
decessor of 〈(g′, q′), ωv〉, and 〈(g′, q′), ωv〉 is an immediate successor of 〈(g, q), γv〉.
The immediate successor relation in BPDS is written as 〈(g, q), γv〉 ⇒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ωv〉,
where we say this state transition follows the BPDS rule r. The reachability re-
lation, ⇒∗BP , is the reflexive and transitive closure of the immediate successor
relation.
A path of BP , denoted φ, is a sequence of BPDS configurations, c0 ⇒BP
c1 . . . ⇒BP ci ⇒BP . . ., where i ≥ 0, ci ∈ Conf(BP), and φ(i) = ci denotes the
ith configuration on the path. The path is also referred to as a trace of BP if
c0 = 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉 is the initial configuration.
Definition 4.3. Given a BPDS path φ, the Bu¨chi constraint of BPDS requires
that if φ is infinitely long, it should have infinite many occurrences of BPDS con-
figurations from the set { c | head(c) ∈ F ′ }.
Given a BPSD path φ, it is straightforward to infer that:
• the projection of φ on B, denoted by φB, is a path of B; and
• the projection of φ on P, denoted by φP , is a path of P.
2Note that a BPDS head can also be considered as a special type of BPDS configuration.
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Note that φB does not contain any self-loop BA transition; and φP does not contain
any self-loop LPDS transition, as introduced by Algorithm 4.1.
Complexity analysis. For every LPDS rule, Algorithm 4.1 explores all BA
transitions to construct the BPDS rules; therefore, it takes O(|δ| × |∆|) time.
We denote the set of BPDS rules constructed by Algorithm 4.1 as ∆′ = δ × ∆.
Apparently, |δ| × |∆| 6= |δ ×∆|, since Algorithm 4.1 constructs BPDS rules based
on the information whether the LPDS rule and BA transition enable each other.
Therefore, the algorithm takes O(|δ ×∆|) space to store the new BPDS rules.
Example. A BPDS model BP = (G × Q,Γ,∆′, 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉, F
′) is constructed
using the BA example illustrated in Section 4.1 and the LPDS example illustrated
in Section 4.2.2 as follows:
• G×Q = {(⋄, Init), (⋄, Rst), (⋄, Wrk), (⋄, Idle), (⋄, Intr), (a, Init),
(a, Rst), (a, Wrk), (a, Idle), (a, Intr), (!a, Init), (!a, Rst), (!a, Wrk),
(!a, Idle), (!a, Intr)};
• Γ = {⊔, main0, main1, main2, main3, main4, main5, reset0, reset1, stop0,
stop1, NonHWRelated0, NonHWRelated1, isr0, isr1};
• ∆′ is constructed according to Algorithm 4.1. Figure 4.6 illustrates an ex-
ample of constructing the BPDS rules;
• 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉 = 〈(⋄, Init),⊔〉;
• F = { 〈(g, Init), γ〉, 〈(g, Wrk), γ〉, 〈(g, Idle), γ〉 }, where g ∈ G and γ ∈ Γ.
Figure 4.6, item 1 demonstrates the case where the LPDS rule and BA transitions
are independent and self-loop rules/transitions are introduced to the BA or LPDS
in order to model the asynchronous transitions. Item 2 demonstrates the case
where LPDS rules and BA transitions are dependent, the BPDS rules should be
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1. Given an LPDS rule 〈a, main1〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈!a, main2〉, for all BA transitions,
the following BPDS rules are constructed by Algorithm 4.1:
〈(a, Init), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Init), main2〉 〈(a, Rst), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Rst), main2〉
〈(a, Rst), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Wrk), main2〉 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Idle), main2〉
〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Intr), main2〉 〈(a, Idle), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Init), main2〉
〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Wrk), main2〉 〈(a, Idle), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Idle), main2〉
〈(a, Init), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Init), main1〉 〈(a, Rst), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Rst), main1〉
〈(a, Rst), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Idle), main1〉
〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Intr), main1〉 〈(a, Idle), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Init), main1〉
2. Given an LPDS rule 〈·, main1〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−→ 〈·, isr0 main1〉, for all BA transitions,
the following BPDS rule is constructed by Algorithm 4.1 (it is actually two
rules, since “.” represents a or !a):
〈(·, Intr), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(·, Wrk), isr0 main1〉
3. Given an LPDS rule 〈·, reset0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈·, reset1〉, for all BA transitions,
the following BPDS rules are constructed by Algorithm 4.1:
〈(·, Init), reset0〉 →֒BP 〈(·, Rst), reset1〉 〈(·, Wrk), reset0〉 →֒BP 〈(·, Rst), reset1〉
〈(·, Rst), reset0〉 →֒BP 〈(·, Rst), reset1〉 〈(·, Rst), reset0〉 →֒BP 〈(·, Wrk), reset1〉
〈(·, Rst), reset0〉 →֒BP 〈(·, Rst), reset0〉 〈(·, Rst), reset0〉 →֒BP 〈(·, Wrk), reset0〉
Figure 4.6: Example of constructing BPDS rules. The bold rules are constructed
by introducing self-loop transitions to B or P.
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constructed in such a way that can represent the synchronous transitions between
the BA and LPDS. For item 3, since the LPDS rule 〈·, reset0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈·, reset1〉
is dependent with the BA transitions Init
{reset}
−−−−→ Rst and Wrk
{reset}
−−−−→ Rst, the first
two BPDS rules are constructed to represent the synchronous transitions between
the BA and LPDS. On the other hand, since the LPDS rule is independent with
the BA transitions Rst
∅
−→ Rst and Rst
∅
−→ Wrk, the rest four BPDS rules are
constructed to represent the asynchronous transitions.
4.3.3 BPDS Loop Constraint
According to the BPDS rules shown in Figure 4.6, there exists an infinite path
φ = 〈(a, Rst), main1〉 ⇒BP 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 ⇒BP 〈(a, Idle), main1〉 ⇒BP
〈(a, Init), main1〉 ⇒BP 〈(a, Init), main1〉 . . .. Because the BA B and LPDS P
can transition asynchronously at the BPDS configurations on φ, it is possible that
B keeps on moving forward while P self-loops. However, after reaching the configu-
ration 〈(a, Init), main1〉, the BPDS BP starts to self-loop forever, where the self-
loop transition follows the BPDS rule 〈(a, Init), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Init), main1〉.
This BPDS rule is constructed from the BA transition Init
{no event}
−−−−−−→ Init and
the LPDS rule 〈a, main1〉 ֒
no intr
−−−−→ 〈a, main1〉. The BA transition belongs to the
original design of B, which indicates that B can self-loop at the state Init. How-
ever, the LPDS rule is a self-loop rule introduced to P in order to model the
asynchronous transitions between B and P. This type of self-loop rule should not
affect the fairness of other rules that belong to the original design. In other words,
since P always self-loops at the configuration 〈(a, Init), main1〉, no transition
that belongs to the original design of P occurs on the path φ. Therefore, φ is not
a path of BP and should be ruled out.
Definition 4.4. BPDS loop constraint. Given any infinite BPDS path φ, it
must satisfy the requirements such that φB and φP are also infinite. In other
words, the BA (respectively, LPDS) transitions that are not self-loop transitions
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introduced to ∆vert (respectively, ∆hori) in Algorithm 4.1 should occur infinitely
often on φ.
The BPDS loop constraint requires that the transitions from δ or ∆ repeatedly
occur on all BPDS paths. It implies the fairness between B and P, because either
B or P needs to repeatedly transition to satisfy the constraint. However, B and/or
P can still self-loop infinitely if their designs contain self-loop transitions. For
example, since the design of B contains a self-loop transition Init
{no event}
−−−−−−→ Init,
B can always self-loop at the state Init, which is not affected by the BPDS loop
constraint.
4.4 SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIONS
Algorithm 4.1 needs to explore every BA transition and every LPDS rule in order
to construct BPDS rules. The cost of the algorithm mainly depends the number of
BA transitions and LPDS rules, i.e., |δ|×|∆|. Furthermore, as we shall demonstrate
in Chapter 5, the complexity of the algorithms for BPDS depends highly on how
well the transition rules can be represented. Therefore, it is desired that both δ
and ∆ are represented in a compact way so that analyzing algorithms for BPDS
can be carried out more efficiently.
4.4.1 Symbolic representation of BA
Given a BA B = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F ), the set of transitions δ can be divided into several
subsets such that δ = δ1 ∪ δ2 ∪ . . . ∪ δn, where
• 0 < n ≤ |δ|;
• ∀i ∈ [1, n], ∃σ ∈ Σ, ∃τ ∈ I such that δi = {t|t = q
σ
−→ q′ ∈ δ, LB2P(q) = τ}.
This condition requires that the BA transitions in each subset not only have the
same input symbol but also enable the same LPDS rules. Therefore, a subset δi
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can be understood as a rule that describes a set of BA transitions. Normally, these
subsets are referred to as symbolic BA transition rules. This type of representation
is referred to as a symbolic representation. Given a BA state q and a symbolic
BA transition rule δi, δi(q) = q
′ represents the transition q
σ
−→ q′; while δi(q) =
ε indicates that δi is not applicable to q. Since a symbolic BA transition rule
describes BA transitions labeled by the same input symbol, a label on the rule is
unnecessary.
Example. Consider the BA example illustrated in Figure 4.1, the set of transitions
δ can be written as δ = δ1 ∪ δ2 ∪ δ3 ∪ δ4 ∪ δ5, where
• δ1 = Q× {{reset}} ×Q = {t1, t2},
LB2P(Init) = LB2P(Wrk) = {no intr};
• δ2 = Q× {{stop}} ×Q = {t3},
LB2P(Wrk) = {no intr};
• δ3 = Q× {∅} ×Q = {t4, t5},
LB2P(Rst) = {no intr};
• δ4 = Q× {{no event}} ×Q = {t6, t7, t8, t9},
LB2P(Init) = LB2P(Wrk) = LB2P(Idle) = {no intr};
• δ5 = Q× {{no event}} ×Q = {t10},
LB2P(Intr) = {intr}.
Since the number of the symbolic BA transition rules, n = 5, is less than the
number of BA transitions, |δ| = 10, Algorithm 4.1 operates more efficiently on the
symbolic representation compared to the explicit representation. The rest of the
problem is how to describe these symbolic BA transition rules.
For various purposes, symbolic transition rules can be described at different
levels of abstraction. For example, a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) [16, 53] is a
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data structure commonly used to represent transition relations such as δ1, δ2, etc.
Because BDDs are compact and the logical operations on BDDs are efficient, model
checking algorithms usually utilize BDD representations for their target models.
Although BDD representations are efficient for automatic analysis, it is hard to
read or construct them manually.
Symbolic transition rules also can be described at a higher abstraction level
without BDD representations. Figure 4.7 illustrates an example of the symbolic
BA transition rules specified in the modelC language. The set of BA states Q is
described by the global variable Q. The five symbolic BA transition rules, δ1, δ2,
δ3, δ4, and δ5 are described by five hardware transaction functions (see definition in
Chapter 3), delta1, delta2, delta3, delta4, and delta5 respectively. Consider
ρ ⊆ Q as the current-states of BA, i.e., the BA states when entering a hardware
transaction function deltai (where 1 ≤ i ≤ 5), ρ′ ⊆ Q as the next-states of BA, i.e.,
the BA states when exiting deltai, and σ ∈ Σ as the label on δi, deltai specifies
the set of BA transitions in δi, i.e., ρ×{σ}×ρ
′. Each hardware transaction function
updates the value of Q based on Q’s current value. A symbolic BA transition rule
may not be applicable to certain states. For example, δ1 should not be applied to
states other than Init or Wrk. The keyword halt signifies that if the current state
of Q is not applicable for a rule, the state transition based on this rule should halt.
Non-deterministic transitions are specified using the non-deterministic function
choice. For example, delta3 specifies two non-deterministic transitions from the
state Rst to the states Rst and Wrk respectively.
4.4.2 Symbolic representation of LPDS
The control flow of a program refers to the order in which individual statements,
instructions, or function calls are evaluated; and data flow refers to how the value
of program variables should be updated along with the execution. The symbolic
representation of LPDS is based on the control flow and data flow. Given an LPDS
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enum { Init, Rst, Wrk, Idle, Intr } Q;
// δ1, labeled by {reset}
atomic void delta1() {
switch( Q ) {
case Init: Q = Rst; break;
case Wrk: Q = Rst; break;
// halt: current state is not applicable to
// delta1, since delta1 can only be applied
// to the states Init and Wrk
default: halt;
}
}
// δ3, labeled by ∅
atomic void delta3() {
switch( Q ) {
case Rst:
// model the non-deterministic
// transitions from Rst to
// Rst and Wrk respectively
if ( choice() ) Q = Rst;
else Q = Wrk;
break;
default: halt;
}
}
// δ2, labeled by {stop}
atomic void delta2() {
switch( Q ) {
case Wrk: Q = Init; break;
default: halt;
}
}
// δ4, labeled by {no event}
atomic void delta4() {
switch( Q ) {
case Wrk:
if ( choice() ) Q = Idle;
else Q = Intr;
break;
case Idle: Q = Init; break;
case Init: Q = Init; break;
default: halt;
}
}
// δ5, labeled by {no event}
atomic void delta5() {
switch( Q ) {
case Intr: Q = Wrk; break;
default: halt;
}
}
Figure 4.7: Symbolic BA transition rules specified in modelC.
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P = (I, G,Γ,∆, 〈g0, ω0〉), the global states can be written as G = Gc×Gd and the
stack alphabet can be written as Γ = Γc×Γd. A symbolic LPDS rule is written as
follows:
〈g, γ〉 ֒
τ
−→
R
〈g′, γ1 . . . γn〉,
where g, g′ ∈ Gc, γ, γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Γc, and R ⊆ (Gd×Γd)× (Gd×Γ
n
d ). Conceptually,
symbols from Gc and Γc describe the control flow of LPDS and symbols from Gd
and Γd describe the data flow of LPDS. A symbolic LPDS rule describes a set of
LPDS rules that are labeled by the same input symbol and have the same state
transition with respect to the control flow.
There are three motivations for separating the representation of control flow
and data flow. First, many properties focus on control flow instead of data flow
in software verification. For example, SLIC properties focus on the order of how
functions are entered or exited in the execution of a program. Second, the input
alphabet of BA is defined on the control flow of LPDS. For example, in Figure 4.2,
the propositional variable reset in Σ is evaluated as true when the stack location
reset0 is reached, which represents a software interface event that attempts to reset
hardware. Third, the separated representation can help the analysis of LPDS,
which will be utilized in Chapter 5 to optimize the model checking algorithm for
BPDS.
Similar to the symbolic representation of BA, the symbolic representation of
LPDS exists on different level of abstractions. BDDs are an efficient representation
for implementing model checking algorithms. However, a program can also be
considered as a symbolic representation of LPDS at a higher level of abstraction,
where each atomic statement of the program corresponding to a symbolic rule of
LPDS.
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4.4.3 Symbolic representation of BPDS
A symbolic LPDS rule describes multiple LPDS rules that may not necessarily have
the same head; a symbolic transition rule of BA describes multiple BA transitions
that may not necessarily have the same current-state, i.e., the state on the left
side of a BA transition. Therefore, the labeling functions should be modified to
support the symbolic representations as follows:
• L′P2B : (Gc × Γc) → Σ, which associates the control flow location of LPDS
with the set of propositions that hold on it;
• L′B2P : 2
δ → I, which associates a symbolic rule of BA with the set of
propositions that hold on it.
L′P2B is equivalent to LP2B, since the input alphabet of BA is defined on the control
flow of LPDS. L′B2P is equivalent to LB2P , since for all BA transitions described by
the same symbolic transition rule, their current-states should have the same label
by LB2P . After the labeling functions are defined for symbolic representations of
BA and LPDS, the indistinguishability relation and independence relation can be
defined for symbolic representations based on L′P2B and L
′
B2P .
Let BP = (G ×Q,Γ,∆′, 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉, F
′) be a BPDS. The symbolic represen-
tation of BP is constructed from the symbolic representations of B and P. A
symbolic BPDS rule, 〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉 ⊆ ∆′, has two parts. First, the state
transition regarding the control flow of P is explicitly specified. Second, the tran-
sition relation R′ ⊆ (Q×Gd×Γd)× (Q×Gd×Γ
|ω|
d ), associated with the symbolic
BPDS rule, describes a set of state transitions regarding both the states of B and
the data flow of P.
In order to model the asynchronous transitions between BA and LPDS, Al-
gorithm 4.1 introduces self-loop transitions to BA and LPDS respectively. For
symbolic representations, these self-loop transitions should be introduced to BA
and LPDS as well. Therefore, we need to define two self-loop transition relations:
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• Rloop ⊆ (Gd × Γd) × (Gd × Γ
∗
d) and ∀〈gd, γd〉 ∈ (Gd × Γd), Rloop(〈gd, γd〉) =
〈gd, γd〉, i.e., Rloop is a self-loop transition relation for data flow of LPDS;
• Uloop ⊆ Q×Σ×Q and ∀q ∈ Q,Uloop(q) = q, i.e., Uloop is a self-loop transition
relation for BA.
Given the set of symbolic BA transition rules δ and the set of symbolic LPDS
rules ∆, Algorithm 4.2 constructs the set of symbolic BPDS rules ∆′. Let R ⊆ ∆
Algorithm 4.2 SymbolicBPDSRules(δ ×∆)
1: ∆sycn ← ∅ ∆hori ← ∅, ∆vert ← ∅, ∆diag ← ∅
2: for all R = 〈g, γ〉 ֒
τ
−→
R
〈g′, ω〉 ⊆ ∆ do
3: for all U = Q× {σ} ×Q ⊆ δ and σ ⊆ L′P2B(〈g, γ〉) and τ ⊆ L
′
B2P(U) do
4: if R and U are dependent then
5: {B and P must transition together}
6: ∆sync ← ∆sync
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× U
7: else
8: {B transitions and P self-loops}
9: ∆hori ← ∆hori
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g, γ〉, where R
′ = Rloop × U
10: {P transitions and B self-loops}
11: ∆vert ← ∆vert
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× Uloop
12: {B and P transition together}
13: ∆diag ← ∆diag
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× U
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: ∆′ ← ∆sync
⋃
∆hori
⋃
∆vert
⋃
∆diag
18: return ∆′
and U ⊆ δ. IfR and U are dependent, B and P must transition together; therefore,
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a symbolic BPDS rule 〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉 is constructed, where R′ is the Cartesian
product of U and R (the transition relation associated withR). On the other hand,
if R and U are independent, B and P can transition asynchronously; therefore,
Algorithm 4.2 introduces self-loop transitions to B or P. When a symbolic BPDS
rule, 〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g, γ〉, is constructed to represent the situation that B transitions
and P self-loops, the transition relation R′ is constructed as the Cartesian product
of U and the self-loop transition relation Rloop. When a symbolic BPDS rule,
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, is constructed to represent the situation that P transitions
and B self-loops, the transition relation R′ is constructed as the Cartesian product
of the self-loop transition relation Uloop and R.
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Chapter 5
CO-VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
Formal verification has three basic elements. First, we need a model for abstracting
the target system. A system design usually has implementation details in various
aspects, e.g., design logic, power consumption, and physical layout. A model
captures only the interested aspects to be verified. As discussed in Chapter 4,
the Bu¨chi Pushdown System (BPDS) is the unifying model in our co-verification
framework. Second, we need a property which predicates the possible observations
that can be made of the model. A property simply has two values. If the obser-
vation of the model agrees with the predication, the property is said to be true on
the model. Otherwise, the property is said to be false on the model. Third, we
need a methodology to prove or disprove a property on the model. Model checking
is an automatic process that explores the state space of the model to verify the
property.
We commonly verify two types of properties in model checking. Safety prop-
erties are understood as “bad events never happen.” For example, a computer
system should never crash. Liveness properties are understood as “good events will
eventually happen.” For example, a program should eventually terminate. Due
to their differences, safety properties and liveness properties are usually treated
differently in verification. We will discuss the model checking algorithms for both
safety properties and liveness properties on BPDS.
Since a BPDS BP is the Cartesian product of a BA B and an LPDS P, the
size of the BP is very sensitive to how the Cartesian product is constructed. Al-
gorithm 4.1 constructs BPDS rules from the BA transitions and LPDS rules in a
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straightforward way. However, since B and P are mostly asynchronous, some of
their transition orders do not affect the properties to be verified. If model checking
can avoid exploring these transition orders, the verification cost should be greatly
reduced. Therefore, we can improve Algorithm 4.1 so that the unnecessary transi-
tion orders between B and P will not be explored in model checking. Our approach
follows the idea of static partial order reduction, where the reduction is applied
at compile time before model checking. As a result, no modification is required in
the model checking algorithm.
As discussed in Chapter 4, explicit representations of the BA and LPDS are
inefficient in practice. In contrast, we have two benefits using symbolic represen-
tations. First, the target systems are specified using programming languages such
as C, SystemC, modelC, etc., in co-verification. It is inefficient to translate these
programs into their explicit representations in order to construct a BPDS model.
Indeed, we can treat these programs as a symbolic representation of a BA or LPDS
and apply our reduction algorithms directly to the programs. Second, it is nei-
ther necessary nor efficient to build a complete state graph (even if it is possible)
for a BPDS during model checking. Symbolic model checking algorithms encode
the transition relation of a BPDS implicitly using data structures such as BDDs.
This approach can greatly alleviate the state explosion problem in model checking.
Obviously, the two benefits of symbolic representations exist on different levels of
abstractions; however the symbolic algorithms are described in a similar manner.
In this dissertation, we will elaborate on the first type of symbolic representation,
where the algorithms work directly on the programs in order to construct reduced
BPDS models.
5.1 MODEL CHECKING PROBLEMS OF BPDS
Given a property ϕ to be verified on a model M , if we consider ϕ as some kind of
state machine, the model checking problem of ϕ on M can be generally expressed
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as a process of checking whether the language of M is contained by the language
of ϕ, L(M) ⊆ L(ϕ). There are two types of properties:
• Safety properties refer to those critical requirements that ensure bad events
never happen. For example, SLIC rules (see Chapter 2) are all safety prop-
erties. The question of whether or not a safety property holds on a model
is equivalent to the problem of whether or not the model has a state that
violates the property and is reachable from the model’s initial state. The
second problem can be solved via reachability analysis.
• Liveness properties refer to those functional requirements that ensure good
events will eventually happen. For example, the LTL formula (see Chapter 2),
F a, states that the propositional variable a should eventually become true
at some time point starting from the model’s initial state. This verification
problem can be solved as two sub-problems. First, does there exist a path
from the initial state to a state on which a is evaluated as true? Second, if
the path exists, does there exist any loop on the path such that the event,
a becoming true, may be delayed infinitely? The first sub-problem can be
solved via reachability analysis and the second sub-problem can be solved
via loop computation.
In our co-verification framework, the formal model is a BPDS and the properties
are specified using SLIC rules or LTL formulae. When a property is specified using
a SLIC rule, we can solve the model checking problem through reachability analysis.
When a property is specified using an LTL formula, we need to construct a Bu¨chi
automaton to represent the negation of the formula. The model checking problem
is to compute whether the Bu¨chi automaton has an accepting run on a trace of
BPDS. Given a BPDS BP = (G × Q,Γ,∆′, 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉, F
′), the following sub-
sections discuss the reachability analysis problem and the LTL checking problem
of BP respectively.
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5.1.1 Reachability Analysis
A safety property can be specified as a label on a configuration of BP or a finite
state machine that monitors the state transition of BP . In both ways, verification
of the safety property can be solved via reachability analysis. For the first type of
safety property, the problem is to solve whether the labeled BPDS configuration
is reachable from the initial configuration. For the second type of safety property,
we can instrument BP using the property. The resulting transition system is still
considered as a BPDS, since the state machine of the property only monitors the
state transition of BP . The model checking process verifies whether a labeled
violation state in the new BPDS (due to the instrumentation) is reachable from
the initial configuration.
Definition 5.1. Given a BPDS configuration c ∈ Conf(BP), reachability analysis
computes if c is reachable from the initial configuration c0, i.e., c0 ⇒
∗
BP c.
Reachability analysis is applied in two ways: pre∗ and post∗. Given a set of
BPDS configurations C ⊆ Conf(BP),
• pre∗(C) = { p | c ∈ C and p⇒∗BP c }, i.e., the backward reachability analysis
computes the predecessors of elements in C;
• post∗(C) = { p | c ∈ C and c⇒∗BP p }, i.e., the forward reachability analysis
computes the successors of elements in C.
The reachability analysis problem of BPDS can be solved via the backward reach-
ability analysis algorithm by computing whether c0 ∈ pre
∗({c}) or via the forward
reachability analysis algorithm by computing whether c ∈ post∗({c0}).
5.1.2 LTL Checking
Given an LTL formula ϕ and a BPDS BP , we want to compute if L(BP) ⊆ L(ϕ),
i.e., the language of BP is contained by the language of ϕ. Vardi and Wolper [86]
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have introduced an automata-theoretic approach for LTL checking on finite state
systems. Schwoon [77] has demonstrated an automata-theoretic approach to model
checking PDS, an infinite state system. There are two observations. First, a PDS
is finitely representable. Second, there exists a labeling function that can map
from a possibly infinite state space of PDS to a finite set of symbols. These two
observations are true of BPDS as well.
Let At(ϕ) be the set of atomic propositions in ϕ. There exists a labeling
function,
Lϕ : Conf(BP)→ 2
At(ϕ),
i.e., Lϕ maps a BPDS configuration to a set of propositions that are true of it.
Although Conf(BP) is an infinite set, the heads of BP belongs to a finite set, i.e.,
(G×Q)× Γ. Therefore, Lϕ can be built in such a way that it only looks into the
head of a BPDS configuration to decide the output symbol.
According to the idea of automata-theoretic approach, the two conditions,
L(BP) ⊆ L(ϕ) and L(BP) ∩ L(¬ϕ) = ∅, are equivalent. Furthermore, the second
condition can be checked via computing the accepting run of the Bu¨chi automaton
constructed from ¬ϕ. Since there always exists a BA Bϕ = (2
At(ϕ), Qϕ, δϕ, qϕ0, Fϕ)
that accepts the language L(¬ϕ), we can synthesize a transition system B2P from
BP and Bϕ using the labeling function Lϕ, where conceptually Bϕ monitors the
state transitions of BP.
Formally, B2P = (G×Q×Qϕ, Γ, ∆B2P , 〈(g0, q0, qϕ0), ω0〉, FB2P), where
• G×Q×Qϕ is the finite set of global states,
• Γ is the stack alphabet,
• ∆B2P is the finite set of transition rules,
• 〈(g0, q0, qϕ0), ω0〉 is the initial configuration, and
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• FB2P = F
′ × Fϕ specifies the accepting states of B
2P.
The transition relation ∆B2P is constructed in such a way that we add (c, qϕ) →֒B2P
(c′, q′ϕ) to ∆B2P if and only if
• c →֒BP c
′ ∈ ∆′,
• qϕ
σ
→ q′ϕ ∈ δϕ, and
• σ ⊆ Lϕ(c).
The set of all configurations is denoted by Conf(B2P) ⊆ G × Q × Qϕ × Γ
∗. For
the purpose of simplicity, we also write
B2P = (P,Γ,∆B2P , FB2P),
where P = G × Q × Qϕ. Given γ ∈ Γ and v ∈ Γ
∗, the head of a configuration
c = 〈p, γv〉 is 〈p, γ〉 and denoted by head(c); and the head of a rule r = 〈p, γ〉 →֒B2P
〈p′, ω〉 is 〈p, γ〉 and denoted by head(r).
Given a rule r = 〈p, γ〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′, ω〉 ∈ ∆B2P , for every v ∈ Γ
∗ the configu-
ration 〈p, γv〉 is an immediate predecessor of 〈p′, ωv〉, and 〈p′, ωv〉 is an immedi-
ate successor of 〈p, γv〉. The immediate successor relation of B2P is written as
〈p, γv〉 ⇒B2P 〈p
′, ωv〉, where we say this state transition follows the rule r. The
reachability relation,⇒∗B2P , is the reflexive and transitive closure of the immediate
successor relation.
A path of B2P, denoted by φ, is a sequence of configurations, c0 ⇒B2P c1 . . .⇒B2P
ci ⇒B2P . . ., where i ≥ 0, ci ∈ Conf(B
2P), and φ(i) = ci denotes the i
th configu-
ration on the path. The path is also referred to as a trace of B2P if c0 is the initial
configuration. An infinite path of B2P needs to satisfy both the Bu¨chi constraint
and the BPDS loop constraint, which are defined for BPDS paths in Chapter 4.
It is straightforward to infer that:
• the projection of φ on Bϕ, denoted by φ
Bϕ , is a path of Bϕ;
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• the projection of φ on B, denoted by φB, is a path of B; and
• the projection of φ on P, denoted by φP , is a path of P.
Definition 5.2. An accepting run of B2P is an infinite trace φ such that (1) φ has
infinitely many occurrences of configurations from the set { c | head(c) ∈ FB2P },
i.e., the Bu¨chi acceptance condition is satisfied; and (2) both φB and φP are also
infinite, i.e., the BPDS loop constraint is satisfied.
Definition 5.3. Given a BPDS BP and an LTL formula ϕ, the model checking
problem is to compute if the B2P model constructed from BP and ϕ has an
accepting run.
5.2 REACHABILITY ANALYSIS ALGORITHM
Given a BPDS BP = (G × Q,Γ,∆′, 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉, F
′) and a configuration c ∈
Conf(BP), reachability analysis computes whether c0 ⇒
∗
BP c. Obviously, the
shortest path φ that demonstrates c0 ⇒
∗
BP c should have a finite length, because
the set of global states G×Q and the stack alphabet Γ are both finite. Therefore,
the Bu¨chi constraint F ′ is not relevant to reachability analysis. Furthermore, since
φ is finite, the BPDS loop constraint is not applicable to φ either.
A BP without the Bu¨chi constraint F ′ has a set of global states, a stack al-
phabet, a set of transition rules, and an initial configuration. Intuitively, if we
can convert BP to a PDS model, the reachability problem of BP can be solved
on PDS using existing algorithms [6, 50, 77]. Figure 5.1 illustrates the idea. The
reachability analysis algorithm first converts a BP to a PDS P ′ and then checks
the reachability property using model checking algorithms for PDS models. We
refer to P ′ as the verification model for BP . Compared to the LPDS P used to
construct BP , it is important to note that P ′ is a standard PDS in the sense that
P ′ does not have inputs.
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BPDS
BPDS2PDS
PDS
Model checker
YES
NO
BP P'
Figure 5.1: Reachability analysis of BPDS.
Now, we present a straightforward conversion algorithm from BP to P ′, namely
BPDS2PDS. Given BP , we can construct P ′ = (GP ′ ,ΓP ′,∆P ′, c0) such that
• GP ′ = (G×Q),
• ΓP ′ = Γ,
• ∆P ′ = { 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒ 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 | 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 ∈ ∆′ }, and
• c0 = 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉.
Theorem 5.1. P ′ preserves the reachability property of BP .
Proof. We use the idea of proof by construction. According to how P ′ is con-
structed, it is straightforward that: (1) the state space of P ′ equals to that of BP ;
(2) P ′ preserves all the transition rules of BP ; (3) the initial state of P ′ is the
initial state of BP ; and (4) the Bu¨chi constraint F ′ in BP is not preserved in P ′,
since F ′ is not used for reachability checking.
A PDS rule of P ′ represents the transitions of both the BA and LPDS by simply
treating the BA transition as a part of the global state transition and keeping the
LPDS transition in its original form. When representing software using PDS, such
a transition rule, 〈g, γ〉 →֒ 〈g′, γ〉 where g 6= g′, is uncommon, since the stack
control location needs to be updated when a global state is modified. However,
this kind of rule is allowed by PDS and can be used to represent a BPDS transition
where BA executes asynchronously with LPDS.
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Complexity analysis. In theory, the conversion algorithm, BPDS2PDS, needs
to go through every BPDS rule of BP and constructs a corresponding PDS rule
for P ′. This is unnecessary in practice, since the BPDS rules and PDS rules
are different only in concept, but indeed they can be stored using the same data
structure. BPDS2PDS should be considered as an abstract algorithm that helps
us understand the reachability analysis of BPDS. However, the algorithm does not
require an actual implementation.
With respect to the reachability analysis of PDS-equivalent models, the Be-
bop [6] model checker computes the reachability status of a Boolean program
statement (from the entry statement of the main procedure) with both the time
and space complexity of O(E×2k), where E is the number of edges in the interpro-
cedural control-flow graph of the Boolean program and k is the maximal number of
variables in scope at any program location. Compared to the PDS representation,
the edges in the interprocedural control-flow graph correspond to the transition
rules, and the number of the states of the visible Boolean variables has an upper
bound by the number of the heads of P ′. Therefore, we have E ∈ O(|∆P ′|) and
2k ∈ O(|GP ′ × ΓP ′ |).
The Moped model checker [77] provides the reachability analysis of PDS in
two ways: pre∗ and post∗. Let c0 be the initial configuration of P
′. Given a
configuration c ∈ Conf(P ′), the backward reachability analysis algorithm, pre∗,
computes whether c0 ∈ pre
∗({c}) using O(|GP ′|
2 × |∆P ′|) in time and O(|GP ′| ×
|∆P ′|) in space; while the forward reachability analysis algorithm, post
∗, computes
whether c ∈ post∗({c0}) using O((|GP ′|+ |∆P ′|)
3) in both time and space.
5.3 LTL CHECKING ALGORITHM
According to Definition 5.2 and Definition 5.3, the LTL checking of BP has two
steps. First, we need to compute some kind of loops in the state graph of B2P,
where each loop should satisfy both the Bu¨chi acceptance condition and the BPDS
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loop constraint. Second, we need to check if the loops are reachable from the initial
configuration of B2P.
Definition 5.4. In order to identify those loops that satisfy our requirement, we
define a binary relation ⇒rB2P between two configurations of B
2P. Given two
configurations c and c′, we write c⇒rB2P c
′ if and only if ∃〈p, γ〉 ∈ FB2P such that
c ⇒∗B2P 〈p, γω〉 ⇒
+
B2P c
′, where ω ∈ Γ∗. A head 〈p, γ〉 is repeating if ∃v ∈ Γ∗ for
some 〈p, γ〉 ⇒rB2P 〈p, γv〉. The set of repeating heads is denoted by Rep(B
2P). We
refer to the path that demonstrates a repeating head as a repeating path.
Based on Definition 5.4, given a repeating head 〈p, γ〉 and v, ω ∈ Γ∗, there must
exist a path that transitions from 〈p, γv〉 to 〈p, γωv〉 without touching the stack
content v. In other words, no transition on the path pops the stack content v.
There may be more than one repeating path for a repeating head.
Proposition 5.1. Given the initial configuration c0, B
2P has an accepting run if
and only if (1) ∃c0 ⇒
∗
B2P c
′ such that head(c′) ∈ Rep(B2P); and (2) a repeating
path φs of head(c
′) satisfies the condition that |φBs | 6= 0 and |φ
P
s | 6= 0.
Proof. “⇒”: Let φ be an accepting run of B2P. We know that φ has an infinite
length. Since the set of heads in B2P is finite, there must be at least one head
〈p, γ〉 ∈ P × Γ that occurs on φ infinitely often. Furthermore, we can always find
a sequence of positive integers 0 = i0 < i1 < i2 < . . . such that
φs = 〈p, γv〉 ⇒
∗
B2P 〈p
′, γ′ω′v〉 ⇒+B2P 〈p, γωv〉 = 〈p, γv〉 ⇒
r
B2P 〈p, γωv〉,
where
1. φ(ik) = 〈p, γv〉, φ(ik+1) = 〈p, γωv〉, k ≥ 0, v, ω, ω
′ ∈ Γ∗;
2. 〈p′, γ′〉 ∈ FB2P ; and
3. |φBs | 6= 0 and |φ
P
s | 6= 0, since a run of B
2P must satisfy the BPDS loop
constraint.
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Therefore, we have proven this direction of the proposition.
“⇐”: Let 〈p, γ〉 = head(c′) ∈ Rep(B2P). Based on the hypothesis we have
φs = (c
′ : 〈p, γv〉)⇒rB2P 〈p, γωv〉,
where v, ω ∈ Γ∗, |φBs | 6= 0, and |φ
P
s | 6= 0. Using φs, we can construct an infinite
trace such that
φ = c0 ⇒
∗
B2P (c
′ : 〈p, γv〉)⇒rB2P 〈p, γωv〉 ⇒
r
B2P 〈p, γωωv〉 ⇒
r
B2P . . ..
Because paths in the form of φs repeatedly occurs on φ, both the acceptance
condition and BPDS loop constraint are satisfied on φ. Therefore, φ is an accepting
run of B2P.
Proposition 5.1 presents a practical strategy for us to check LTL properties on
BPDS. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, there are two phases. First, we need to compute
a special set of repeating heads, R ⊆ Rep(B2P), where the repeating paths of the
heads satisfy the BPDS loop constraint. Second, we need to check if there exists a
path of B2P that leads from the initial configuration c0 to a configuration c such
that head(c) ∈ R.
Computing 
B P
2
Repeating Heads 
Repeating Heads, R
Reachability analsys
using pre* algorithm
 = ∅ No accepting
run found
Accepting
run found
post*({c0 }) ∩ { c | head(c)    R }∈
= ?  = ∅
Figure 5.2: Computing the accepting run of B2P (c0 is the initial configuration).
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5.3.1 Computing the Repeating Heads
As an important observation, when computing the repeating heads, we are looking
for a path between 〈p, γ〉 and 〈p, γv〉. However, the actual content of v is not
interested. Therefore, we can compute the repeating heads solely based on the
information about which heads are reachable from each other and whether the
accepting requirements (i.e., the Bu¨chi acceptance condition and the BPDS loop
constraint) on the paths between these heads are satisfied. Such kind of informa-
tion can be encoded into a finite graph and the repeating heads can be computed
by detecting the strongly connected components that satisfy the accepting require-
ments.
Before constructing the graph, we need to define the notions about how an
edge of the graph can satisfy the accepting requirements. Therefore, we define
three labeling functions on the rules of B2P:
1. FB2P : ∆B2P → {0, 1}, where given r ∈ ∆B2P , FB2P(r) = 1 if head(r) ∈ FB2P
and FB2P(r) = 0 if otherwise;
2. RB(r) : ∆B2P → {0, 1}, where given r ∈ ∆B2P , RB(r) = 1 if r is constructed
using a BA transition from δ (defined for checking the BPDS loop constraint)
and RB(r) = 0 if otherwise;
3. RP(r) : ∆B2P → {0, 1}, where given r ∈ ∆B2P , RP(r) = 1 if r is constructed
using an LPDS rule from ∆ (defined for checking the BPDS loop constraint)
and RP(r) = 0 if otherwise.
Definition 5.5. The head reachability graph of B2P is a directed labeled graph
G = ((P × Γ), E), where the set of nodes are the heads of B2P, the set of edges
E ⊆ (P × Γ) × {0, 1}3 × (P × Γ) denotes the reachability relation between the
heads. Let p, p′, p′′ ∈ P , γ, γ′ ∈ Γ, v1, v2 ∈ Γ
∗, and ε be the empty string. An edge
(〈p, γ〉, (b1, b2, b3), 〈p
′, γ′〉) belongs to E under the following conditions:
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• ∃r = 〈p, γ〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′′, v1γ
′v2〉;
• ∃φ = 〈p′′, v1〉 ⇒
∗
B2P 〈p
′, ε〉;
• b1 = 1, if and only if FB2P(r) = 1 or 〈p
′′, v1〉 ⇒
r
B2P 〈p
′, ε〉;
• b2 = 1, if and only if RB(r) = 1 or |φ
B| 6= 0;
• b3 = 1, if and only if RP(r) = 1 or |φ
P | 6= 0.
Definition 5.5 is based on the idea of backward reachability computation. Given
the head 〈p′, ε〉 reachable from 〈p′′, v1〉, if there exits a rule to indicate that 〈p
′′, v1γ
′〉
is reachable from 〈p, γ〉, then we know that the head 〈p′, γ′〉 (a.k.a., 〈p′, εγ′〉) is
reachable from the head 〈p, γ〉. During such a computation process, we use the
three labels, b1, b2, and b3 to record the information whether a path between the
heads contains an accepting state in FB2P and satisfies the BPDS loop constraint.
The set of repeating heads, R, can be computed by exploiting the fact that a
head 〈p, γ〉 is repeating and the repeating path satisfies the BPDS loop constraint
if and only if
• 〈p, γ〉 is part of a strongly connected component of G; and
• this strongly connected component has internal edges labeled by (1, ∗, ∗),
(∗, 1, ∗), and (∗, ∗, 1), where ∗ represents 0 or 1.
Algorithm 5.1, RepHeads, takes B2P as input in order to compute the set of
repeating heads, R. The algorithm has two parts. First, it computes the head
reachability graph of B2P using three steps as follows:
1. Between line 4 and line 6, it constructs edges of the head reachability graph
from ∆B2P . We refer to such edges as direct reachability edges, because
reachability between the heads are satisfied through only one transition.
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2. At line 8, it invokes the algorithm, HeadReachability, to compute the
indirect reachability relation between heads, i.e., reachability through more
than one transitions. As illustrated in Algorithm 5.2, HeadReachability
(see below for discussion) utilizes the backward reachability analysis algo-
rithm pre∗ presented in [77] to compute a set of labeled transition rules
(see Definition 5.5), ∆label, that describes the indirect reachability relation
between heads.
3. Between line 10 and line 12, it constructs edges of the head reachability graph
based on ∆label. We refer to these edges as indirect reachability edges.
Second, between line 15 and line 21, Algorithm 5.1 computes strongly connected
components of the head reachability graph G and checks whether there exists
strongly connected components that satisfy the accepting requirements. If a strongly
connected component satisfies the accepting requirements, all the heads on it are
added to the set R.
Algorithm 5.2, HeadReachability, computes a set of labeled transition rules
∆label, that describes the indirect reachability relation between heads. The algo-
rithm utilizes the pre∗ algorithm [77]. Given ∆B2P , pre
∗ finds a special set of rules
trans ⊆ ∆B2P such that trans has rules all in the form of 〈p, γ〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′, ε〉, also
written as (p, γ, p′) for simplicity. With the three labels defined on BPDS rules,
we can further write a rule in trans as (p, [γ, b1, b2, b3], p
′). Given such a rule, the
algorithm between line 7 and 25 computes the reachability relation between heads,
where rel stores the processed rules from trans. Specifically,
• At line 11 or line 14, when we see a rule 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p, γ〉, we know 〈p
′, ε〉
is reachable from 〈p1, γ1〉; therefore, we add a new rule 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′, ε〉
to trans;
• At line 17, when we see a rule 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p, γγ2〉 , we know 〈p
′, γ2〉 is
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Algorithm 5.1 RepHeads( B2P = (P,Γ,∆B2P , FB2P) )
1: R← ∅, E ← ∅
2: {First, compute the set of edges, E, of the head reachability graph from B2P}
3: {Direct reachability between two heads, i.e., indicated by a rule of B2P}
4: for all r = 〈p, γ〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′, γ′v〉 ∈ ∆B2P , where v ∈ Γ
∗ do
5: E ← E
⋃
{(〈p, γ〉, (FB2P(r), RB(r), RP(r)), 〈p
′, γ′〉)}
6: end for
7: {Compute the indirect reachability relation between heads, see Algorithm 5.2.}
8: ∆label ← HeadReachability(∆B2P)
9: {Indirect reachability between two heads, computed by HeadReachability}
10: for all 〈p, γ〉
l
→֒B2P 〈p
′, γ′〉 ∈ ∆label do
11: E ← E
⋃
{(〈p, γ〉, l, 〈p′, γ′〉)}
12: end for
13:
14: {Second, find R in G}
15: Find strongly connected components, SCC, in G = ((P × Γ), E)
16: for all C ∈ SCC do
17: if C has internal edges labeled by (1, ∗, ∗), (∗, 1, ∗), and (∗, ∗, 1), where ∗
represents 0 or 1 then
18: {C contains a set of repeating heads whose repeating paths satisfy the
BPDS loop constraint}
19: R← R
⋃
{the heads in C}
20: end if
21: end for
22: return R
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Algorithm 5.2 HeadReachability( ∆B2P )
1: ∆label ← ∅, rel← ∅, trans← ∅
2: {Compute the head reachability graph of B2P using the pre∗ algorithm}
3: for all r = 〈p, γ〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′, ε〉 ∈ ∆B2P do
4: {Add the labeled rule r (written in a simplified form) to trans}
5: trans← trans
⋃
{ (p, [γ, FB2P(r), RB(r), RP(r)], p
′) }
6: end for
7: while trans 6= ∅ do
8: pop t = (p, [γ, b1, b2, b3], p
′) from trans;
9: if t /∈ rel then
10: rel← rel
⋃
{t};
11: for all r = 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p, γ〉 ∈ ∆B2P do
12: trans← trans
⋃
{ (p1, [γ1, b1
∨
FB2P(r), b2
∨
RB(r), b3
∨
RP(r)], p
′) }
13: end for
14: for all 〈p1, γ1〉
l
→֒B2P 〈p, γ〉 ∈ ∆label, l = (b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3) do
15: trans← trans
⋃
{ (p1, [γ1, b1
∨
b′1, b2
∨
b′2, b3
∨
b′3], p
′) }
16: end for
17: for all r = 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p, γγ2〉 ∈ ∆B2P do
18: ∆label ← ∆label
⋃
{〈p1, γ1〉
l
→֒B2P 〈p
′, γ2〉}, where
l = (b1
∨
FB2P(r), b2
∨
RB(r), b3
∨
RP(r))
19: {Match the new rule with the rules that have been processed}
20: for all (p′, [γ2, b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3], p
′′) ∈ rel do
21: trans← trans
⋃
{ (p1, [γ1, b1
∨
b′1
∨
FB2P(r),
b2
∨
b′2
∨
RB(r), b3
∨
b′3
∨
RP(r)], p
′′) }
22: end for
23: end for
24: end if
25: end while
26: return ∆label
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reachable from 〈p1, γ1〉; therefore, we add a new rule 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′, γ2〉
to ∆label.
• Between line 20 and line 22, since there is a new rule 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′, γ2〉
generated, we need to go through the set rel in order to check if the new rule
can be combined with any processed rules. If there is a rule 〈p′, γ2〉 →֒B2P
〈p′′, ε〉 in rel, a new rule 〈p1, γ1〉 →֒B2P 〈p
′′, ε〉 should be added to trans.
During this process, we also use the labels to record the information whether the
Bu¨chi acceptance condition and the BPDS loop constraint can be satisfied by
repeating the path between two heads.
Complexity analysis. Algorithm 5.2 is actually a pre∗ algorithm which takes
O(|P |2|∆B2P |) time and O(|P ||∆B2P |) space [77]. In Algorithm 5.1, the first
part generates the head reachability graph G which takes O(|P |2|∆B2P |) time and
O(|P ||∆B2P |) space by invoking Algorithm 5.2. The second part computes strongly
connected components in G which is a linear time computation with respect to the
size of G. The rules of ∆B2P contribute O(|∆B2P |) nodes and edges to the size
of G. Since the size of ∆label is O(|P ||∆B2P |), the total size of G is O(|P ||∆B2P |).
Obviously, the first part of the algorithm dominates the complexity; therefore Al-
gorithm 5.1 takes O(|P |2|∆B2P |) time and O(|P ||∆B2P |) space.
5.3.2 Computing the Reachability of Repeating Heads
After R is computed, we need to decide whether post∗({c0})
⋂
{c|head(c) ∈ R} = ∅,
i.e., given the initial configuration c0, if there exits c0 ⇒
∗ c for some head(c) ∈
R. Similar to the reachability analysis algorithm discussed in Section 5.2, a B2P
model can also be converted into a PDS model for reachability analysis, where the
complexity of the conversion is O(|B2P|).
The forward reachability algorithms, post∗, for PDS-equivalent models have
been well studied. We utilize Schwoon’s algorithm [77] in our LTL checking of
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BPDS, where the complexity of the algorithm is O((|P |+ |∆B2P |)
3).
5.3.3 Summary
Given a BPDS BP and an LTL property ϕ, we can construct a transition sys-
tem B2P as the Cartesian product of BP and a BA Bϕ that recognizes ϕ. The
model checking problem is then reduced to computing if B2P has an accepting
run. There are two parts in computing the accepting run of B2P. First, we need
to detect a special set of repeating heads in B2P such that their repeating paths
can help satisfy the BPDS loop constraint. Algorithm 5.1 solves this problem us-
ing O(|P |2|∆B2P |) time and O(|P ||∆B2P |) space. Second, we need to check if a
repeating head is reachable from the initial configuration of B2P. This problem
can be solved using O((|P | + |∆B2P |)
3) time and space. In conclusion, the LTL
model checking of BPDS has the complexity of O((|P |+ |∆B2P |)
3).
5.4 OPTIMIZATION OF REACHABILITY ANALYSIS
5.4.1 Reduction Algorithm
As discussed in Chapter 4, a BPDS BP is constructed from a BA B and an LPDS
P using a Cartesian product. It is na¨ıve to verify such a BPDS model, since
we may not need all the information from a model to prove a specific type of
property. Instead, it is a common practice to automatically prune the model
according to the property to be verified. For example, the set of BPDS rules is the
product of δ that belongs to B and ∆ that belongs to P in the na¨ıve approach.
However, with respect to reachability analysis, a complete product is unnecessary
when B and P are asynchronous (i.e., when the BA transitions and LPDS rules
are independent), since their transition orders usually do not matter. Without
affecting the verification result, static partial order reduction can be applied to
reduce the BPDS rules generated by the product. The reduced BPDS model BPr
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will have a smaller set of transition rules ∆′r ⊆ ∆
′ and fewer state transition traces
while still preserving the reachability properties of BP . Figure 5.3 illustrates the
verification process that supports the reduction. When constructing the BPDS
BPDSRULES
PDS
Model
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with Static Partial  
Order Reduction  
P'r checkerBPDS2PDS  BPDS
Reduced
BPr
LPDSP
BBA 
Figure 5.3: Reachability analysis of BPDS with static partial order reduction.
BPr from B and P, static partial order reduction is applied to reduce the BPDS
rules that are generated. Since there are fewer BPDS rules to be explored in
verification, the reachability analysis is more efficient with reduction than that of
the na¨ıve approach.
Our reduction [49] is based on the observation that when B and P transition
asynchronously, one can run continuously while the other one loops. Figure 5.4
illustrates the idea of reducing a BPDS state transition graph that starts from
the configuration c0,0. Figure 5.4a is a complete state transition graph. There are
three types of transition edges:
• a horizontal edge represents a transition when B transitions and P self-loops,
which follows a BPDS rule in the form of 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉;
• a vertical edge represents a transition when P transitions and B self-loops,
which follows a BPDS rule in the form of 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), w〉; and
• a diagonal edge represents a transition when B and P transition together,
which follows a BPDS rule in the form of 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), w〉.
For every configuration ci,j = 〈(g, q), γv〉 (0 ≤ i ≤ m and 0 ≤ j ≤ n) as well as
the BA transition t = q
σ
→ q′ and the LPDS rule r = 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉 that are
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Figure 5.4: An example of static partial order reduction on BPDS transitions.
State transition edges are reduced without affecting the reachability from c0,0 when
BA and LPDS are asynchronous.
both enabled on ci,j, if t and r are independent, we can reduce a large set of state
transitions in Figure 5.4a without affecting the reachability from c0,0 to other con-
figurations in the graph. Figure 5.4b and Figure 5.4c illustrate two types of static
partial order reductions that reduce horizontal/diagonal transition edges and ver-
tical/diagonal transition edges respectively. The reduction can significantly reduce
the transition rules of BP , when BA transitions and LPDS rules are independent.
Now we present an optimization of Algorithm 4.1, where the reduction is ap-
plied during the rule generation of the BPDS model BPr. In the reduction pro-
cess, we need to identify those situations when BPDS rules can be reduced. Since
the reduction is applied only if the transitions of B and P are independent, a
straightforward approach needs to maintain all independent BA transitions and
LPDS rules as the reducible candidates. However, such an approach is inefficient.
Because B and P are asynchronous in most of their transitions, there are many
independent BA transitions and LPDS rules. Therefore, we try to identify the
situations when BA transitions and LPDS rules are dependent so that we know
what BPDS rules cannot be reduced instead of what BPDS can be reduced. Note
that both reduction approaches should have the same effect. We define a set of
LPDS heads, SensitiveSet, on Conf(P) as follows:
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Definition 5.6. SensitiveSet = { head(〈g0, ω0〉) }
⋃
{ head(c′) | ∃r = c
τ
→֒ c′ ∈
∆, ∃t ∈ δ, r and t are dependent }, where 〈g0, ω0〉 is the initial configuration of P.
The concept of SensitiveSet is similar to that of sleep set [33]. However, instead
of identifying transitions that are unnecessary to be executed (i.e., reducible) at
a state, SensitiveSet identifies transitions that should be preserved (i.e., irre-
ducible).
Algorithm 5.3 applies the reduction following the idea illustrated in Figure 5.4b,
where the horizontal/diagonal edges are reduced.
• At line 6, since the LPDS rule r and the BA transition t are dependent,
B and P must transition together; therefore, we construct a BPDS rule
〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉;
• At line 9, we construct a vertical rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉 to represent
the asynchronous situation when P transitions and B self-loops. Since Al-
gorithm 5.3 follows the reduction demonstrated in Figure 5.4b, all vertical
BPDS rules are preserved;
• At line 12, we construct a horizontal rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉 to repre-
sent the asynchronous situation when B transitions and P self-loops, if and
only if head(r) belongs to SensitiveSet.
Complexity analysis. Same to Algorithm 4.1, Algorithm 5.3 takes O(|δ| × |∆|)
time and O(|δ×∆|) space, where |δ×∆| denotes the size of BPDS rules that can
be constructed without the reduction.
Let nSR be the number of LPDS rules (in ∆) whose heads belong to SensitiveSet,
and nsync be the number of BPDS rules (in ∆
′) where the corresponding BA tran-
sitions and LPDS rules are dependent. We have |∆hori| = nSR × |δ| and |∆sync| =
nsync. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, asynchronous transitions can be organized as
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Algorithm 5.3 BPDSRulesViaSPOR(δ ×∆)
1: ∆sync ← ∅, ∆vert ← ∅, ∆hori ← ∅
2: for all r = 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉 ∈ ∆ do
3: for all t = q
σ
→ q′ ∈ δ and σ ⊆ LP2B(〈g, γ〉) and τ ⊆ LB2P(q) do
4: if r and t are dependent then
5: {B and P must transition together}
6: ∆sync ← ∆sync
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉}
7: else
8: {Vertical edges (see Figure 5.4b), when P transitions and B self-loops}
9: ∆vert ← ∆vert
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉}
10: if 〈g, γ〉 ∈ SensitiveSet then
11: {Horizontal edges (see Figure 5.4b), when B transitions P self-loops}
12: ∆hori ← ∆hori
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉}
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: ∆′r ← ∆sync
⋃
∆vert
⋃
∆hori
18: return ∆′r
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triples where each one includes a vertical transition, a horizontal transition, and a
diagonal transition, so we have |∆vert| =
|δ×∆|−nsync
3
. The number of rules generated
in Algorithm 5.3 is |∆′r| = nsync+
|δ×∆|−nsync
3
+nSR×|δ| =
2
3
nsync+
|δ×∆|
3
+nSR×|δ|.
The number of transition rules reduced is |∆′|−|∆′r| =
2
3
|δ×∆|− 2
3
nsync−nSR×|δ|.
We can infer from this expression that the fewer dependent transitions of B and
P the more BPDS rules Algorithm 5.3 can reduce.
5.4.2 Correctness Argument
In Algorithm 5.3, a diagonal rule is reduced if the corresponding BA transition
and LPDS rule are independent. This kind of reduction does not affect any reach-
ability property, because the diagonal rule can be represented by one horizontal
rule and one vertical rule respectively. A horizontal rule is reduced if the head of
the corresponding LPDS rule in P does not belong to SensitiveSet. There is a
special set of heads,
DivideSet = { h | h ∈ SensitiveSet, ∀r = c
τ
→֒ c′ ∈ ∆ and ∀t ∈ δ, if head(c) = h
then r and t are not dependent }.
Informally, DivideSet describes a set of configurations that can be considered
as divide-lines (in the traces of P projected from the traces of BP) for two ad-
jacent LPDS transitions that are respectively dependent and independent with
the BA transitions. Given a trace of BPr in the form of 〈(g0, q0), ω0〉 ⇒BP
. . . ⇒BP 〈(gj, qj), ωj〉 ⇒BP . . . ⇒BP 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉 ⇒BP . . . (0 ≤ j < k), if
head(〈gj, ωj〉) ∈ DivideSet and 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉 is the first configuration satisfying
head(〈gk, ωk〉) ∈ SensitiveSet after 〈(gj, qj), ωj〉, we can infer that no horizontal
transition occurs between 〈(gj, qj), ωj〉 and 〈(gk−1, qk−1), ωk−1〉 in the trace (i.e.,
qj = qk−1), because the horizontal transitions have been reduced.
Theorem 5.2. BPr preserves the reachability of BP from the initial configuration.
Proof. It is easy to observe that BPr and BP have the same state space and initial
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configuration, so the question is to prove that (1) given a trace of BP in the form
of φ = c0 ⇒BP c1 . . . ⇒BP c, there is a corresponding trace of BPr such that
φ′ = c0 ⇒BP c
′
1 . . .⇒BP c; and (2) vice versa.
“⇒”: Two types of transitions are reduced in BPr, compared to BP . As explained
above, the reduction of diagonal transitions does not affect any reachability prop-
erty. We prove that the reduction of horizontal transitions does not affect the
correctness of (1) by mathematical induction.
Basis. If |φ| = 0, i.e., c = c0, the reachability trivially holds on BPr. If |φ| = 1,
because there is no horizontal transition reduced on the initial configuration, for
any transition c0 ⇒BP c of BP there must be a corresponding trace of BPr that
preserves the reachability.
Inductive step. Given a trace φ = c0 ⇒BP c1 . . . ⇒BP ci ⇒BP c
′ (i ≥ 0) of BP
where |φ| = i+ 1, if there exists a trace φ′ = c0 ⇒BP c
′
1 . . .⇒BP c
′
j ⇒BP c
′ (j ≥ 0)
of BPr where |φ
′| = j + 1, we show that for every t = c′ ⇒BP c of BP , there
is a trace of BPr such that c0 ⇒
∗
BP c. Recall that the horizontal transitions are
reduced in BPr except at configurations whose heads belong to SensitiveSet, so
we need to prove that this reduction does not affect the reachability if t involves a
horizontal transition that is reduced in BPr. In the trace φ
′, we can always find a
configuration
c′k = 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉, 0 ≤ k ≤ j,
such that c′k is the last configuration satisfying head(〈gk, ωk〉) ∈ SensitiveSet.
Thus, the path from c′k to c
′ has the form of
(c′k : 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉)⇒BP 〈(gk+1, qk), ωk+1〉 ⇒BP . . .⇒BP (c
′ : 〈(gj+1, qk), ωj+1〉),
where B always loops at the state qk after c
′
k. Because the horizontal transitions
are reduced on the configurations after c′k, BPr cannot directly have the transition
(c′ : 〈(gj+1, qk), ωj+1〉) ⇒BP (c : 〈(gj+1, qk+1), ωj+1〉), i.e., the corresponding BPDS
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rule 〈(gj+1, qk), γj+1〉) →֒BP 〈(gj+1, qk+1), γj+1〉 (γj+1 is the top stack symbol of
ωj+1) does not exist after the reduction. However, since the BA transitions and
LPDS transitions are independent on the path from c′k to c
′, we can shift the
horizontal transition backward to the position right after c′k where the horizontal
transitions are not reduced. In this case, the path is
(c′k : 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉)⇒BP 〈(gk, qk+1), ωk〉 ⇒BP 〈(gk+1, qk+1), ωk+1〉 ⇒BP . . .⇒BP (c :
〈(gj+1, qk+1), ωj+1〉).
Therefore, we have proven that there exists a trace of BPr such that c0 ⇒
∗
BP c.
“⇐”: The other direction always holds because ∆′r ⊆ ∆
′. For every rule of BPr,
BP has the same rule. Thus, for every trace of BPr, BP has the same trace.
Theorem 5.3. BPr is optimal with respect to static partial order reduction.
Proof. Since static partial order reduction is applied on the model before model
checking, information available only during the model checking process cannot be
utilized. For example, given two LPDS rules: r1 = c ֒
τ
−→ c′ that is dependent
with at least one BA transition and r2 = c
′′ ֒
τ ′
−→ c′ that is independent with all
BA transitions. A transition path through r2 clearly does not need to explore a
horizontal transition at c′ in order to preserve the reachability. However, unless in
the model checking process, we cannot know how c′ is reached, i.e., via r1 or r2.
Therefore, head(c′) should be added to SensitiveSet and horizontal BPDS rules
should not be reduced if they are related to head(c′).
We prove the theorem by demonstrating that any BPDS rule constructed by
Algorithm 5.3 cannot be reduced without affecting the reachability properties to
be verified.
• At line 6, if the BPDS rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 is reduced, the con-
figuration 〈(g′, q′), ω〉 may not be reachable anymore, since B and P must
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transition together at dependent transitions. Furthermore, any BPDS con-
figuration that is reachable from 〈(g′, q′), ω〉 may also be affected. Note that
〈(g′, q′), ω〉 may still be reachable through other BPDS paths even if the rule
is reduced, but we cannot know this unless in the model checking process.
Therefore, we should not reduce the rule;
• At line 9, if 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉 is reduced, the configuration 〈(g′, q), ω〉
may not be reachable anymore. For example, in Figure 5.4b, reduce any
vertical transition may affect the reachability to some BPDS configurations;
• At line 12, if 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉 is reduced, the configuration 〈(g, q′), γ〉
may not be reachable anymore. For example, in Figure 5.4b, reduce any hor-
izontal transition may affect the reachability to some BPDS configurations.
With the information available in static partial order reduction, we cannot ensure
reducing any rule constructed by Algorithm 5.3 without affecting the reachability
properties; therefore, we have proven that BPr is optimal.
Example 1. Given a BA transition, t = Wrk
{no event}
−−−−−−→ Idle, illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.1 and an LPDS rule, r = 〈a, main1〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈!a, main2〉, illustrated in
Figure 4.4, Algorithm 4.1 constructed the following BPDS rules:
• 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Idle), main1〉, i.e., B transitions and P self-
loops;
• 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Wrk), main2〉, i.e., P transitions and B self-
loops; and
• 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP 〈(!a, Idle), main2〉, i.e., B and P transitions to-
gether.
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Since t and r are independent, B and P do not need to transition together.
Furthermore, the LPDS head 〈a,main1〉 is not in SensitiveSet, since there is
no BA transition dependent with an LPDS rule that transition to 〈a,main1〉.
Therefore, Algorithm 5.3 only constructs one BPDS rule 〈(a, Wrk), main1〉 →֒BP
〈(!a, Wrk), main2〉, while the first and third BPDS rules are reduced.
Example 2. Given a BA transition t = Init
{reset}
−−−−→ Rst and an LPDS rule r =
〈a, reset0〉 ֒
{no intr}
−−−−−→ 〈a, reset1〉, since t and r are dependent, both Algorithm 4.1
and Algorithm 5.3 need to construct the BPDS rule 〈(a, Init), reset0〉 →֒BP
〈(a, Rst), reset1〉 to represent the synchronous transition of B and P.
Example 3. Given a BA transition t = Intr
{no event}
−−−−−−→ Wrk and an LPDS rule
r = 〈a, NonHWRelated1〉 ֒
{intr}
−−−→ 〈a, isr0 NonHWRelated1〉, since t and r are
dependent, both Algorithm 4.1 and Algorithm 5.3 need to construct the BPDS
rule 〈(a, Intr), NonHWRelated1〉 →֒BP 〈(a, Wrk), isr0 NonHWRelated1〉 to rep-
resent the synchronous transition of B and P. However, this BPDS rule is actually
unnecessary. Since the procedure NonHWRelated neither operates the hardware
nor accesses any software global variable, interrupting NonHWRelated to execute
the ISR will not affect the verification results.
Reducing ISR calls. Example 3 demonstrates that ISR calls are unnecessary af-
ter some LPDS transitions; therefore, these ISR calls should be reduced. Following
the idea of relative atomicity (see Chapter 3), we can understand the execution of
ISR as an atomic transition with respect to other lower-priority software routines.
A statement of the lower-priority routines is dependent with such an ISR transition
if and only if the statement operates hardware or accesses software global variables;
otherwise, the statement is independent with the ISR transition. Based on this
observation, the idea similar to Algorithm 5.3 can also be applied to reduced the
ISR calls introduced to LPDS. Chapter 6 will further discuss the reduction of ISR
calls combined with Algorithm 5.3 in implementation.
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5.5 OPTIMIZATION OF LTL CHECKING
5.5.1 Reduction Algorithm
When verifying an LTL property on a BPDS BP , some transition orders between
the BA B and the LPDS P can also be reduced without affecting the verification
result. In this section, we present how to utilize the concept of static partial order
reduction in the LTL checking of BPDS. We denote the reduced BPDS model as
BPr. Let ∆
′
r be the set of BPDS rules of BPr and ∆
′ be the set of BPDS rules
of BP . We have ∆′r ⊆ ∆
′, i.e., BPr has a smaller set of BPDS rules compared to
BP .
In reachability analysis, we have demonstrated that static partial order reduc-
tion can be applied on BPDS without affecting the reachability from the initial
configuration to any other configurations. This reduction is conservative, since
there always exists at least one trace that preserves the reachability to certain
configuration. However, LTL checking is different, since we not only need to know
whether a configuration is reachable, but also need to know how the configuration
is reached. In other words, without the knowledge about what LTL property to
verify, a reachability-preserving trace may not be able to preserve the LTL prop-
erty. Therefore, we need to consider the LTL property in our reduction algorithm.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are five temporal operators that are commonly
used to specify LTL properties. Partial order reduction cannot be effectively ap-
plied with the next operator, X . Intuitively, next operator states the relation
between two propositions within one state transition, which can make all tran-
sition orders between B and P matter to the verification result. Therefore, we
apply static partial order reduction with LTL properties that do not use the next
operator. This type of LTL property is denoted as LTL−X .
Definition 5.7. Given an LTL−X formula ϕ to be verified on BP , a BPDS rule
c →֒BP c
′ is invisible to ϕ if and only if Lϕ(c) = Lϕ(c
′), i.e., all state transitions
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that follow this BPDS rule do not change the value of the propositional variables
in At(ϕ); otherwise the rule is visible to ϕ. If all the transitions on a BPDS path
are invisible to ϕ, the path is also invisible to ϕ.
Definition 5.8. Given a BPDS rule rBP , V isProp(rBP) denotes the set of propo-
sitional variables whose value is affected by the BPDS rule rBP . Obviously, if
V isProp(rBP) = ∅, rBP is invisible.
• Given t = q
σ
−→ q′ ∈ δ and a ∈ 2At(ϕ), for every rBP = 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP
〈(g, q′), γ〉 ∈ ∆′, if V isProp(rBP) = a 6= ∅, t is said to be horizontally visible.
• Given r = 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉 ∈ ∆ and a ∈ 2At(ϕ), for every rBP = 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP
〈(g′, q), ω〉 ∈ ∆′, if V isProp(rBP) = a 6= ∅, r is said to be vertically visible.
Intuitively, horizontal visibility describes the situation when some propositional
variables are evaluated only based on the states of BA; vertical visibility describes
the situation when some propositional variables are evaluated only based on the
states of LPDS. This kind of classification, as quite useful in symbolic represen-
tations (see Section 5.6), can help us reduce many visible BPDS rules without
affecting the LTL−X properties to be verified.
Given a BA transition t and an LPDS rule r, Algorithm 5.4 decides whether
the corresponding diagonal/horizontal BPDS rules are reducible candidates. We
should assume that t and r are independent; otherwise, since B and P must tran-
sition together when t and r are dependent, no BPDS rule can be reduced.
• Between line 8 and line 9, if there is no visible BPDS rule, both the horizontal
rule r1 and the diagonal rule r3 are reducible candidates;
• Between line 11 and line 13, the diagonal rule r3 is a reducible candidate if it
is replaceable by a horizontal rule and a vertical rule. Lemma 5.3 will discuss
the correctness of this reduction;
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Algorithm 5.4 ReducibleBPDSRules(t ∈ δ, r ∈ ∆)
Require: t and r are independent.
1: ReduceDiag ← FALSE, ReduceHori← FALSE
2: Let t = q
σ
−→ q′
3: r = 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉
4: r1 = 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉 {Horizontal BPDS rules, see Figure 5.4a}
5: r2 = 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉 {Vertical BPDS rules, see Figure 5.4a}
6: r3 = 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 {Diagonal BPDS rules, see Figure 5.4a}
7: if V isProp(r1) = ∅ and V isProp(r2) = ∅ and V isProp(r3) = ∅ then
8: {If r1, r2, and r3 are all invisible}
9: ReduceDiag ← TRUE, ReduceHori← TRUE
10: else
11: if V isProp(r1) = V isProp(r3) or V isProp(r2) = V isProp(r3) or
V isProp(r1) = ∅ or V isProp(r2) = ∅ then
12: ReduceDiag ← TRUE
13: end if
14: if r1 is invisible or t is horizontally visible then
15: ReduceHori← TRUE
16: end if
17: end if
18: return (ReduceDiag, ReduceHori)
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• Between line 14 and line 16, the horizontal rule r1 is a reducible candidate if
it is either invisible or constructed from a BA transition (i.e., t) that is hor-
izontally visible. Theorem 5.5 will discuss the correctness of this reduction.
Definition 5.9. Similar to the reduction applied in reachability analysis, we need
to decide which BPDS rules cannot be reduced. Therefore, we identify three sets
of heads, SensitiveSet, V isibleSet, and LoopSet on Conf(P) as follows:
• SensitiveSet = { head(〈g0, ω0〉) }
⋃
{ head(c′) | ∃r = c
τ
→֒ c′ ∈ ∆, ∃t ∈ δ, r
and t are dependent }, where 〈g0, ω0〉 is the initial configuration of P;
• V isbileSet = { head(〈g′, ω〉) | ∃r = 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 ∈ ∆′ that is
visible to ϕ; and r is irreducible according to Algorithm 5.4 };
• LoopSet = { h | for every strongly connected component C in GP , pick a
head h from C }, where GP is the head reachability graph of P and there is
no preference on how h is selected from C.
SensitiveSet is necessary to preserve the reachability from the initial configuration
to other configurations; the concept of V isibleSet is similar to that of SensitiveSet,
i.e., preserving the reachability of BPDS paths right after a visible transition that
cannot be reduced according to Algorithm 5.4; LoopSet, similar to the concept
of cycle closing condition [44], is introduced to satisfy the BPDS loop constraint
when a loop of P is involved in the accepting run of B2P.
Algorithm 5.5 applies the reduction following the idea illustrated in Figure 5.4b,
where the horizontal/diagonal edges are reduced.
• At line 6, since the LPDS rule r and the BA transition t are dependent,
B and P must transition together; therefore, we construct a BPDS rule
〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉;
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Algorithm 5.5 BPDSRulesViaSPOR LTL(δ ×∆)
1: ∆sync ← ∅, ∆vert ← ∅, ∆hori ← ∅, ∆diag ← ∅
2: for all r = 〈g, γ〉
τ
→֒ 〈g′, ω〉 ∈ ∆ do
3: for all t = q
σ
→ q′ ∈ δ and σ ⊆ LP2B(〈g, γ〉) and τ ⊆ LB2P(q) do
4: if r and t are dependent then
5: {B and P must transition together}
6: ∆sync ← ∆sync
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉}
7: else
8: {P transitions and B self-loops}
9: ∆vert ← ∆vert
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉}
10: (ReduceDiag, ReduceHori)← ReducibleBPDSRules(t, r)
11: if ReduceDiag = FALSE then
12: {B and P transition together}
13: ∆diag ← ∆diag
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉}
14: end if
15: if ReduceHori = FALSE or
〈g, γ〉 ∈ SensitiveSet
⋃
V isibleSet
⋃
LoopSet then
16: {B transitions and P self-loops}
17: ∆hori ← ∆hori
⋃
{〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉}
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: ∆′r ← ∆sync
⋃
∆vert
⋃
∆hori
⋃
∆diag
23: return ∆′r
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• At line 9, we construct a vertical rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉 to represent
the asynchronous situation when P transitions and B self-loops. Since Al-
gorithm 5.5 follows the reduction demonstrated in Figure 5.4b, all vertical
BPDS rules are preserved;
• At line 10, we invoke Algorithm 5.4, i.e., ReducibleBPDSRules, to decide
if the horizontal/diagonal BPDS rules are reducible candidates;
• Between line 11 and line 14, we construct a diagonal BPDS rule if necessary;
• Between line 15 and line 18, we construct a horizontal BPDS rule if necessary;
Note that even if ReducibleBPDSRules returns TRUE for ReduceHori,
we still have to preserve this horizontal BPDS rule if head(r) belongs to
SensitiveSet, V isibleSet, or LoopSet.
Complexity analysis. Algorithm 5.5 takes O(|δ|×|∆|) time and O(|δ×∆|) space,
where |δ×∆| denotes the size of BPDS rules that can be constructed without the
reduction.
Let nsync be the number of BPDS rules that are generated from dependent BA
transitions and LPDS rules (at line 6), nv be the number of BPDS rules related to
visible transitions (i.e., when Algorithm 5.4 returns ReduceDiag or ReduceHori as
FALSE), nsvl be the number of BPDS rules associated to SensitiveSet, V isibleSet,
and LoopSet (at line 17 when ReduceHori is TRUE). We have |∆hori
⋃
∆diag| = nv+
nsvl and |∆sync| = nsync. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, asynchronous transitions can
be organized as triples where each one includes a vertical transition, a horizontal
transition, and a diagonal transition, so we have |∆vert| =
|δ×∆|−nsync
3
. The number
of rules generated by Algorithm 5.5 is |∆′
r
| = nsync +
|δ×∆|−nsync
3
+ nv + nsvl =
2
3
nsync +
|δ×∆|
3
+ nv + nsvl. The number of transition rules reduced is |∆
′| − |∆′r| =
2
3
|δ×∆|−nv−
2
3
nsync−nsvl. Therefore, our reduction is effective when the following
criteria have small sizes:
129
• BPDS rules visible to ϕ;
• dependent transitions of B and P; and
• loops in P.
5.5.2 Correctness Argument
We prove the correctness of the reduction by two steps. First, we assume that
no visible BPDS rule (including the related invisible BPDS rules) is reduced by
Algorithm 5.5. More specifically, the pseudo code between line 10 and line 17 of
Algorithm 5.4 is not used in this case. Based on this assumption, let the reduced
BPDS model be BP ′r. We prove that any LTL−X property is invariant on BP and
BP ′r. Second, let the reduced BPDS model without the assumption be BPr. We
prove that any LTL−X property is invariant on BP
′
r and BPr.
First, any LTL−X property is invariant on BP and BP
′
r. There are several
concepts that can help our proof.
Definition 5.10. Given a labeling function L, two infinite paths φ1 = s0 → s1 →
. . . and φ2 = q0 → q1 → . . . are stuttering equivalent, written as φ1 ∼st φ2, if
there are two infinite sequences of positive integers 0 = i0 < i1 < i2 < . . . and
0 = j0 < j1 < j2 < . . . such that for every k ≥ 0, L(sik) = L(sik+1) = . . . =
L(sik+1−1) = L(qjk) = L(qjk+1) = . . . = L(qjk+1−1).
Definition 5.11. We define a transition block as a BPDS path K = c⇒∗BP c
′ such
that K is invisible, where for c = 〈(g, q), ω〉, head(〈g, ω〉) ∈ V isibleSet. K can be
considered as an invisible path right after a visible transition. Given two transition
blocks K = c ⇒∗BP c
′ and K ′ = c′′ ⇒∗BP c
′′′, they are referred to as corresponding
transition blocks if c = c′′ and c′ = c′′′. Obviously, K ∼st K
′.
Lemma 5.1. If BP has a transition block K = c0 ⇒BP c1 ⇒BP . . . ⇒BP c, BP
′
r
always has a corresponding transition block K ′ = c0 ⇒BP c
′
1 ⇒BP . . .⇒BP c.
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Proof. Two types of transitions are reduced in BP ′r: diagonal and horizontal.
First, the reduction of diagonal transitions does not affect this lemma. Given any
invisible diagonal transition t = c ⇒BP c
′, if it is reduced by Algorithm 5.5, all
transitions starting from c must be invisible. Therefore, we can always use an
invisible path, (c : 〈(g, q), γv〉) ⇒BP (c
′′ : 〈(g, q′), γv〉) ⇒BP (c
′ : 〈(g′, q′), ωv〉), to
replace t, where Lϕ(c) = Lϕ(c
′′) = Lϕ(c
′), γ ∈ Γ, and v, ω ∈ Γ∗.
Second, we prove that the reduction of horizontal transitions does not affect this
lemma by mathematical induction.
Basis. When |K| = 0, i.e., c = c0, the lemma trivially holds. When |K| = 1, since
no horizontal edges are reduced at c0, the lemma also holds.
Inductive step. Given K = c0 ⇒BP c1 . . . ⇒BP ci−1 ⇒BP c
′, where |K| = i > 0,
if BP ′r has a transition block K
′ = c0 ⇒BP c
′
1 . . . ⇒BP c
′
j−1 ⇒BP c
′ where |K ′| =
j > 0, we show that for every invisible transition t = c′ ⇒BP c of BP , there is a
transition block of BP ′r such that c0 ⇒
∗
BP c.
In K ′, we can always find a configuration c′k = 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉 (0 ≤ k < j) such
that c′k is the last configuration satisfying
head(〈gk, ωk〉) ∈ SensitiveSet
⋃
V isibleSet
⋃
LoopSet.
Thus, the path from c′k to c
′ has the form of
(c′k : 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉)⇒BP 〈(gk+1, qk), ωk+1〉 ⇒BP . . .⇒BP (c
′ : 〈(gj, qk), ωj〉),
where B always loops at the state qk after c
′
k. Because the horizontal transitions
are reduced on the configurations after c′k, BP
′
r cannot have a horizontal transition
from c′ to c. However, since the BA transitions and LPDS transitions are inde-
pendent on the path from c′k to c
′, we can shift the horizontal transition backward
to the position right after c′k where the horizontal transitions are not reduced. In
this case, the path is
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(c′k : 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉)⇒BP 〈(gk, qk+1), ωk〉 ⇒BP 〈(gk+1, qk+1), ωk+1〉 ⇒BP . . .⇒BP (c :
〈(gj, qk+1), ωj〉).
Note that, this path is invisible, because BP ′r does not have any visible transitions
on the paths between c′k and c. Otherwise, there must be a configuration, 〈(g, q), ω〉
after c′k on path K
′, such that head(〈g, ω〉) ∈ V isibleSet. Therefore, BP ′r has a
transition block c0 ⇒
∗
BP c.
Lemma 5.2. Any LTL−X property is invariant under stuttering [22].
Theorem 5.4. Any LTL−X property is invariant on BP and BP
′
r.
Proof. We prove that if BP has a trace φ, BP ′r always has a trace φ
′ that is
stuttering equivalent to φ; and vice versa.
“⇒”: φ can be written as a sequence of transition blocks such that K0 ⇒BP
K1 ⇒BP . . ., where only the transitions between the transition blocks are visible.
Since no visible transition is reduced, BP ′r has the same transitions that connect
these transition blocks in φ. Lemma 5.1 has already proven that ∀i ≥ 0, BP ′r has
K ′i corresponding to Ki. Therefore, BP
′
r has a trace φ
′ such that φ ∼st φ
′.
“⇐”: For every rule of BP ′r, BP has the same rule; therefore, for every trace of
BP ′r, BP has the same trace.
Second, any LTL−X property is invariant on BP
′
r and BPr.
Lemma 5.3. Any diagonal BPDS rule (written as 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉)
reduced according to Algorithm 5.4 can be replaced by a horizontal BPDS rule and
a vertical BPDS rule.
Proof. The diagonal BPDS rule can be either visible or invisible. As illustrated in
Figure 5.5, a visible diagonal BPDS rule is reduced in the following four conditions:
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Figure 5.5: Reducible visible diagonal BPDS rules.
• For V isProp(r1) = V isProp(r3), we know that r
′ = 〈(g, q′), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉
must be invisible; therefore r3 can be replaced by r1 and r
′ without affecting
the stuttering equivalence between the paths of BP ′r and BPr.
• For V isProp(r2) = V isProp(r3), we know that r
′ = 〈(g′, q), γ′〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), γ′〉
must be invisible, where γ′ is the top stack symbol in ω; therefore r3 can be
replaced by r2 and r
′.
• For V isProp(r1) = ∅, given r
′ = 〈(g, q′), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉, we know that
V isProp(r′) = V isProp(r3); therefore r3 can be replaced by r1 and r
′.
• For V isProp(r2) = ∅, given r
′ = 〈(g′, q), γ′〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), γ′〉, where γ′ is the
top stack symbol in ω, we know that V isProp(r′) = V isProp(r3); therefore
r3 can be replaced by r2 and r
′.
As illustrated in Figure 5.6, an invisible diagonal BPDS rule is reducible in the
following two conditions:
• For V isProp(r1) = V isProp(r3) or V isProp(r1) = ∅, we know that r
′ =
〈(g, q′), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 must be invisible; therefore r3 can be replaced by
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Figure 5.6: Reducible invisible diagonal BPDS rules.
r1 and r
′ without affecting the stuttering equivalence between the paths of
BP ′r and BPr.
• For V isProp(r2) = V isProp(r3) or V isProp(r2) = ∅, we know that r
′ =
〈(g′, q), γ′〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), γ′〉 must be invisible, where γ′ is the top stack
symbol in ω; therefore r3 can be replaced by r2 and r
′.
Theorem 5.5. Any LTL−X property is invariant on BP
′
r and BPr.
Proof. We prove that given a trace of BP ′r in the form of φ
′ = c0 ⇒BP c
′
1 . . .⇒BP c,
there is a trace of BPr in the form of φ = c0 ⇒BP c1 . . . ⇒BP c, such that φ
′ and
φ are stuttering equivalent; and (2) vice versa.
“⇒”: Lemma 5.3 has demonstrated that the reduction of diagonal BPDS rules
according to Algorithm 5.4 does not affect the stuttering equivalence between any
traces of BP ′r and BPr. Therefore, we only need to prove that the reduction
of horizontal BPDS rules does not affect the stuttering equivalence neither. In
Algorithm 5.4, a horizontal BPDS rule is considered as a reducible candidate if it
is either invisible or constructed from a BA transition that is horizontally visible.
In both ways, the horizontal transition can be shifted backward on the BPDS trace
without affecting the stuttering equivalence requirement. We prove this direction
of the theorem by mathematical induction.
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Basis. If |φ′| = 0, i.e., c = c0, our argument trivially holds. If |φ
′| = 1, be-
cause there is no horizontal transition reduced on the initial configuration, for any
transition c0 ⇒BP c of BP
′
r, there must be a stuttering equivalent trace of BPr.
Inductive step. Given a trace φ′ = c0 ⇒BP c
′
1 . . . ⇒BP c
′
j ⇒BP c
′ (j ≥ 0) of
BP ′r where |φ
′| = j + 1, if there exists a trace φ = c0 ⇒BP c1 . . . ⇒BP ci ⇒BP c
′
(i ≥ 0) of BPr where |φ| = i + 1, we show that for every t = c
′ ⇒BP c of BP
′
r,
there is a trace of BPr such that c0 ⇒
∗
BP c. Furthermore, if φ
′ and φ are stuttering
equivalent, the new traces of BP ′r and BPr are also stuttering equivalent.
In the trace φ, we can always find a configuration
ck = 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉, 0 ≤ k ≤ i,
such that ck is the last configuration satisfying
head(〈gk, ωk〉) ∈ SensitiveSet
⋃
V isibleSet
⋃
LoopSet.
Thus, the path from ck to c
′ has the form of
(ck : 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉)⇒BP 〈(gk+1, qk), ωk+1〉 ⇒BP . . .⇒BP (c
′ : 〈(gi+1, qk), ωi+1〉),
where B always loops at the state qk after ck. Because the horizontal transitions
are reduced on the configurations after ck, BPr cannot directly have the transition
(c′ : 〈(gi+1, qk), ωi+1〉) ⇒BP (c : 〈(gi+1, qk+1), ωi+1〉), i.e., the corresponding BPDS
rule 〈(gi+1, qk), γi+1〉) →֒BP 〈(gi+1, qk+1), γi+1〉 (γi+1 is the top stack symbol of ωi+1)
does not exist after the reduction. However, we can shift the horizontal transition
backward to the position right after ck where the horizontal transitions are not
reduced. No matter whether the transition is invisible or horizontally visible (as the
two types of reducible horizontal BPDS rules according Algorithm 5.4), the paths
before and after the shift operation are stuttering equivalent. We can construct
the new path as
(c′k : 〈(gk, qk), ωk〉)⇒BP 〈(gk, qk+1), ωk〉 ⇒BP 〈(gk+1, qk+1), ωk+1〉 ⇒BP . . .⇒BP (c :
〈(gi+1, qk+1), ωi+1〉).
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Therefore, we have proven this direction of the theorem.
“⇐”: the other direction trivially holds because BP ′r has all the BPDS rules of
BPr.
Theorem 5.6. Algorithm 5.5 preserves all LTL−X properties to be verified on BP.
Proof. This theorem holds, as the result of Theorem 5.4 and Theorem 5.5.
Theorem 5.7. BPr is optimal with respect to static partial order reduction.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.3, we demonstrate that any BPDS rule
constructed by Algorithm 5.5 cannot be reduced without affecting the LTL−X
property to be verified.
• At line 6, if the BPDS rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 is reduced, the con-
figuration 〈(g′, q′), ω〉 may not be reachable anymore, since B and P must
transition together at dependent transitions. Furthermore, any BPDS con-
figuration that is reachable from 〈(g′, q′), ω〉 may also be affected. Since we
do not know whether the reachability to 〈(g′, q′), ω〉 can affect the LTL−X
property without going through a model checking process, the BPDS rule
should not be reduced;
• At line 9, if 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q), ω〉 is reduced, the configuration 〈(g′, q), ω〉
may not be reachable anymore. For example, in Figure 5.4b, reduce any
vertical transition may affect the reachability to some BPDS configurations;
• At line 13, the diagonal rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g
′, q′), ω〉 is constructed only
in two possibilities as illustrated in Figure 5.7. In a general point of view,
the BPDS rule cannot be reduced in either way (see Section 5.6.2 for further
discussion);
• At line 17, the BPDS rule 〈(g, q), γ〉 →֒BP 〈(g, q
′), γ〉 is not reduced. When
ReduceHori = FALSE, reducing the rule may eliminate the traces of BPr
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Figure 5.7: Irreducible diagonal BPDS rules.
that are stuttering equivalent with a trace of BP ′r; when the BPDS rule
is related to SensitiveSet, reducing the rule can affect the reachability to
〈(g, q′), γ〉; when the BPDS rule is related to V isibleSet, reducing the rule
can either affect invisible paths after visible transitions or eliminate all hor-
izontally visible transitions after visible transitions; when the BPDS rule is
related to LoopSet, reducing the rule can simply remove all BPDS traces,
because the BPDS loop constraint may not be satisfied.
With the information available in static partial order reduction, we cannot be
sure to reduce any rule constructed by Algorithm 5.5 without affecting the LTL−X
property to be verified; therefore, we have proven that BPr is optimal.
5.6 SYMBOLIC ALGORITHMS
A system design can have an enormous number of states; therefore, it is almost
impossible to specify the design explicitly in practice, where the transition relation
between every two states is described by a separate rule. It is also inefficient
to analyze an explicit representation, because most analysis algorithms need to
explore all the transition rules.
Symbolic representation is a compact way to specify system designs. A symbolic
rule describes the transition relation between two sets of states. In a general point
of view, we can consider a hardware transaction function in modelC (see Chapter 3)
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as a symbolic rule of BA or a C statement in software programs as a symbolic rule
of LPDS, because both of them describe the transition relation between two sets
of states. Therefore, we can apply our static partial order reduction algorithms
directly on the programs specified using C, modelC, etc. On the other hand, data
structures such as BDD can be utilized to encode the transition rules of BPDS
during model checking. Symbolic model checking that operates on these symbolic
BPDS rules are more efficient than model checking on explicit BPDS rules. In
this section, we will discuss the symbolic algorithms for the first type of symbolic
representation, where the algorithms work directly on the programs in order to
construct reduced BPDS models.
5.6.1 Reduction Algorithm for Reachability Analysis
Given the symbolic representations of BPDS discussed in Section 4.4, we present
Algorithm 5.6 as the symbolic version of Algorithm 5.3. Algorithm 5.6 is similar
to Algorithm 5.3, except that Algorithm 5.6 operates on symbolic rules of BA and
LPDS in order to construct symbolic rules of BPDS. We have two observations on
Algorithm 5.6:
• B and P need to transition together only when their transitions are depen-
dent; and
• B and P can transition in an interleaved manner when their transitions are
independent.
The two observations tell us how BP can be constructed from B and P so that only
the necessary BPDS rules are included. Since a modelC program can be considered
as the symbolic representation of BA and a C program can be considered as the
symbolic representation of LPDS, we can construct a BPDS model by instrument
the C program using the modelC program. If we drop the acceptance condition
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Algorithm 5.6 SymbolicBPDSRulesViaSPOR(δ ×∆)
1: ∆sync ← ∅, ∆vert ← ∅, ∆hori ← ∅
2: for all R = 〈g, γ〉 ֒
τ
−→
R
〈g′, ω〉 ⊆ ∆ do
3: for all U = Q× {σ} ×Q ⊆ δ and σ ⊆ L′P2B(〈g, γ〉) and τ ⊆ L
′
B2P(U) do
4: if R and U are dependent then
5: {B and P must transition together}
6: ∆sync ← ∆sync
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× U
7: else
8: {Vertical edges (see Figure 5.4b), when P transitions and B self-loops}
9: ∆vert ← ∆vert
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× Uloop
10: if 〈g, γ〉 ∈ SensitiveSet then
11: {Horizontal edges (see Figure 5.4b), when B transitions P self-loops}
12: ∆hori ← ∆hori
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g, γ〉, where R
′ = Rloop × U
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: ∆′r ← ∆sync
⋃
∆vert
⋃
∆hori
18: return ∆′r
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of the BPDS model, the resulting program actually corresponds to the PDS ver-
ification model, P ′r; therefore, we can utilize existing model checkers to solve our
reachability problems of BPDS. Chapter 6 will discuss the details regarding the
implementation aspect of Algorithm 5.6.
5.6.2 Reduction Algorithm for LTL Checking
As discussed in Section 4.4, a symbolic LPDS rule, 〈g, γ〉 ֒
τ
−→
R
〈g′, ω〉, describes a set
of LPDS rules that are not only labeled by the same input symbol but also have
the same state transition with respect to the control flow. The transition relation
R describes a set of data-flow transitions with respect to the same control-flow
transition. It is inefficient (also unnecessary) to specify an LTL property on both
the control flow and the data flow of LPDS; otherwise, all symbolic BPDS rules can
be visible (due to some visible data-flow transition). Without loss of generality,
we assume that the labeling function Lϕ is defined based on the BA states and
the LPDS states that are only related to the control flow. Furthermore, we extend
the function V isProp to take symbolic BPDS rules as the input. Algorithm 5.7
and Algorithm 5.8 are the symbolic version of Algorithm 5.4 and Algorithm 5.5
respectively. We have the following observations:
• A symbolic BA transition rule describes a set of BA transitions. There may
exist some visible BPDS rules that are constructed from such BA transi-
tions. Assuming that we are not allowed to reduce any visible BPDS rule,
in the worst case, if every symbolic BA transition rule describes some BA
transitions that are horizontally visible, we will not be able to reduce any of
the horizontal symbolic BPDS rules. This is the motivation for us to reduce
visible BPDS rules based on how the property is specified.
• As illustrated in Figure 5.7, diagonal BPDS rules are irreducible only if the
related horizontal and vertical BPDS rules are all visible.
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Algorithm 5.7 ReducibleSymbolicBPDSRules(U ⊆ δ,R ⊆ ∆)
Require: U and R are independent.
1: ReduceDiag ← FALSE, ReduceHori← FALSE
2: Let U = Q× {σ} ×Q
3: R = 〈g, γ〉 ֒
τ
−→
R
〈g′, ω〉
4: R1 = 〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g, γ〉, where R
′ = Rloop × U {Horizontal BPDS rules}
5: R2 = 〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× Uloop {Vertical BPDS rules}
6: R3 = 〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× U {Diagonal BPDS rules}
7: if V isProp(R1) = ∅ and V isProp(R2) = ∅ and V isProp(R3) = ∅ then
8: {If R1, R2, and R3 are all invisible}
9: ReduceDiag ← TRUE, ReduceHori← TRUE
10: else
11: if V isProp(R1) = V isProp(R3) or V isProp(R2) = V isProp(R3) or
V isProp(R1) = ∅ or V isProp(R2) = ∅ then
12: ReduceDiag ← TRUE
13: end if
14: if R1 is invisible or U is horizontally visible then
15: ReduceHori← TRUE
16: end if
17: end if
18: return (ReduceDiag, ReduceHori)
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Algorithm 5.8 SymbolicBPDSRulesViaSPOR LTL(δ ×∆)
1: ∆sync ← ∅, ∆vert ← ∅, ∆hori ← ∅, ∆diag ← ∅
2: for all R = 〈g, γ〉 ֒
τ
−→
R
〈g′, ω〉 ⊆ ∆ do
3: for all U = Q× {σ} ×Q ⊆ δ and σ ⊆ L′P2B(〈g, γ〉) and τ ⊆ L
′
B2P(U) do
4: if R and U are dependent then
5: {B and P must transition together}
6: ∆sync ← ∆sync
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× U
7: else
8: {P transitions and B self-loops}
9: ∆vert ← ∆vert
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R× Uloop
10: (ReduceDiag, ReduceHori)← ReducibleBPDSRules(U,R)
11: if ReduceDiag = FALSE then
12: {B and P transition together}
13: ∆diag ← ∆diag
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g
′, ω〉, where R′ = R × U
14: end if
15: if ReduceHori = FALSE or
〈g, γ〉 ∈ SensitiveSet
⋃
V isibleSet
⋃
LoopSet then
16: {B transitions and P self-loops}
17: ∆hori ← ∆hori
⋃
〈g, γ〉 −֒→
R′
BP〈g, γ〉, where R
′ = Rloop × U
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: ∆′r ← ∆sync
⋃
∆vert
⋃
∆hori
⋃
∆diag
23: return ∆′r
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• The first type of irreducible diagonal BPDS rule, as demonstrated on the left
side of Figure 5.7 requires the LTL properties being specified on an explicit
BPDS configuration. However, in symbolic representations, properties are
specified on control-flow locations, where each control-follow location corre-
sponds to a set of BPDS configurations. If a vertical transition is visible, the
related diagonal transition should also be visible. Therefore, such irreducible
diagonal BPDS rules do not exist in symbolic representations.
• In practice, the second type of irreducible diagonal BPDS rule, as demon-
strated on the right side of Figure 5.7, is reducible under certain conditions.
The rule r3 can be replaced by r1 and r
′
2 if
1. V isProp(r1)
⋃
V isProp(r′2) = V isProp(r3); and
2. the propositional variables respectively from V isProp(r1) and V isProp(r
′
2)
do not occur in the same Boolean expression (i.e., excluding the tem-
poral operators) of the LTL property.
r3 can be replaced by r2 and r
′
1 if
1. V isProp(r2)
⋃
V isProp(r′1) = V isProp(r3); and
2. the propositional variables respectively from V isProp(r2) and V isProp(r
′
1)
do not occur in the same Boolean expression of the LTL property.
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Chapter 6
IMPLEMENTATION
In our approach, hardware and software can be specified using different languages
such as C or SystemC. These specification languages need to be converted to
a uniform format acceptable by the model checking engine. A straightforward
conversion preserves the state space of the specification; however, it usually suffers
from the state explosion problem. Therefore, a counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement process is commonly applied to alleviate this problem, where the process
starts with a highly abstracted conversion and then asymptotically introduces more
details to the abstraction based on infeasible counterexamples given by the model
checking engine.
For safety property verification, counterexample-guided abstraction refinement
has been widely applied to software implementations such as C programs. Accord-
ing to the discussions in Chapter 5, BPDS models can be specified in C/modelC
programs and then converted into a C program for checking safety properties.
Therefore, the SLAM verification engine can be utilized to solve our verification
problems. SLAM accepts properties specified in SLIC, a property specification
language designed for software. As for our co-verification framework, property
specification on hardware behaviors also is desired. We demonstrate how SLIC
can be adapted to specify hardware properties.
For liveness property verification, one major challenge is loop computation,
i.e., checking whether or not there exists a loop in the design that may not termi-
nate. Loop computation is often inefficient in counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement, because a loop needs to be completely unrolled in order to check its
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termination properties. Such unrolling itself may not even terminate when the
specification language has the power to describe a Turing machine. Therefore,
verification of liveness properties on C programs requires different techniques than
safety properties. In this chapter, we will discuss verification of liveness properties
on BPDS models specified using Boolean programs. The general concept of our
approach also is applicable to BPDS models specified using C/modelC programs
when a liveness verification engine for C programs (such as Terminator [25]) is
available.
Considering a hardware BA model and a software LPDS model, we discuss
the implementation in three steps: First, we need to construct a BPDS model
from the BA and LPDS models. Second, we want to specify the properties that
should be observed on the target model in verification. Third, we should apply
our reduction algorithms at a proper phase of our implementation so that the size
of the BPDS model can be reduced with a low cost. The rest of this chapter is
organized as follows: Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 discuss the implementation of
reachability analysis and LTL checking for co-verification respectively. Section 6.3
discusses our co-verification tool, CoVer.
6.1 REACHABILITY ANALYSIS
As discussed in Chapter 4, a symbolic BPDS model can be constructed directly
from a symbolic BA model and a symbolic LPDS model. In co-specification, we
have designed a language, modelC, to formally specify the device behaviors from
the view of a driver, namely a formal device model (also referred to as a hardware
interface model [49]). A Formal Device Model (FDM) includes both the HW/SW
interface specification and hardware specification (see Chapter 3). Conceptually,
the hardware behaviors described by a FDM can be represented by a symbolic BA
model, where a hardware transaction function describes a set of BA transitions
labeled by the same input symbol. Our goal is to verify a driver implementation
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with its FDM, where the driver’s C code can be considered as a symbolic LPDS
model and an atomic software statement describes a set of LPDS rules labeled
by the same input symbol. We can then construct a symbolic BPDS model from
the symbolic BA model and the symbolic LPDS model. The Cartesian product is
carried out via code instrumentation, i.e., instrument the driver’s C code with the
device’s modelC code. The symbolic BPDS model, as the result of the product,
is actually a C program with non-determinism and a Bu¨chi constraint. We can
safely drop the Bu¨chi constraint, since it is irrelevant to reachability analysis.
Therefore, the non-deterministic C program can be verified by the SLAM engine [4]
for reachability properties.
SLAM takes SLIC [10] as the property specification language. Since SLIC was
designed for software verification, the language constructs of SLIC mainly focus
on the control flow of C programs. This is different from hardware designs, where
the data flow is more interesting. We demonstrate that the properties regarding
hardware behaviors can also be specified using the SLIC language within our co-
verification framework.
A straightforward product of the BA and LPDS will construct BPDS rules
that are unnecessary for reachability analysis. In Chapter 5, we presented a static
partial order reduction algorithm to reduce BPDS rules while constructing the
BPDS model. Since the reduction is applied during the compilation phase of co-
verification, no modification is necessary to the model checker. This is very helpful
in practice, because verification engines with industrial strength, such as SLAM,
can thus be readily utilized.
6.1.1 Cartesian Product via Code Instrumentation
There are two types of BPDS rules. First, synchronous BPDS rules are constructed
from dependent BA transitions and LPDS rules. Second, asynchronous BPDS rules
are constructed from independent BA transitions and LPDS rules.
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In co-specification, the synchronous BPDS rules are specified in HW/SW inter-
face. For example, when a driver invokes a function, WRITE REGISTER UCHAR (see
Figure 3.1), to update device interface registers, the corresponding hardware trans-
action functions, e.g., atWritePortA, are invoked subsequently1. This sequence of
operations can be understood as a synchronous (a.k.a., dependent) transition of the
driver and device, where the driver executes the function, WRITE REGISTER UCHAR,
and at the same time the device executes the hardware transaction function,
atWritePortA. In the other direction, when device raises an interrupt, the driver
should invoke ISR to service the interrupt. The function RunIsr, illustrated in
Figure 3.4, models such a process. There are two atomic blocks in RunIsr. The
first atomic block checks the states of both device and driver to decide if an ISR
should be invoked; and the second atomic block sets the device and driver to the
proper state after the ISR returns. The two atomic blocks should be considered as
two synchronous transitions of the device and driver.
With respect to asynchronous BPDS rules, there are three types of asyn-
chronous transitions, i.e., BA transitions and LPDS self-loops, LPDS transitions
and BA self-loops, and BA and LPDS transition together. The three types of
asynchronous BPDS rules can be modeled as interleaved executions between the
driver statements and the hardware transaction function of the hardware model.
Hardware instrumentation function. As illustrated in Figure 6.1, a hardware
instrumentation function implements a non-deterministic loop to invoke atRun DIO
and RunIsr in sequence. If an interrupt is raised due to a hardware state transition
by executing atRun DIO, the context-switch to the ISR is modeled as a function
call, where the execution switches back to the interrupted thread only after the
ISR returns. This approach is correct to simulate the context-switches because
1In verification, the implementation of WRITE REGISTER UCHAR is replaced by the glue code
illustrated in Figure 3.3. The replacement is carried out automatically by Static Driver Verifier
(SDV) [4], the working environment of SLAM.
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VOID HWInstr () {
while( choice() ) { // Non-deterministic choices
atRun DIO(); // Run hardware transaction function
RunIsr(); // If interrupt has been raised
}
}
Figure 6.1: The hardware instrumentation function.
ISRs are relatively atomic to other driver routines.
Code instrumentation. We insert the hardware instrumentation function, HWIn-
str, after every atomic driver statement to construct asynchronous BPDS rules.
The idea is based on the concept of relative atomicity as illustrated in Figure 3.7.
The non-deterministic while-loop simulates the delays of either software or hard-
ware, i.e., BA transitions and LPDS self-loops or LPDS transitions and BA self-
loops. The situation when hardware (i.e., BA) and software (i.e., LPDS) transition
together can be replaced by continuous executions of a driver statement and the
hardware transaction function, atRun DIO.
6.1.2 Specification of SLIC rules
Hardware and software are different in nature. When specifying the properties
to be verified on hardware and/or software, their differences must be explored
to ensure that the unique behaviors of hardware and software can be precisely
captured. In general, hardware is data-flow-centric, where the state change of
registers by hardware transactions is interested; software is control-flow-centric,
where the execution sequences of program statements are interested. These design
features must be considered in the property specifications of co-verification.
Control flow refers to the order in which individual statements, instructions, or
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// InvalidRead: the driver should never complete an I/O read request using
// STATUS SUCCESS without actually reading any data from the device.
// Declare the state variable used by this rule
state { enum { INIT, DPCSch } s = INIT; }
[ atReadPortA, atReadPortB, atReadPortC ].entry {
halt; // Stop the current execution if any data is read from hardware
}
WdfInterruptQueueDpcForIsr.entry {
s = DPCSch; // DPC is scheduled in the ISR
}
DioDpc.entry {
// Stop the current execution if DPC is not scheduled in the ISR
if ( s == INIT ) halt;
}
WdfRequestCompleteWithInformation.entry {
// If the I/O request is completed with STATUS SUCCESS but no data
// is actually read, raise an alarm.
if( (s == DPCSch) && ($2 == STATUS SUCCESS) )
abort “Input request is successfully completed with no read operation.”;
}
Figure 6.2: The SLIC rule InvalidRead for the PIO-24 digital I/O card driver.
The driver source code is discussed in Section 2.5. We implemented a test harness,
as illustrated in Figure 6.3, to model the OS environment on how the driver should
be called.
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function calls of an imperative or a declarative program are executed or evaluated.
The SLIC language allows temporal properties to be specified on the order of func-
tion calls/returns. Commonly, there are two types of events that can be specified
on a function: entry and exit. The two events identify the program points in the
function immediately before its first statement and immediately before it returns
control to the caller. Meanwhile, the states of the program can be specified by
referring to function parameters and global variables at the events. The value of
the nth formal parameter in a function is referred to as $n. The return value of a
function is referred to as $return.
Figure 6.2 illustrates an example of a SLIC rule that checks whether the driver
will ever complete an I/O read request using STATUS SUCCESS without actually
reading any data from the device. The halt statement signals that the analysis
of the current execution path should stop. We halt the verification when a port
(A, B, or C) is read by the driver, which satisfies the rule immediately; otherwise
when the function, WdfRequestCompleteWithInformation, is invoked with the
second formal parameter equal to STATUS SUCCESS, we raise an alarm using the
statement, abort.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the test harness that models the OS environment for invok-
ing the driver. Instead of directly invoking the dispatch routines that are provided
by the PIO-24 digital I/O card driver, we invoke the role type functions. A role
type function corresponds to those dispatch routines that service the same type of
request in Windows. Such dispatch routines should have the same function type;
however, they may be defined under different names in various driver implementa-
tions. Therefore, role type functions help us to attain the portability of verification
over different driver implementations. The tool that matches role type functions
to driver dispatch routines is provided by Static Driver Verifier (SDV) [4]. For ex-
ample, the role type function, fun WDF IO QUEUE IO DEVICE CONTROL, corresponds
to the dispatch routine, DioEvtDeviceControl, in the PIO-24 driver and the role
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void main() {
// Non-deterministically invoke the role type functions for different requests
switch( choice() ) {
case 0: fun WDF IO QUEUE IO READ( . . . ); break;
case 1: fun WDF IO QUEUE IO WRITE( . . . ); break;
default: fun WDF IO QUEUE IO DEVICE CONTROL( . . . ); break;
}
// Invoke DPC to complete the request
fun WDF DPC(. . . );
}
Figure 6.3: The test harness for InvalidRead.
type function, fun WDF DPC, corresponds to the dispatch routine, DioDpc, in the
driver. As an execution scenario, the two dispatch routines DioEvtDeviceControl
and DioDpc can be invoked in sequence by the harness. Meanwhile, the hardware
instrumentation function, HWInstr, is invoked after every driver statement due to
the code instrumentation. If the device model raises an interrupt, the ISR routine,
DioIsr, will be invoked via HWInstr. At last, although the test harness invokes
the DPC routine, DioDpc, it will not be executed in verification unless DioIsr has
requested for a DPC routine (at the line P3 of Figure 2.8b). This is guaranteed
by the SLIC rule, InvalidRead, where the rule halts verification at the entry of
DioDpc if no DPC routine was requested by DioIsr.
Data flow refers to the order in which the values of variables are changed. For
example, in a clock-driven hardware design, the values of registers are updated
along with every clock cycle. How the registers should be updated depends on the
current state of the registers and the design of the hardware (i.e., the transition
rules specified). Property specifications based on data flow usually monitor the
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changes of register values along with clock cycles. In our approach, clock cycles
are abstracted away. Instead, we use hardware transaction functions to describe
the state transition rules of hardware. Because hardware transaction functions
are atomic in the view of software, we do not need to monitor the intermediate
hardware state within a transaction. Because software cannot directly update
the hardware state without going through hardware transaction functions, we do
not need to monitor the hardware state when a program statement is executed.
As a result, we monitor the hardware states at the exits of hardware transaction
functions, because conceptually these exit events occur when hardware states are
updated. Figure 6.4 illustrates a SLIC rule that checks whether the hardware
// InvalidHWInterrupt: formal device model should not raise an interrupt when
// it is in an interrupt disabled state.
// Check the hardware state at the exit of a hardware transaction function
atRun DIO.exit {
// If hardware raises an interrupt when it is in an interrupt disabled state
if( ($g DIORegs.IRQST.IRQST1==1) && ($g DIORegs.IRQ.IRQENn!=1) ) {
abort “Interrupt is raised when the Interrupt Enable (IE) register is 0.”;
}
Figure 6.4: The SLIC rule InvalidHWInterrupt for the PIO-24 digital I/O card
device model.
model of the PIO-24 digital I/O card will ever raise an interrupt when its interrupt
status is disabled. This rule is useful to validate the correctness of our formal
device/driver models in co-specification.
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6.1.3 Reduction
In Chapter 5, we demonstrated an approach to efficient reachability analysis of
BPDS models. The process that reduces a BPDS model BP is presented in Algo-
rithm 5.3 and the symbolic version is presented in Algorithm 5.6. As the key idea
of the reduction, we observe that the BA B and the LPDS P can run separately
when their state transitions are independent. This allows the reduction of many
transition rules of BP without affecting the verification result. Following the con-
cept of static partial order reduction, these reducible transition rules need not be
included when constructing the BPDS model.
Software synchronization points. With respect to static partial order reduc-
tion, a key concept is SensitiveSet, defined to identify the BPDS rules that are
necessary in reachability analysis. As the concrete counterpart of the SensitiveSet
concept in implementation, we define software synchronization points as a set of
program locations1 where the program statements right before these locations may
be dependent with some of the hardware state transitions. In general, there are
three types of software synchronization points:
1. the point where the program is initialized;
2. those points right after software reads/writes hardware interface registers;
3. those points where hardware interrupts may affect the software execution.
The first and second types are straightforward for hardware and software to tran-
sition synchronously. We may understand the third type in such a way that the
effect of interrupts (by executing ISRs) may influence certain program statements,
e.g., the statements that access global variables. For example, in Figure 2.8b, the
program reads hardware interface registers by READ REGISTER UCHAR. There is a
1Assuming the program is preprocessed to ensure that every statement is atomic from the view of hardware.
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software synchronization point right after the function call. There is another soft-
ware synchronization point right before the statement P1 of Figure 2.8a, because
a global variable CurrentRequest is accessed in the previous statement.
To construct the reduced BPDS model, BPr, according to Algorithm 5.6, we
instrument the driver code by HWInstr in such a way that HWInstr is invoked
at every software synchronization point. Conceptually, the instrumentation lets
hardware run after every HW/SW synchronous transition. Compared to the triv-
ial approach that inserts HWInstr after every software statement to simulate the
concurrent state transitions of hardware and software, our algorithm can signif-
icantly reduce the complexity of the verification model, because the number of
software synchronization points are usually very small in common applications.
6.2 LTL CHECKING
We have implemented the LTL checking algorithm for BPDS, where the LPDS P is
specified using Boolean programs and the BA B is specified using Boolean programs
with the semantic extension of relative atomicity, i.e., hardware transitions are
modeled as atomic to software. In this section, we first present an example of a
BPDS model specified in Boolean programs. Second, we illustrate how we specify
LTL properties on such a BPDS model. Third, we elaborate on how we generate
a reduced BPDS model for the verification of an LTL−X formula.
6.2.1 A BPDS Model specified using Boolean programs
We specify B and P using our co-specification approach as described in Chapter 3.
Figure 6.5 demonstrates such an example. The states of B are represented by
global variables. All the functions labeled by the keyword atomic are hardware
transaction functions that describe the state transitions of B. The function main
is the program entry of P, where main has three steps:
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void main() begin
decl v0,v1,v2 := 1,1,1;
reset();
// wait for the reset to complete
v1,v0 := status();
while(!v1|v0) do v1,v0 := status(); od
// wait for the counter to increase
v2,v1,v0 := rd reg();
while(!v2) do v2,v1,v0 := rd reg(); od
// if the return value is valid
if (v1|v0) then
error: skip;
fi
exit: return;
end
atomic void inc reg()
begin
if (!c0) then c0 := 1;
elsif (!c1) then c1,c0 := 1,0;
elsif (!c2) then
c2,c1,c0 := 1,0,0; fi
end
// represent hardware registers
decl c0, c1, c2, r, s;
atomic void reset()
begin reset cmd: r := 1; end
atomic bool<3> rd reg()
begin return c2,c1,c0; end
atomic bool<2> status()
begin return s,r; end
// hardware instrumentation function
void HWInstr() begin
while(∗) do HWModel(); od
end
// asynchronous hardware model
atomic void HWModel() begin
if (r) then
reset act: c2,c1,c0,r,s := 0,0,0,0,1;
elsif(s) then inc reg(); fi
end
Figure 6.5: An example of BA B and LPDS P both specified in Boolean programs.
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1. resets the state of B by invoking the function reset;
2. waits for the reset to complete;
3. waits for the counter of B to increase above 4, i.e., v2==1.
When a hardware transaction function, such as reset or rd reg, is invoked from
P, it represents a dependent (a.k.a., synchronous) transition between B and P.
On the other hand, the hardware transaction function HWModel represents inde-
pendent (a.k.a., asynchronous) transitions of B with respect to P. In this example,
since the dependent transitions of B and P are already specified as direct function
calls, the rest of the Cartesian product is to instrument P with the independent
transitions of B, i.e., add function call to HWInstr after each statement in main.
Such instrumentation only models two types of asynchronous BPDS rules when B
transitions and P self-loops or P transitions and B self-loops. The BPDS rules
when B and P transition together are not directly modeled by code instrumen-
tation. Sometimes, these types of BPDS rules are not necessary to the checked
LTL property; therefore, they can be replaced by interleaved transitions of B and
P (Note that the transition order between B and P does not matter here). Oth-
erwise, when these types of BPDS rules may affect the LTL property, we need to
apply some restrictions on how the propositional variables are evaluated during
verification, in order to reduce the BPDS rules. The next sub-section will discuss
the details about what LTL properties require the asynchronous BPDS rules for
B and P to transition together as well as how we can satisfy such requirements in
verification.
6.2.2 Specification of LTL Properties
Without loss of generality, we specify LTL properties on the statement labels of
Boolean programs. Formally, such labels are considered as propositional variables
that evaluate to true at those BPDS configurations right after the execution of the
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labeled statements. For example, we write an LTL formula, F exit, which asserts
that the function main always terminates. This property is asserted on a common
scenario: when software waits for hardware to respond, the waiting thread should
not hang. As illustrated in Figure 6.5, the hardware transaction function, HWModel,
describes a hardware model that responds to software reset immediately; therefore,
the first while-loop in main will not loop for ever. Since hardware increments its
register after reset, the second while-loop in main also will terminate. Therefore, F
exit holds. Note that the non-deterministic while-loop in HWInstr will repeatedly
call HWModel, which is guaranteed by the BPDS loop constraint and the fairness
between hardware state transitions (i.e., transitions specified by HWModel should
not be starved by self-loop transitions introduced when constructing a BPDS).
There may exist a hardware design that cannot guarantee immediate responses
to software reset commands. Therefore, delays should be represented in the hard-
ware model. Figure 6.6 illustrates a hardware transaction function, HWModelSlow,
which describes a hardware design that cannot guarantee immediate responses
to reset commands. The property, F exit, fails on the BPDS model that uses
atomic void HWModelSlow() begin
if (r) then
if (∗) then reset act: c2,c1,c0,r,s := 0,0,0,0,1; fi
elsif(s) then inc reg(); fi
end
Figure 6.6: Hardware does not respond to reset immediately.
HWModelSlow for hardware, since the hardware can delay the reset operation in-
finitely. In practice, design engineers may want to assume that hardware can delay
the reset operation; therefore, software should wait for reset completion; however
hardware should not delay the reset operation for ever. Such assumptions also
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can be specified as LTL formulae. Under the assumption, G (reset cmd → (F
reset act)), the property, F exit, will hold on the BPDS model.
As another example, we write an LTL formula, G !error, asserting that the
labeled statement, error, in main is not reachable. The verification of G !error
fails on the BPDS model in Figure 6.5. Since hardware is asynchronous with
software when incrementing the register, it is impossible for software to control
how fast the register is incremented. Therefore, when software breaks from the
second while-loop, the hardware register may have already been incremented to 5,
i.e., (v2==1)&&(v1==0)&&(v0==1).
B and P transition together in an asynchronous BPDS rule. The property
G !(error && reset ack) specifies that BPDS does not contain states such that the
hardware model acknowledges the reset command at the same time that P is
executing the software statement labeled by error. Despite the usefulness of such
kind of rule, they put a requirement on how the propositional variables should be
evaluated during verification. In this case, the BPDS rules for B and P to transition
together cannot be easily reduced; otherwise, the propositional variables, error and
reset ack, will not be evaluated as true at the same time. To solve this problem,
we let the propositional variable, error, stay true when B executes and P self-
loops; therefore, error and reset ack can be evaluated as true at the same time
even when the asynchronous BPDS rules for B and P to transition together are
reduced.
6.2.3 Reduction
In order to construct the Cartesian product of B and P, we need to add a function
call to HWInstr after every software statement. As discussed in Chapter 5, some
BPDS rules are unnecessary to be generated for such a product. In other words, it
is only necessary to call HWInstr after certain software statements in order to verify
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an LTL−X property. There are three types of program locations of P necessary
for instrumentation. Except for the software synchronization points as defined in
Section 6.1, we define the other two types of program locations:
Software visible points. Corresponding to V isibleSet, we define software visible
points as a set of program locations right after the program statements whose labels
are used in the LTL property. For example, in Figure 6.5 the program location
right after the statement, error, can be a software visible point. However, the
location right after the statement, reset act, cannot be a software visible point,
since this statement is in a hardware transaction function of B.
Software loop points. Corresponding to LoopSet, we define software loop points
as a set of program locations involved in program loops. The precise detection
of those loops needs to explore the program’s state graph, which is inefficient.
Therefore, we try to identify a super set LoopSet′ ⊇ LoopSet using heuristics.
A program location is included into the super set if it is at (1) the point right
before the first statement of a while loop; (2) the point right before a backward
goto statement; or (3) the entry of a recursive function, which can be detected by
analyzing the call graph between functions.
As for implementation, we first detect the software synchronization points, vis-
ible points, and loop points in the Boolean program of P and then inserts function
calls to HWInstr only at those detected points. Conceptually, the instrumenta-
tion lets hardware run for all the possibilities at those instrumentation points.
Note that some transitions described by HWModel (called via HWInstr) may be
visible when a statement label in HWModel is used in the LTL formula, e.g., F
reset act. However, such BA transitions are horizontally visible, since reset act
is not affected by any transition of P. This is why function calls to HWInstr can
be reduced without affecting the LTL properties even if HWModel describes visible
transitions. Compared to the trivial approach that inserts HWInstr after every
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software statement to simulate the concurrent state transitions of hardware and
software, our reduction can significantly reduce the complexity of the model to be
verified, since the number of the instrumentation points are usually very small in
common applications.
6.3 CO-VERIFICATION TOOL, COVER
We have created a co-verification tool, CoVer, which provides two options for
reachability analysis and LTL property verification respectively.
Reachability analysis. Figure 6.7 illustrates the implementation for reachabil-
ity analysis. CoVer has two steps. First, the frontend automatically instruments
Driver code
Co-verification
SLAM
YES
NOinstrumentation
frontend
C program
Formal Device
Model (FDM)
SLIC rule
Figure 6.7: CoVer implementation for reachability analysis.
the driver with the formal device model to generate the verification model, a C
program. Static partial order reduction is applied during this step in order to
reduce function calls to the hardware instrumentation function, HWInstr. Sec-
ond, the SLAM engine checks the reachability property (in the form of a SLIC
rule) on the C program. As proven in Chapter 5, the reachability properties sat-
isfied/disatisfied on the verification model will also be satisfied/disatisfied on the
original device/driver model.
It is important to note that our approach is not restricted by the verification
engine, SLAM. Any verification engine that supports: (1) the verification of C
programs; (2) non-determinism; and (3) property specification languages similar
to SLIC, can be readily utilized in our co-verification approach.
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LTL property verification. As illustrated in Figure 6.8, we have realized the
LTL checking algorithm for BPDS as well as the static partial order reduction
algorithm in our co-verification tool, CoVer. The implementation is based on the
Moped model checker [77]. CoVer takes three inputs: First, the LTL assertions and
Software LPDS model
Co-verification
YES
NO
instrumentation
frontend
Boolean program
LTL assertions
Hardware BA model
Büchi constraint
Model checker
based on Moped
LTL assumptions
+ LTL2BA
BA
+
Figure 6.8: CoVer implementation for LTL checking.
assumptions. Second, the software LPDS model specified using Boolean programs.
Third, the hardware BA model specified using Boolean programs with relative
atomicity.
There are three steps in verification: First, the LTL formulae are converted
into a BA using the LTL2BA tool [31]. Second, the software LPDS model is
instrumented with the hardware BA model to generate a Boolean program with
the Bu¨chi constraint. Third, this Boolean program is verified for the LTL formulae
using the model checker implemented based on Moped. The static partial order
reduction is implemented in the second step, and the Moped model checker is
extended in order to support the BPDS loop constraint.
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Chapter 7
EVALUATION
In practice, our approach has two phases: First, we need to formally specify the
HW/SW interface protocols, i.e., co-specification. Second, we can utilize the formal
models, as constructed in the co-specification process, in co-verification of driver
implementations. Since our specifications closely resemble the implementation
semantics of HW/SW interfaces, the formal models can be used, without any
modification, as the test harness in co-verification. When a formal model is used
as the test harness for a driver implementation, we refer to such a test harness as
a Formal Device Model (FDM), because it describes the device behaviors in the
view of the driver.
We applied our approach to four device/driver frameworks. One of the de-
vice/driver frameworks is still under development, while the other three have ex-
isted for many years. Following the mechanized process presented in Chapter 3, we
constructed four formal models from the English documents of the device/driver
frameworks. Although the quality of the English documents varies, the formal
models are specified under the same criteria. For example, hardware behaviors
visible to software should be clearly specified, and vice versa. We also applied au-
tomatic tools, such as CoVer, to validate our formal models. This is a significant
benefit of formal models, because they can be analyzed by automatic tools. In
total, there are fifteen specification issues in the English documents discovered
during our formal specification process. Such specification issues can mislead de-
velopment engineers and cause product failures. Given the fact that some of the
English documents have existed for many years and been revised several times, our
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formalization approach is rather effective.
Co-verification is evaluated in reachability analysis and LTL checking respec-
tively. For reachability analysis, CoVer is able to co-verify driver implementations
with their FDMs. Both the driver implementations and the FDMs are directly used
without any modification. There are five Windows drivers developed for the four
device/driver frameworks: one Microsoft in-house driver, one Open Systems Re-
sources (OSR) sample driver published by OSR online [67], and three drivers pub-
lished in Microsoft Windows Driver Kit (WDK) as the sample drivers [59, 61, 63].
Except for the Microsoft in-house driver, which is a prototype currently under de-
velopment, all other drivers are fully functional and well tested; however, utilizing
our co-verification tool, CoVer, we have still discovered twelve real bugs. All of
these bugs, which could cause serious system failures including data loss, interrupt
storm, device hang, etc., were previously unknown to the driver developers. For
LTL checking, we have designed a synthetic BPDS template to generate BPDS
models with various complexities. The template mimics the common scenarios of
HW/SW interactions. The evaluation illustrates that our reduction algorithm is
very effective in both reachability analysis and LTL checking. The average reduc-
tion of the verification cost is 70% in time usage and 30% in memory usage.
7.1 CO-SPECIFICATION
As discussed in Chapter 3, the development process of a device/driver framework
contains three stages: design, development, and certification. We have applied our
approach to the first two stages.
First, for the design stage, we have applied our approach to the next generation
of a pervasively used industry standard. Our approach has led to the detection of
five issues in the draft English HW/SW interface document. One of the issues is a
spec-inconsistency in an algorithm pseudo-code that describes the hardware-side
interface protocol. This finding has triggered a discussion between two companies
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who participated in the design of this HW/SW interface protocol. Our formal
model has 4781 lines of modelC code that covers about 277 pages of the English
document. Therefore, the Model-Doc ratio is 17.26, which indicates that the
draft English document is considerably elaborate compared with the other case
studies (see below). The Model-Doc ratio is an important criteria to compare
the formal model with its document. Specifically, Model-Doc is the ratio between
the size of the formal model and the size of the document portion that is actually
modeled.
Second, for the development stage, we have applied our approach to three long-
existing device/driver frameworks:
• the Sealevel PIO-24 digital I/O device/driver framework, a.k.a., PIO-24 [78];
• the Intel 8255x 10/100Mbps Ethernet controller device/driver framework,
a.k.a., Ethernet controller [39]; and
• the USB 2.0 device/driver framework, a.k.a., USB 2.0 [23, 57].
Our HW/SW interface formalization process (i.e., co-specification) has led to the
detection of ten issues in the English documents.
PIO-24 device/driver framework. We use two sets of tables to present the eval-
uation of our formalization process. Table 7.1 illustrates the overall statistics about
the formalization for the PIO-24 device/driver framework. The statistics are gath-
ered before and after the formalization respectively. We require the specification
engineer1 to give an estimation of the manual effort necessary for formalization,
so that we can compare how well interface documents with different complexities
can be handled by an engineer. We also take the specification engineer’s experi-
ence into consideration, where three areas of the experience may largely affect the
1The author is the specification engineer in this dissertation research.
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Table 7.1: Formalization of the PIO-24 device/driver framework.
Gathered before the formalization process
HW/SW interface doc. (document) size (pages) 20
The portion of the doc. for the HW/SW interface protocol (pages) 10
The portion of the doc. that cannot be modeled (pages) 10
Specification engineer’s experience in driver development (years) 2
Specification engineer’s experience in hardware design (years) 1
Specification engineer’s experience in formal verification (years) 3
Specification engineer estimated manual effort (person-day) 7
Gathered after the formalization process
The actual manual effort (person-day) 3
Specification issues found in the English document 2
Size of the modelC code in formal model (lines) 773
Size of the comments in formal model (lines) 577
Model-Doc ratio as 773/10
(lines of the modelC code)/(pages of the modeled doc.) = 77.3
result of the formalization. Two specification issues have been discovered in the
HW/SW interface document for the PIO-24 device/driver framework: one spec-
inconsistency and one spec-incompleteness. Taking the spec-incompleteness issue
as an example, the document does not mention the default value of the interrupt
pending register (which is usually disabled by default in many English documents
for HW/SW interface specifications); therefore, we assign a non-deterministic ini-
tialization value to this register in our formal specification. Coincidentally, the
Windows driver of this device does not clear the interrupt pending register during
the driver initialization. This uninitialized register affects the driver’s interrupt
handling process, which can lead to data loss (see rule ProperISR2 in Table 7.7 for
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Table 7.2: Formal model of the PIO-24 device/driver framework. (Com.: com-
ments, Doc.: document)
File name
# of lines Doc.
Description
Com. Code pages
DIODefs.h 63 151 2 Data structures
DIO.c 210 192 1 Hardware transaction function
DIODrv.c 37 76 1 software-side protocol
Global∼.c 21 15 N/A Global variables for both
hardware and software models
DIORegs.c 146 270 3 Registers, HW/SW interface events
Environ∼.c 100 69 3 Simulate inputs to Port A, B, and C
more details about this driver bug). We consider this driver bug partially caused
by the spec-incompleteness issue, because the document should at least warn driver
developers that the interrupt pending register is not initialized by default.
Table 7.2 illustrates the detailed statistics about the formal model for the PIO-
24 HW/SW interface protocol. The formal model, as implemented in six files, has
577 lines of comments and 773 lines of modelC code. This corresponds to 10 pages
of the English document. In the form of comments, we have added references that
point to the corresponding document positions; therefore, the formal model can be
related back to the original document. The file “Global∼.c” defines all the global
variables that represent hardware and software states; therefore, we are not able
to determine the exact number of corresponding pages in the document.
Ethernet controller device/driver framework. The statistics about formal-
izing the Ethernet controller device/driver framework are presented in Table 7.3
and Table 7.4 respectively. Compared to the English document of the PIO-24
device/driver framework, the English document of Ethernet controller is more
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Table 7.3: Formalization of the Ethernet controller device/driver framework.
Gathered before the formalization process
HW/SW interface doc. (document) size (pages) 175
The portion of the doc. for the HW/SW interface protocol (pages) 136
The portion of the doc. that cannot be modeled (pages) 39
Specification engineer’s experience in driver development (years) 2
Specification engineer’s experience in hardware design (years) 1
Specification engineer’s experience in formal verification (years) 3
Specification engineer estimated manual effort (person-day) 14
Gathered after the formalization process
The actual manual effort (person-day) 21
Specification issues found in the English document 6
Size of the modelC code in formal model (lines) 2370
Size of the comments in formal model (lines) 1446
Model-Doc ratio as 2370/136
(lines of the modelC code)/(pages of the modeled doc.) = 17.43
elaborate. This can be inferred from the major difference between their Model-
Doc ratios, where the Model-Doc ratio of PIO-24 is much higher. Because the
semantics of formal models closely resemble the HW/SW implementation seman-
tics, necessary details must be specified. Therefore, the size of formal models can
be considered as a standard measurement of the HW/SW interface complexities.
During our formalization process, we have detected six specification issues in the
Ethernet controller English document. One example of the issues is already illus-
trated in Figure 3.8. Given that this document has been published for seven years
and revised three times, we were surprised. We have also observed an interesting
difference between the manual effort estimations: it is clear that engineers have a
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Table 7.4: Formal model of the Ethernet controller device/driver framework.
(Com.: comments, Doc.: document)
File name
# of lines Doc.
Description
Com. Code pages
E100Defs.h 203 768 14 Data structures
E100.c 182 197 15 Hardware transaction function
E100Drv.c 48 182 9 software-side protocol
Global∼.c 20 15 N/A Global variables for both
hardware and software models
E100Regs.c 173 492 35 Registers, HW/SW interface events
Port.c 170 151 5 Handle software commands to
PORT interface registers
CmdUnit.c 410 329 26 Process the Command Unit (CU)
RcvUnit.c 133 134 25 Process the Receive Unit (RU)
Environ∼.c 107 102 7 Simulate the inputs to the device
better control over English documents that are less complicated.
USB 2.0 device/driver framework. The USB 2.0 device/driver framework is
different from the previous device/driver frameworks such as PIO-24 and Ethernet
controller in the sense that USB 2.0 devices use the USB bus instead of the PCI
bus. Therefore, their HW/SW interfaces are quite different. Nevertheless, our
approach has also been successfully applied to the USB 2.0 device/driver frame-
work. The statistics are presented in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 respectively. The
formal model has 2304 lines of modelC code, which corresponds to 60 pages of
the USB 2.0 document [23] and 70 pages (by estimation) of the Microsoft online
document [57]. Therefore, the Model-Doc ratio is 17.72. We have discovered
two spec-incompleteness problems in the Microsoft online document. Windows
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Table 7.5: Formalization of the USB 2.0 device/driver framework.
Gathered before the formalization process
HW/SW interface doc. (document) size (pages) 650 + 120
= 770
The portion of the doc. for the HW/SW interface protocol (pages) 60 + 70
= 130
The portion of the doc. that cannot be modeled (pages) 640
Specification engineer’s experience in driver development (years) 2
Specification engineer’s experience in hardware design (years) 1
Specification engineer’s experience in formal verification (years) 3
Specification engineer estimated manual effort (person-day) 16
Gathered after the formalization process
The actual manual effort (person-day) 20
Specification issues found in the English document 2
Size of the modelC code in formal model (lines) 2304
Size of the comments in formal model (lines) 1016
Model-Doc ratio as 2304/130
(lines of the modelC code)/(pages of the modeled doc.) = 17.72
provides a set of programming interfaces for operating USB devices. However,
some programming rules are not specified, which has confused driver developers.
We have discovered such programming problems in driver implementations using
CoVer. For example, one of the problems is caused by redundant function calls
from driver to stop a USB device2.
Because formal models are manually specified, it is impossible to guarantee that
2Note that such problems are not reported as bugs in co-verification statistics; however, they
can also be considered as bugs in a stricter standard.
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Table 7.6: Formal model of the USB 2.0 device/driver framework. (Com.: com-
ments, Doc.: document)
File name
# of lines Doc.
Description
Com. Code pages
USBDef.h 52 128 20 Data structures
USB.c 186 178 20 Hardware transaction function
USBDrv.c 112 140 20 software-side protocol
Global∼.c 9 8 N/A Global variables for both
hardware and software models
wdfintfs.c 393 1394 50 Registers, HW/SW interface events
device.c 244 445 15 USB device state machine
Environ∼.c 20 11 5 Simulate the inputs to USB devices
no error is made by the specification engineer. However, we are able to validate
our formal models using automatic tools. For example, a C compiler has helped
discover quite a few specification inconsistencies in our formal models, because
most inconsistencies fail the syntax/semantic checking right away. Furthermore,
CoVer has helped discover thirteen errors in our formal models. The errors are
mostly introduced by code copy-paste and misunderstandings of the English speci-
fications. In our approach, the ability to utilize automatic tools in formal HW/SW
interface specifications is a significant advantage over English specifications.
7.2 CO-VERIFICATION
Co-verification is evaluated in reachability analysis and LTL checking respectively,
where real driver programs are verified in reachability analysis and synthetic BPDS
models are used as the benchmark in LTL checking. All evaluation experiments run
on a Lenovo ThinkPad notebook with Dual Core 2.66GHz CPU and 4GB memory.
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The timeout threshold is set as 3000 seconds for both reachability analysis and LTL
checking. For reachability analysis, the spaceout threshold is set as 2000MB, which
is enforced by the SLAM engine. For LTL checking, the spaceout threshold is not
explicitly specified, i.e., a maximum of 4000MB memory may be used.
7.2.1 Reachability Analysis
In reachability analysis, the properties to be verified can be classified into two
categories:
1. whether a driver callback function3 accesses the hardware interface registers
in correct ways, e.g., a command should not be issued when hardware is
busy;
2. whether a driver callback function can cause an out-of-synchronization be-
tween the driver and device. For example, we check if the return value of a
driver callback function correctly indicates the current hardware state.
We have applied CoVer to co-verification of a Microsoft in-house driver with
its FDM developed in co-specification. This in-house driver is a prototype with
the functionalities partially implemented. However, CoVer can still be applied to
analyze the implemented portion of the driver. As a result, two real bugs were
discovered. This is an advantage over runtime validation where most functional-
ities of the driver need to be implemented before any comprehensive test can be
conducted.
We have also applied CoVer to four fully functional Windows device drivers
with their FDMs:
• OSR PIO-24 driver [67];
3 Windows OS invokes predefined driver callback functions to service the I/O requests from
user applications.
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• Microsoft Ethernet controller driver [61];
• OSR USB 2.0 OSRUSBFX2 driver [59]; and
• Microsoft USB 2.0 USBSAMP driver [63].
Because the source code of the drivers has been provided to public as samples
for years, we did not expect to find many bugs. However, utilizing CoVer, we
discovered ten real bugs. All of these bugs, which could cause serious system
failures including data loss, interrupt storm, device hang, etc., were previously
unknown to the driver developers.
PIO-24 driver by OSR. Table 7.7 presents the statistics on the verification
of the PIO-24 driver with its FDM. We discovered four bugs and proved two
Table 7.7: Statistics on the co-verification of the PIO-24 device/driver.
Size of the driver (# of lines) 1724
Size of the formal device model (# of lines) 1237
No reduction Reduction
Rule Description Time Mem. Time Mem. Result
(Sec) (MB) (Sec) (MB)
DevD0Entry
Driver and device will not go
out-of-synchronization when 391.3 293 214.3 181 Passed
starting.
DevD0Exit
Driver and device will not go
out-of-synchronization when 71.1 69 38.4 43 Passed
stopping.
IsrCallDpc
ISR will not queue DPC without
Timeout N/A 700.5 218 Failed
reading the hardware registers.
InvalidRead
Driver will not read any invalid
589.4 132 91.3 66 Failed
input data.
ProperISR1
ISR will clear device interrupt-
58.9 58 35.2 43 Failed
pending status before return.
ProperISR2
ISR will not acknowledge the
74.1 62 28.7 37 Failed
interrupt raised by other devices.
properties of the driver using CoVer. For example, the code excerpt in Figure 2.8
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contains one bug, which violates the rule InvalidRead (illustrated in Figure 6.2)
and will cause the driver return invalid data to user applications. This “invalid
read” bug occurs when the ISR routine DioIsr interrupts the device driver control
routine DioEvtDeviceControl at P1, where the variables CurrentRequest and
AwaitingInt become inconsistent. DioIsr will not execute the if block at P2
because AwaitingInt is FALSE. Later the DPC routine DioDpc is requested at P3.
After both DioIsr and DioEvtDeviceControl have returned, DioDpc starts to
run. At P4, the data is read from PortAValueAInt which has never been written
in DioIsr; therefore, the data is invalid. However, DioIsr still sends the invalid
data back to user application with STATUS SUCCESS at P5.
Another serious bug (discovered using the rule ProperISR1) of this driver can
cause an interrupt storm. The design of the device allows interrupts being repeat-
edly generated in certain configuration; however the driver does not handle the
interrupts correctly which will cause interrupts being raised more frequently than
that can be consumed, i.e., interrupt storm. This bug also reveals a problem of
the device document. Since the assumption on device input is not well defined in
the document, our formal model has to simulate all possible input. On the other
hand, the driver fails to handle one of the possibilities. As a solution to fix this
bug, the driver can disable the interrupt in ISR first and re-enable it later after
interrupt processing is completed.
Ethernet controller driver by Microsoft. Table 7.8 presents the statistics
on the verification of the Intel 82557/82558 based Ethernet controller driver with
its FDM. We discovered three bugs and proved five properties of the driver using
CoVer. For example, CoVer helps discover a bug that violates the rule DevD0Entry
and reports an error trace where the callback function EvtDeviceD0Entry returns
TRUE even if the driver fails to initialize the device correctly. This is a direct
violation of Windows device driver programming standards and will cause the
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Table 7.8: Statistics on the co-verification of the Ethernet controller device/driver.
Size of the driver (# of lines) 14406
Size of the device formal model (# of lines) 3586
No reduction Reduction
Rule Description Time Mem. Time Mem. Result
(Sec) (MB) (Sec) (MB)
DevD0Entry
Driver and device will not go
out-of-synchronization when 1328.3 758 367.1 182 Failed
starting.
DevD0Exit
Driver and device will not go
out-of-synchronization when Timeout N/A 206.6 143 Failed
stopping.
IsrCallDpc
ISR will not queue DPC
64.1 99 39.9 79 Passedwithout reading the
hardware registers.
ProperISR1
ISR will clear device interrupt-
48.9 59 32.6 52 Passed
pending status before return.
ProperISR2
ISR will not acknowledge the
779.3 291 407.4 199 Passed
interrupt raised by other devices.
DoubleCUC
Driver will not issue a command
Timeout N/A 602.4 238 Failed
while the command unit is busy.
DoubleRUC
Driver will not issue a command
N/A Spaceout 1797.3 231 Passed
while the receiving unit is busy.
ProperReset
Driver uses a correct sequence
Timeout N/A 86.9 71 Passed
to reset the device.
device to become unusable without the OS being notified. The error trace also
illustrates that the driver continues its attempts to initialize the device even after
the previous device operations have failed. This may cause the device to become
permanently unaccessible.
Another bug that violates the rule DoubleCUC is illustrated in Figure 3.16b,
where the function D100IssueScbCommand waits before issuing a new command
only if the function parameter WaitForScb is TRUE. This kind of design is due to
a performance optimization. Since there are some program locations where the
driver knows that the device command register is free, it is unnecessary to check
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Table 7.9: Statistics on the co-verification of the USB 2.0 OSRUSBFX2 de-
vice/driver.
Size of the driver (# of lines) 2892
Size of the device formal model (# of lines) 3068
No reduction Reduction
Rule Description Time Mem. Time Mem. Result
(Sec) (MB) (Sec) (MB)
StopIO
I/O on interrupt pipe should be
Timeout N/A 2755.6 340 Passed
stopped during powering down
ResetDevice
All I/O on all pipes should be
318.0 150 126.2 82 Failedstopped before resetting
the device.
ResetPipe
Driver must stop the pipe before
0.9 28 0.6 28 Passed
resetting it.
DevIORead
A read request should fail if the
221.4 133 54.6 60 Passed
device is in an invalid state.
DevIOWrite
A write request should fail if the
200.3 132 87.6 71 Passed
device is in an invalid state.
the register before issuing a new command. However, CoVer has demonstrated that
in some program execution path, a command is issued by the driver even when
the device command register is busy. This is a typical example of performance
optimization creating bugs. Since optimized code is often more complex than the
original code, it very important to use automatic tools, such as CoVer, in order to
ensure the correctness of the optimization.
USB 2.0 device drivers by Microsoft and OSR. Table 7.9 presents the statis-
tics on co-verification of the OSR OSRUSBFX2 driver implementation. We discov-
ered one real bug in this driver using CoVer. The SLIC rule ResetDevice checks
that I/O on all pipes should be stopped before a resetting command; however, the
driver fails to follow this rule in certain execution paths. As for the SLIC rule
ResetPipe, the verification cost is very low. Because CoVer (actually, SLAM)
decides that the error routine (i.e., function that contains the reachability label)
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Table 7.10: Statistics on the co-verification of the USB 2.0 USBSAMP de-
vice/driver.
Size of the driver (# of lines) 3969
Size of the device formal model (# of lines) 3068
No reduction Reduction
Rule Description Time Mem. Time Mem. Result
(Sec) (MB) (Sec) (MB)
StopIO
I/O on interrupt pipe should be
105.8 81 98.2 72 Passed
stopped during powering down
ResetDevice
All I/O on all pipes should be
200.1 100 110.3 65 Failed
stopped before resetting
the device.
ResetPipe
Driver must stop the pipe before
54.2 51 31.6 40 Failed
resetting it.
DevIORead
A read request should fail if the
70.1 63 38.4 48 Passed
device is in an invalid state.
DevIOWrite
A write request should fail if the
68.5 63 34.7 48 Passed
device is in an invalid state.
is not reachable in the call graph of the instrumented program, verification stops
with a rule pass right after compilation; therefore, no model checking is necessary
for ResetPipe. Table 7.10 presents the statistics on co-verification of the Microsoft
USBSAMP driver implementation. We discovered two real bugs in this driver us-
ing CoVer. Other than ResetDevice, the SLIC rule ResetPipe is also violated
by USBSAMP driver, where the driver does not stop the I/O on a pipe before
resetting. Such bug may cause data loss in I/O operations. Note that verification
of the OSRUSBFX2 driver costs much more time and memory than that of the
USBSAMP driver, because OSRUSBFX2 implements iterations on operating mul-
tiple USB device pipes. These iterations need to be fully unrolled in verification.
Effectiveness of reduction. We have also compared the differences of co-
verification performance on whether our reduction algorithm is applied. It is clear
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that our reduction algorithm can significantly scale co-verification, especially when
the target system is complex. For example, when no reduction is applied, there is
only one non-useful result in Table 7.7, however half of the verification cannot com-
plete in Table 7.8. This is because the Ethernet controller device/driver have more
comprehensive functionalities and implementation than the PIO-24 device/driver.
7.2.2 LTL Checking
We designed a synthetic BPDS template BPDS<N> for N > 0 to evaluate our
algorithms. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, this template is similar to the BPDS
model in Figure 6.5. The major difference is between the models of P. BPDS<N>
has two function templates level<N> and gcd<N> for P, where each of the function
templates has N instances. For 0 < i ≤ N , level<i> calls gcd<i> which is the ith
instance of gcd<N> that computes the greatest common divisor (implementation
of gcd<N> is omitted). For 0 < j < N , the instance of <stmt> in the body of the
function level<j> is replaced by a call to level<j+1>. The instance of <stmt>
in the body of level<N> is replaced by skip. The design of BPDS<N> mimics
the common scenarios in co-verification: since hardware and software are mostly
asynchronous, there are many software statements independent with hardware
transitions.
Table 7.11 presents the statistics for the verification of five LTL formulae on
the BPDS models generated from BPDS<N>, where some of the LTL formulae are
discussed as the examples in Chapter 6.
Table 7.12 presents the statistics for the verification of BPDS models generated
from BPDS Slow<N>, a template that differs from BPDS<N> only in the hardware
model. BPDS Slow<N> uses the hardware model illustrated in Figure 6.6. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 6, verification of the properties A1 and A2 will fail on the BPDS
models generated from BPDS Slow<N>, since the hardware cannot guarantee an im-
mediate response to the software reset command. However, by assuming A2, the
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decl c0, c1, c2, r, s; // hardware registers
decl g; // software global variable
void main() begin
decl v0,v1,v2 := 1,1,1;
reset();
v1,v0 := status();
while(!v1|v0) do v1, v0 := status(); od
// call the first level
level<1>();
v2,v1,v0 := rd reg();
while(!v2) do v2,v1,v0 := rd reg(); od
if (v1|v0) then error: skip; fi
exit: return;
end
void level<i>()
begin
decl v0,v1,v2,v3,v4,v5;
v2,v1,v0 := rd reg();
v5,v4,v3 := rd reg();
v2,v1,v0 :=
gcd<i>(v5,v4,v3,v2,v1,v0);
if(*) then reset(); fi
if(g) then
g := (v3 != v0);
<stmt>;
fi
end
Figure 7.1: The BPDS template BPDS<N> for evaluation.
verification of A1 should pass. Obviously, the verification of this property, denoted
by ϕ (including both A1 and A2), costs more time and memory compared to other
properties, because ϕ is more complex than other properties.
We can infer from the two tables that our reduction algorithm is very effective
in reducing the verification cost. For example, without the reduction, verification
of the property ϕ gets a spaceout failure for N = 2000, i.e., CoVer fails to allocate
more memory from the Operating System. The statistics suggest that our reduc-
tion algorithm can reduce the verification cost by 80% in time usage and 35% in
memory usage on average.
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Table 7.11: Statistics on the LTL checking of BPDS<N>. (NoR.: No Reduction.
Red.: Reduction)
LTL Property
N
500 1000 2000
F exit
NoR. 177.9sec/49.1MB 606.8sec/98.1MB 1951.5sec/196.3MB
Red. 55.6sec/27.8MB 100.9sec/55.6MB 231.5sec/111.2MB
G( reset cmd → NoR. 100.8sec/51.1MB 439.0sec/102.1MB 1742.1sec/204.3MB
(F reset act) ) Red. 19.2sec/31.6MB 37.2sec/63.2MB 115.0sec/126.5MB
F level N
NoR. 165.3sec/49.1MB 524.1sec/98.1MB 1934.1sec/196.3MB
Red. 52.9sec/27.8MB 99.8sec/55.6MB 230.7sec/111.2MB
G !level N
NoR. 94.8sec/43.4MB 404.0sec/86.2MB 1728.9sec/172.5MB
Red. 10.7sec/25.0MB 22.3sec/49.9MB 84.5sec/99.9MB
G !error
NoR. 96.6sec/42.4MB 402.6sec/84.8MB 1719.9sec/169.8MB
Red. 10.1sec/24.8MB 21.2sec/49.2MB 81.5sec/98.5MB
7.3 SUMMARY
Summary of the bug discovery by co-verification. Consider the twelve bugs
discovered using co-verification in Windows driver implementations:
• All the bugs involve interactions between drivers and devices.
• One bug happens when a driver does not initialize its device correctly, i.e.,
a default device state is not considered during the initialization process.
• Three bugs happen when devices interrupt their drivers. It is a restricted
version of concurrency checking.
• Four bugs are due to the out-of-synchronization between drivers and devices.
For example, a driver issues a command while its device is busy.
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Table 7.12: Statistics on the LTL checking of BPDS Slow<N> which uses the hard-
ware model of Figure 6.6. (NoR.: No Reduction. Red.: Reduction)
LTL Property
N
500 1000 2000
A1:F exit
NoR. 186.5sec/49.1MB 576.4sec/98.1MB 1913.5sec/196.3MB
Red. 38.1sec/27.8MB 98.5sec/55.6MB 207.1sec/111.2MB
A2:G( reset cmd NoR. 143.1sec/61.0MB 587.1sec/122.0MB 1778.7sec/203.5MB
→ (F reset act) ) Red. 28.3sec/35.5MB 64.3sec/71.0MB 164.1sec/142.0MB
A1 using A2 as NoR. 1264.0sec/223.4MB 3750.3sec/446.7MB N/A/spaceout
the assumption Red. 255.8sec/109.5MB 565.6sec/218.9MB 1260.8sec/437.7MB
F level N
NoR. 181.9sec/49.1MB 588.6sec/98.1MB 1908.4sec/196.3MB
Red. 42.2sec/27.8MB 90.8sec/55.6MB 198.6sec/111.2MB
G !level N
NoR. 96.7sec/43.4MB 414.6sec/86.2MB 1679.7sec/172.5MB
Red. 12.1sec/25.0MB 26.9sec/49.9MB 91.5sec/99.9MB
G !error
NoR. 95.0sec/42.5MB 414.2sec/84.8MB 1672.6sec/169.8MB
Red. 11.5sec/24.8MB 25.3sec/49.2MB 88.9sec/98.5MB
• Four bugs happen when drivers mishandle their device failures. For example,
a driver returns SUCCESS when its device actually fails.
Summary of evaluation. We have five observations through evaluation:
• First, our co-specification approach is very effective in detecting the specifica-
tion issues of English documents. We have discovered fifteen specification
issues in four English documents, where some of the issues have existed for
many years.
• Second, the formal models developed in co-specification can precisely capture
the HW/SW interface behaviors regardless of the English documents’ quality.
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• Third, the correctness of the formal models can be easily analyzed by auto-
matic tools.
• Fourth, our co-verification algorithm is effective in discovering sophisticated
bugs of HW/SW interface implementations in driver programs. Utilizing
CoVer, we have discovered twelve real bugs in five Windows driver im-
plementations. All these bugs are previously unknown to driver developers,
even after comprehensive testing.
• Fifth, our reduction algorithm is efficient in alleviating the verification cost.
For both reachability analysis and LTL checking, the average reduction of
the verification cost is 70% in time usage and 30% in memory usage.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
8.1 CONCLUSION
HW/SW interfaces exist in all kinds of computer systems ranging from embedded
systems to personal computers. These systems are often expected to be reliable.
However, the intrinsic complexity in HW/SW interface designs have always been
a challenge to this goal. It is challenging to specify HW/SW interface protocols
in a manner that is clear and precise to both hardware and software engineers;
it is challenging to synthesize a unifying formal model for HW/SW interfaces,
since hardware and software have different implementation semantics; it is also
challenging to develop effective tools for HW/SW co-verification, where the design
features of HW/SW interfaces are well exploited.
Throughout this dissertation, we have demonstrated that co-verification of
HW/SW interface protocols can be effectively achieved via formal specification
and model checking.
Co-specification. It is possible to formally specify HW/SW interface protocols
in such a way that closely resembles the implementation semantics of hardware
and software. Our specification language, modelC, is designed based on the C
semantics with three restrictions to achieve finite state and two extensions to sup-
port non-determinism and relative atomicity. The hardware behaviors are specified
using TLM, a common approach in hardware specification. In order to specify a
hardware-side interface protocol in modelC, one should model the hardware states
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using global variables; and describe the hardware behaviors using hardware trans-
action functions. A hardware transaction function is an atomic C function that
describes the transition rule with respect to the state change of (hardware) global
variables. The concurrency in a hardware design is modeled via interleaved exe-
cutions of hardware transaction functions and non-deterministic choices made on
the control flow of each hardware transaction function. On the other hand, it is
straightforward to specify a software-side interface protocol using modelC. Dif-
ferent from hardware, software states are maintained by both (software) global
variables and local variables. In software specification, an atomic program state-
ment describes a set of software state transitions.
Except for the purpose of co-verification, formal models constructed by co-
specification can also be utilized in the development process of devices and drivers,
as the formal HW/SW interface specifications. Compared with English specifica-
tions, formal models are clear, precise, and easy for development engineers to
understand. Furthermore, formal models can serve as the basis of a uniform plat-
form for co-verification, co-simulation, conformance testing, etc. Section 8.2 will
discuss how to apply the formal models to co-simulation and conformance testing
respectively.
Co-specification is very effective to help identify specification issues of HW/SW
interface protocols. As discussed in Chapter 7, the formalization process of four
device/driver interface protocols has led to the detection of fifteen specification
issues, given the fact that some of the specifications have existed as the industry
standards for many years.
Co-verification model. BPDS is a suitable formal model for HW/SW interfaces.
A BPDS model is the Cartesian product of a BA and an LPDS, where BA is a
suitable representation for hardware which is finite state; and LPDS is a suitable
representation for software which is often infinite state. The input alphabets of BA
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and LPDS are induced on the states of each other, so that BA transitions and LPDS
rules can be combined into BPDS rules. BPDS has a synchronous execution mode,
i.e., both the BA and LPDS must transition at the same time in order to make one
BPDS transition. In synchronous execution mode, it is straightforward to model
the situation when hardware and software transition simultaneously. However,
they may also be interleaving, which is modeled by introducing self-loop transitions
to both BA and LPDS.
Co-verification algorithms. The verification problem of BPDS for either safety
properties or liveness properties is solvable in cubic time and space with respect
to the size of the BPDS model and the property to be checked. For reachability
analysis (i.e., safety properties only), BPDS is converted into PDS so that existing
model checkers for PDS can be readily utilized to solve the problem. For LTL
checking (including safety properties and liveness properties), an LTL property is
first negated and then represented as a BA. The BA is combined with BPDS in
such a way that the BA monitors the state transitions of the BPDS. The LTL
property fails if the BA has an accepting run on the BPDS; otherwise, the LTL
property passes.
The verification cost can be greatly alleviated via reducing the size of BPDS.
Since hardware and software are mostly asynchronous, their transition orders are
often unnecessary to be explored during verification. Therefore, many BPDS rules
can be pruned in the compilation phrase while constructing a BPDS from a BA
and an LPDS. Such reduction is very useful in practice, since it does not require
any modification to the model checker. Therefore, model checkers with industry
strength, such as SLAM, can be readily utilized. Interestingly, our reduction al-
gorithm is also useful as the formal foundation for those reductions applied with
runtime techniques. For example, the reduction method used in Device Driver
Tester (DDT) [46] is actually one kind of static partial order reduction for HW/SW
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interfaces. The motivation and correctness of such reduction have been thoroughly
discussed in this dissertation.
Our co-verification tool, CoVer, has been applied to five Windows drivers with
their Formal Device Models (FDMs). Some of the drivers are fully functional,
well tested, and used as sample drivers for many years. However, utilizing CoVer,
we have still discovered real bugs in each of the drivers and the total bug count
is twelve. All of these bugs, which could cause serious system failures including
data loss, interrupt storm, device hang, etc., were previously unknown to the
driver developers. Furthermore, evaluation suggests that the average reduction of
verification cost is 70% in time usage and 30% in memory usage.
8.2 FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation has presented a useful approach to improve the reliability of
HW/SW interface implementations; however, it is only the tip of the iceberg.
There are other interesting research that needs to be explored.
8.2.1 Co-verification of Liveness Properties on Driver Code
We demonstrate the verification of liveness properties on BPDS models specified
using Boolean programs. In practice, it is desired that co-verification of liveness
properties can be applied to driver implementations. For example, developers may
want to know whether their drivers may hang on device operations. Co-verification
of liveness properties on driver implementations can be realized based on liveness
verification engines for C programs, such as Terminator [24, 25].
As illustrated in Figure 8.1, given a liveness property, a driver implementation,
and a FDM, we can implement a co-verification frontend that converts the input
into a C program with some liveness constraints, where the idea of the conversion
is presented in Algorithm 5.8. Therefore, the verification problem can be solved
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Driver code Terminator
YES
NOFormal Device
Model (FDM)
Liveness
property
Co-verification
instrumentation
frontend
C program
with liveness
constraints
Figure 8.1: Co-verification of liveness properties on driver implementations.
by Terminator.
8.2.2 Co-simulation
Although we can discover sophisticated bugs using co-verification, co-simulation,
i.e., simulating a driver with its device model, is also highly desired in practice.
Simulation can help discover shallow bugs with a low cost and is often used to
evaluate the efficiency of implementations.
As illustrated in Figure 8.2, a FDM constructed by co-specification can also
be used in co-simulation, where the FDM interface is a thin layer that adapts
OS ecosystem
Driver
I/O
Lower level
driver statck Symbolic Execution
Environment (SEE)
Formal Device
Model (FDM)
FDM interface
SEE interface
. . .
.  .  .
.  .  .  .  .  .
Figure 8.2: Co-simulation using formal device model.
the interface of the FDM to simulation environment. One major challenge to
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co-simulation is how to support relative atomicity and non-determinism without
changing the FDM. We need to implement two modules: a Symbolic Execution
Environment (SEE) and a SEE interface.
Symbolic Execution Environment executes a FDM via the FDM interface.
Note that non-determinism can be easily supported by symbolic execution.
SEE interface has three functions:
• First, it intercepts the communications between the driver and its underline
stack in order to reroute the I/O to SEE.
• Second, it ensures the relative atomicity. For example, hardware transaction
functions should be atomic to each other; and some driver operations such
as kernel API calls should be atomic to hardware transaction functions.
• Third, it serves as the boundary between symbolic execution and concrete
execution, i.e., how a symbolic value can be passed to concrete system en-
vironment; and how a concrete system call can be translated into symbolic
values.
Although related work can be found in DDT [46] with a technique called selec-
tive symbolic execution [18], the challenges are still open on how to simulate a
comprehensive FDM (instead of a shallow symbolic device model used in DDT);
how to ensure that the interface states of the FDM are always consistent in the
view of the driver, which is not guaranteed by selective symbolic execution; and
how to optimize the simulation since symbolic execution also suffers from the state
explosion problem.
8.2.3 Co-monitoring
An approach to protocol conformance validation is monitoring, where the behav-
iors of a system is observed and compared to the golden model that describes
187
the protocol. With respect to HW/SW interfaces, the behaviors of a device and
its driver should be monitored together, i.e., co-monitoring. The formal model
developed in co-specification can be used as the golden model for co-monitoring.
Figure 8.3 illustrates the framework of co-monitoring, which is different from
co-simulation in four aspects:
OS ecosystem
Driver
I/O
Lower level
driver statck Symbolic Execution
Environment (SEE)
Formal Device
Model (FDM)
FDM interface
CoM interface
. . .
.  .  .
.  .  .  .  .  .
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) 
Software
Hardware
Device
. . .
Upper level device stack
Figure 8.3: Co-monitoring using formal device model.
• First, there is a real hardware device interacting with the driver.
• Second, it only monitors the communications between the driver and the
lower level driver stack; therefore, the communications should be affected as
little as possible.
• Third, it symbolically executes the FDM according to the monitored com-
munications, which makes the FDM a mirror of the device with respect to
their states.
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• Fourth, it raises an alarm when a protocol violation is detected.
One key part of co-monitoring is the CoM (Co-Monitoring) interface, which serves
three functions:
• First, it monitors the communications between the driver and its underline
stack in order to constrain the symbolic execution of the FDM.
• Second, it ensures the relative atomicity inside the FDM, i.e., hardware trans-
action functions should be atomic to each other.
• Third, it monitors the execution of the FDM and raises an alarm if the
FDM’s state indicates a protocol violation by either the driver or the device.
Essentially, co-monitoring does two things: deduces the device’s states based on
the monitored communications; and raises an alarm if a violation is detected by
analyzing the FDM’s states with the communications.
8.2.4 Formal-model-guided Automatic Test Case Generation
It is a common practice that a higher level design, a.k.a., a golden model, is
developed before a system is actually implemented. Such a golden model is very
useful to evaluate the correctness and efficiency of the design. After the system is
implemented, it is also desired that the golden model can be used to guide the test
case generation.
As illustrated in Figure 8.4, we can utilize a FDM as the golden model to
generated test cases for its hardware device. There are three steps for automatic
test case generation:
• First, it utilizes symbolic path exploring tools such as KLEE [17] to generate
path constraints for the FDM. Path constraints describe the condition that
must hold on execution of a path.
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Figure 8.4: Automatic test case generation based on formal device model.
• Second, it implements a path constraint solver, which, given a path con-
straint, generates concrete input to the FDM in order to execute the path.
It also implements a test code generator, which generates a test harness using
the concrete input.
• Third, it loads the test harness, as a driver of the device, into the driver
stack; therefore, automatic testing is conducted as if a driver operates its
device.
Following this approach, test cases can be generated automatically and the device
functionality can be covered by these test cases in a low cost, because the device
is logically similar to its FDM and the symbolic path explorer often can generate
path constraints in such a way that guarantees a high path coverage on the FDM.
This approach can also be combined with co-monitoring; therefore, any protocol
violation by the device can be automatically detected during testing.
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